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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three essays on the application of economics to various aspects
of crime and criminal activity. The research presented in this dissertation points out a cause and a
consequence of crime as well as the possible influence of a law on criminal activity. The first
chapter provides an introduction to the ways that economic reasoning can be used to analyze
criminal activity. The second chapter examines individuals‟ gun carrying activity in the presence
of concealed weapon laws. The results suggest that allowing law-abiding individuals to carry
concealed handguns is more likely to reduce crime than to increase it. Chapter 3 investigates the
effect of joblessness on criminal activity using an international panel data set. The results
indicate that increase in unemployment causes more property crimes. The fourth chapter presents
evidence for the existence of a negative externality of crime. Countries that have higher crime
rates suffer from the loss of international tourists and tourism revenue. Chapter 5 summarizes the
findings of the dissertation, provides concluding remarks, and discusses opportunities for future
research in the economics of crime.

viii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
According to the statistics presented in FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports, in 1960s, on
average twenty five in every one thousand U.S. residents were victims of a crime.1 About two of
those thirty five victims were victims of a violent crime (murder, rape, robbery or assault). Such
high crime rates terrorized the potential victims and bring about fear of crime. Motivated by the
high incidence of crime, economists have started investigating the topic. It became clear that
crime can be analyzed with the tools of economics with Becker (1968) who proposed the idea
that individuals respond to incentives when they decide about participating in criminal activity.
Becker (1968) suggested that individuals compare the possible costs and benefits of committing
a crime, and they (do not) engage in criminal activity if their expected benefits are (smaller)
greater than costs. As crime rates have gotten worse over time, economists have studied criminal
activity more extensively. The national violent crime rate increased from 363 per 100,000
individuals in 1970 to 429 per 100,000 individuals in 2009. Several authors have investigated
different aspects of criminal activity contributing to the economics of crime literature.
The three pieces of my research presented in three chapters of this dissertation contribute
to the economics of crime literature. Specifically, in the next chapter I investigate the contentious
issue of the impact of shall-issue laws on crime. Although previous research has investigated this
question extensively, there is no consensus on the impact of shall-issue laws on crime. A shallissue law allows law-abiding individuals to obtain a license to carry concealed handguns
provided that they satisfy some requirements indicated by the law. Previous researchers have
overlooked the fact that such a law may or may not influence crime depending on the type of the
individuals that respond to the shall-issue law by carrying handguns more frequently. For
example, if potential victims start carrying guns more frequently when a shall-issue law is
enacted, then they can better protect themselves and others. In this case, the shall-issue law can
have a crime-reducing effect. However, if potential criminals start carrying handguns more
frequently after a shall-issue law is enacted, then the shall-issue law may have a crimefacilitating effect. Recognizing the mechanisms through which the shall-issue laws may
influence crime, the study presented in the second chapter acknowledges the fact that shall-issue
laws cannot influence crime unless individuals start carrying guns more frequently as a response.
Consequently, the investigated research questions are twofold. First is whether individuals
respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more frequently. The second research question
involves whether potential victims or criminals respond to these laws. This approach is novel in
the literature.
The third chapter of this dissertation investigates the impact of unemployment on crime
using a country-level panel data set from Europe that contains consistently-measured crime
statistics. As indicated above, criminal activity is primarily motivated by net relative benefits to
illegal activities. One implication of this idea is that individuals with potentially better current
and future opportunities in the legal labor market are less likely to commit crime. One
determinant of these opportunities in the labor market is the unemployment rate, which fluctuates
over the business cycle. During a recession, when the unemployment rate goes up, employment
chances in the legal labor market diminish. During times of high unemployment, the relative
benefit of working in the legal labor market for an individual decreases on the margin, increasing
the crime rate in the country. Using data from one single country, several studies confirm that
1
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unemployment increases crime. However, in an international context, the impact of
unemployment on crime has not been studied extensively. Moreover, there are only a handful of
studies which investigate other aspects of crime using country-level data sets. The primary
reason for the paucity of research based on international data is the absence of comparable crime
statistics across countries. Legal practices, such as definitions and recording methods of crimes
differ across countries.
In the study presented in the third chapter, differences in legal practices such as the
differences in crime definitions across countries are accounted for. The employed crime data
have the advantage of having consistent measures of crime across countries as explained in more
detail below. Consequently, one of the contributions of this research is the introduction of a
panel data set that can be used to study crime in an international context. In addition, the third
chapter contributes to the economics of crime literature by being the first to investigate the
impact of unemployment on crime by employing a uniformly collected international data set
from European countries. Further, recognizing the fact that the unemployment rate may be
endogenous, the third chapter uses IV models which employ novel instruments. Specifically, the
exchange rate movements, industrial accidents and earthquakes are used as instruments for the
unemployment rate.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation provides evidence for the existence of one of the
several possible negative externalities associated with crime. Specifically, using the international
crime data set that has been introduced in the third chapter, the fourth chapter demonstrates that
the countries that have higher crime rates suffer from greater losses of international tourism
revenue and number of international tourists. This finding suggests that international tourists
consider the risk of victimization when choosing a location to visit. Violent crimes (murder,
rape, robbery, and assault), but not property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft),
are negatively associated with incoming international tourists and international tourism revenue.
The influence of crime on tourism activity is smaller in magnitude in Southern European
countries with a coastline which are generally more attractive tourist destinations in terms of sea
tourism, suggesting that victimization risk and attractiveness of the destination may be
substitutable traits.
The fifth chapter provides a summary of the research presented in this dissertation and
concludes.
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CHAPTER 2. SHALL-ISSUE LAWS AND CARRYING HANDGUNS
2.1 Introduction
A shall-issue law allows any individual, who meets state-specified requirements, to
obtain a license to carry concealed handguns.2 Previous research has identified two main effects
of shall-issue laws on crime. The crime-reducing effect predicts that shall-issue laws will
increase a potential criminal‟s cost of committing a crime. For example, potential victims in
states with shall-issue laws (shall-issue states) are more likely to carry concealed weapons. As a
result, they can more easily protect themselves against offenders compared to the potential
victims in states without shall-issue laws (non-shall-issue states).3 Because potential criminals
cannot observe who is carrying a gun, they cannot be sure if their potential victims will fight
back with force. Consequently, a potential criminal‟s cost of committing a crime increases due to
greater possibility of armed resistance.
Some studies have found evidence that shall-issue laws can increase crime because of the
crime-facilitating effect. Numerous mechanisms can generate the crime-facilitating effect. A
shall-issue law may increase the availability of guns to criminals if, for example, a gun in good
hands is transferred to a criminal through theft. It could also be the case that a potential victim
may “convert” into a criminal because carrying a gun reduces the cost of committing a crime. In
addition, potential criminals who observe that potential victims carry guns more frequently may
start carrying guns more often. Consequently, if the victim retaliates, the probability of a fatal
injury increases. This leads to an increase in the number of more-violent crimes (Levitt and
Donohue, 1998).
As both the crime-reducing and crime-facilitating effects of shall-issue laws are plausible,
it is an empirical issue to estimate the net effect of shall-issue laws on crime. Despite the
investigation this effect by numerous studies, no consensus has emerged on the issue. For
example, Lott and Mustard (1997), Lott (1998a, 1998b), Polsby (1995), Olson and Malt (2001),
Moody and Marvell (2009) and Moody (2001) have argued that the enactment of shall-issue laws
decreases crime. Conversely, several other researchers, such as Black and Nagin (1998), Ludwig
(1998), Rubin and Dezhbakhsh (2003) and Ayres and Donohue (2003, 2009) suggest that shallissue laws do not reduce crime, and that they actually increase crime. Differences in the
estimated net effect of shall-issue laws on crime are shown to depend on the researchers‟ choices
of econometric method, model specification and the particular data set employed.
These studies have not investigated the presumed mechanisms underlying the net effect
of shall-issue laws on crime, which is vital to proving causality. If the conditions necessary for
the crime-reducing and crime facilitating effects are not satisfied, then the existence of these
2

These criteria include satisfying the minimum age requirement, having no arrest record, no history of alcohol
addiction or drug abuse as well as no signs of mental incapacitation.
3
Some states employ may-issue laws (may-issue states), which grant concealed weapon licenses only at the
discretion of the license-issuing authority to individuals who satisfy the criteria mentioned. Vermont has no
restrictions on gun carrying. Illinois and Wisconsin are referred to as no-issue states as they prohibit concealed
carrying. Those states which have shall-issue laws or no restrictions for carrying a handgun will be referred to as
Shall-Issue States. The remaining states (states which have may-issue laws in effect and no-issue states) will be
referred to as Non-Shall-Issue States. The Appendix lists state-specific information pertaining to shall-issue status of
the states, time of the enactment of their concealed weapon laws (if one is ever enacted), the laws or statues of the
states which form the basis of their shall-issue statuses and the minimum age requirements.
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effects is questionable. For example, if individuals do not respond to shall-issue laws by carrying
guns in the first place, neither the crime-facilitating nor crime-reducing effects can be observed.
To make the point using a different domain, as an example, consider the case of highway
speed limits. The research question is whether an increase in speed limits increases traffic
fatalities. Here, the first-order question is whether an increase in speed limits induces people to
drive faster. If the answer is affirmative, then the second order question is whether driving faster
leads to more traffic fatalities. The number of fatalities may go up or down depending on the
number of individuals who start driving more carefully to protect themselves when they observe
others who drive fast. However, if initially no driver changes his/her driving speed, no change in
the number of accidents is expected. In other words, if the first-order effect does not take place,
the second-order effect will not be observed and therefore the net effect of the law should be
zero.
Similarly, shall-issue laws intend to change the gun carrying behavior of individuals.
Consequently, the first-order question is whether shall-issue laws increase the number of
individuals who carry handguns. If individuals do not change their behavior, then neither the
crime-facilitating effect nor the crime-reducing effect can exist. Acknowledging this possibility,
this study investigates whether individuals respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns
more frequently in the first place.
Unlike the previous research that employed county or state-level data sets, I use an
individual-level panel data set obtained from NLSY97, which consists of young individuals who
are observed annually between 1997 and 2007. Using NLSY97 allows me to investigate the firstorder question of whether individuals respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more
frequently. I begin with an analysis of whether a law abiding individual‟s probability of carrying
a gun increases when he/she becomes eligible to carry a handgun because of shall-issue laws.
Secondly, I investigate whether a potential criminal‟s tendency to carry a gun changes as a
consequence of shall-issue laws. If potential criminals become more likely to carry guns in the
presence of shall-issue laws, then a crime-facilitating impact of shall-issue laws is possible.
Recognizing that individuals are likely to be different based on the severity of crimes they
commit (serious crimes such as murder, rape and robbery versus misdemeanors such as drug
possession, public order and traffic offenses), I further analyze whether potential criminals who
are likely to commit serious crimes and misdemeanors respond to shall-issue laws differently in
terms of carrying a gun. Finally, using a state-level data set, I investigate whether shall-issue
laws are associated with increases in the number of stolen guns, because gun theft is one of the
main mechanisms through which potential criminals have access to guns.
Estimation of the influence of becoming eligible to carry concealed weapons on
individuals‟ probability of carrying handguns is not straightforward. It is plagued with empirical
difficulties due to individuals‟ unobservable characteristics. Specifically, individuals who have
greater criminal human capital are more likely to have an arrest record and therefore be ineligible
to legally carry a concealed weapon. At the same time they have a greater tendency to carry a
gun. As a result, the unobservable individual characteristics may drive both being eligible and
the tendency to carry a handgun. This leads to biased estimates.
To overcome this hurdle, I separate the estimation samples based on individuals‟ arrest
records similar to Grogger (1995). Individuals with an arrest record as of the last wave of
NLSY97 (in 2007 when they are 25 years old on average) are considered to have a greater level
of criminal human capital. The remaining individuals who have never been arrested have a
smaller level of criminal human capital. Conducting the estimation separately on these groups
4

reduces bias due to unobserved characteristics of individuals. This is because, the unobservable
characteristics will have similar influences on individuals‟ gun carrying probability within these
groups. Therefore, this strategy will yield a comparison of eligible and ineligible individuals‟
gun carrying probabilities which are similarly influenced by their unobservable characteristics.
As a further classification, individuals who have an arrest record are categorized
according to the severity of the crimes they commit. This categorization generates more
homogenous estimation samples. Individuals who have committed serious crimes (FBI‟s Index I
crimes) are considered to have greater level of criminal human capital than those who commit
minor crimes (misdemeanors). Later in the paper, I investigate whether individuals who commit
serious and minor crimes are different from those who do not commit any crimes in terms of
their observable outcomes. The observable outcomes considered include education level, labor
market experiences, family characteristics, marriage choices and mental health.
As explained in more detail below, the findings in this paper provide evidence for the
possible existence of only the crime-reducing effect of shall-issue laws. Specifically, the findings
indicate that the presence of a shall-issue law increases the probability of carrying a handgun for
an individual who is unlikely to commit serious crimes such as manslaughter, rape and robbery.
Conversely, the probability of carrying a handgun for an individual who is likely to commit
serious crimes does not change because of shall-issue laws. Lastly, the findings obtained from a
state panel data set reveal that gun thefts are not related to shall-issue laws. Taken together, these
results imply that some of the conditions for the crime-facilitating effect of shall-issue laws are
not satisfied. Therefore, the existence of a crime-facilitating effect is questionable.
2.2 Individual-Level Data
The main data set used for the individual-level analysis is obtained from National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort (NLSY97). The NLSY97 consists of a nationally
representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who were 12 to 16 years old as of
December 31, 1996. The first round of the survey took place in 1997, with annual interviews
until 2007 (the last year used in this analysis). As of the last wave, the oldest individual is 27
years old and the average age is 25. The survey contains detailed information on a variety of
topics including an individual‟s criminal activity and gun carrying behavior.
The key outcome variable in this paper is constructed based on individual responses to
the yes/no question “Have you carried a handgun since the last interview? When we say
handgun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The indicator variable Gun takes
the value of one if the individual has reported that he/she has carried a handgun. This question is
appropriate in the context of studying the impact of shall-issue laws, since these laws only
involve handguns that can be carried in a concealed fashion.4 As presented in Table 2.1, five
percent of the sample reports having carried a gun.
In each wave of the survey the respondents are asked whether they have been arrested
since the date of the last interview.5 If an individual has been arrested, they are asked to provide
additional information about the offense they were arrested for. An individual can report having
been charged with 11 possible offenses.6 A dichotomous variable is created for each of these
4

Shot guns and rifles are too large to be carried in a concealed fashion.
In the first wave, the respondents are asked whether they have ever been arrested.
6
These categories are limited by the questions posed to the respondents.
5
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offenses to indicate whether an individual has been arrested for the specified crime. Violence
covers all assaults such as such as battery, rape, aggravated assault, and manslaughter. Robbery
is defined as taking something from someone using a weapon or by force. Stealing without force
(auto thefts, larcenies, or shop-lifting) is categorized as Theft. Any offense which involves
breaking into private property, without permission, in an attempt to steal is counted as a
Burglary. Destruction of Property covers offenses such as vandalism, arson and malicious
destruction. Offenses of fencing (knowingly buying stolen property for later re-sale), receiving,
possessing or selling stolen property are considered Other Property Offenses. Possession or use
of illicit drugs and sale or trafficking of illicit drugs are included in Drug Possession and Drug
Sale, respectively. Major Traffic Offenses are those such as driving under the influence, reckless
driving, or driving without a license. Public Order Offenses include drinking or purchasing
alcohol under age, disorderly conduct and sex offenses. The remaining offenses are grouped into
Other Offenses. Consistent with the national distribution of crimes, a quick glance at Table 2.1
reveals that individuals in the sample are associated with committing more misdemeanors such
as drug possession, public order and major traffic offenses compared to felonies.
The variables of interest in this study are Law, Adult and Ever Arrested. Law is an
indicator for a shall-issue state in a given year. It is obtained from Ayres and Donohue (2009)
and merged with the individual-level data set.7 More than half of the observations are in shallissue states (59 percent). Adult denotes whether an individual is at least as old as the minimum
required age in their state of residence. The minimum required age ranges between 18 and 23.8
The ages of the individuals in the sample range between 12 and 18 in the first wave of the survey
and 22 and 27 in the last wave. Overall, in 45 percent of the observations, individuals satisfy the
minimum age requirements of the states where they reside. Finally, Ever Arrested is an indicator
for whether an individual has ever been arrested as of the interview date.
The estimation strategy employed in the paper groups individuals according to their arrest
records as of the last available survey date (2007 wave).9 Law Abiding Individuals are defined as
those who have never been arrested as of the last available interview date. Arrestees, on the other
hand, have an arrest record as of the last available interview date and make up about 30 percent
of the whole sample.10 Arrestees are further categorized according to the severity of the crimes
they have committed: those who have an arrest record for at least one of the offenses listed as
Index-I crimes by FBI (Murder, Rape, Robbery, Assault, Burglary, Larceny, Motor Vehicle
Theft and Arson) are classified as Serious Crime Arrestees. The individuals who have committed
less severe crimes such as misdemeanors (public order offenses, major traffic offenses, drug
possession and sale and so on) are grouped into Minor Crime Arrestees. The majority of the
sample of Arrestees is composed of Minor Crime Arrestees (60 percent). Those Arrestees who
have committed both serious and minor crimes are included in Serious Crime Arrestees group.
7

http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/66/. Ayres and Donohue (2009) treat may-issue states which are de facto
shall-issue state as a shall-issue state. Alabama is one example. Further, Vermont has no restrictions on carrying
guns. Consequently, it is considered a shall-issue state.
8
The states that do not have a shall-issue or may-issue law have not defined a minimum required age. In such cases,
the minimum required age for other gun laws such as those regulate owning and purchasing guns are employed in
the empirical analysis. The details are provided in the Appendix.
9
The last available interview is used for those individuals whose information was missing in the 2007 wave (due to
non-participation).
10
This is consistent with Grogger (1998) who reports that one-fourth of the sample he obtained from NLSY 79
Cohort report having committed a property crime. In the same paper, it is argued that about a third of the individuals
in California and Philadelphia have been arrested at least once before their thirties.
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Table 2.1 Means of the Variables Employed in Individual-Level Analysis
Whole
Sample
N=84,932

Law-Abiding
Individualsa
N=58,010

Arresteesb
N=26,922

Serious Crime
Arresteesc
N=10,701

Minor Crime
Arresteesd
N=16,221

Dependent Variables
Gun
Violence
Robbery
Burglary
Theft
Destruction of Property
Other Property Offenses
Drug Possession
Drug Sale
Major Traffic Offenses
Public Order Offenses
Other Offenses

0.047
0.008
0.003
0.004
0.007
0.005
0.003
0.010
0.003
0.009
0.008
0.012

0.030

0.086
0.024
0.011
0.012
0.021
0.014
0.008
0.032
0.011
0.030
0.024
0.037

0.107
0.060
0.027
0.030
0.052
0.036
0.017
0.044
0.017
0.035
0.030
0.051

0.072

Variables of Interest
Law
Adult
Ever Arrested

0.590
0.455
0.222

0.577
0.451

0.618
0.465
0.700

0.603
0.462
0.793

0.628
0.466
0.638

Individual-Level Control Variables
Age
19.624
Female
0.496
Black
0.264
Hispanic
0.210
Mixed
0.010
Can‟t Marry
0.201
Cohabiting
0.099
Married
0.088
Separated
0.008
Marital Status Missing
0.004
School Enrollment
0.524
School Enrollment Missing
0.001
Highest Grade Comp.
11.204
HGC Missing
0.009
Household Size
3.846
Household Income
33673
Household Size Missing
0.000
Household Income Missing
0.368
Heavy Drinking
1.292

19.593
0.580
0.247
0.212
0.009
0.204
0.085
0.096
0.007
0.004
0.575
0.001
11.551
0.007
3.856
35681
0.000
0.372
0.936

19.693
0.314
0.300
0.205
0.011
0.196
0.129
0.072
0.012
0.004
0.414
0.002
10.457
0.013
3.824
29345
0.000
0.359
2.061

19.675
0.273
0.334
0.200
0.009
0.197
0.133
0.078
0.014
0.005
0.370
0.001
10.047
0.016
3.833
26399
0.000
0.347
2.031

19.704
0.342
0.278
0.209
0.013
0.195
0.126
0.068
0.010
0.004
0.443
0.002
10.727
0.010
3.818
31288
0.000
0.367
2.081

Heavy Drinking Missing

0.008

0.014

0.014

0.015

0.010
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0.002
0.024
0.007
0.026
0.021
0.028

Table 2.1 continued

Marijuana
Marijuana Missing
Burglarized
Burglarized Missing
Bullied
Bullied Missing
Saw Someone Shot
Saw Someone Shot Missing
State-Level Control Variables
Crime Ratee
Unemployment Rate
Victimization Probability
Hunters‟ Share in State Pop.

Whole
Sample
N=84,932
1.794
0.002
0.152
0.017
0.194
0.016
0.110
0.016

Law-Abiding
Individualsa
N=58,010
0.939
0.001
0.136
0.009
0.172
0.007
0.077
0.007

Arresteesb
N=26,922
3.639
0.004
0.187
0.036
0.242
0.035
0.180
0.035

Serious Crime
Arresteesc
N=10,701
3.944
0.004
0.196
0.047
0.249
0.047
0.216
0.046

Minor Crime
Arresteesd
N=16,221
3.437
0.004
0.181
0.029
0.238
0.027
0.157
0.027

4,164
4.960
20.092
0.157

4,151
4.970
18.376
0.140

4,193
4.938
23.791
0.192

4,167
4.947
24.687
0.195

4,209
4.932
23.199
0.190

Notes to Table 2.1:
a
Law Abiding Individuals do not have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97 when the average age is 25.
b
Arrestees have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97 when the average age is 25. Arrestees sample is
composed of Minor Crime Arrestees and Serious Crime Arrestees.
c
Serious Crime Arrestees, as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97, have committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of
FBI (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft).
d
Minor Crime Arrestees, as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97, have committed at least one misdemeanor but none of
the Index-I crimes of FBI.
e
Total number of Index-I crimes per 100,000 individuals.

The individual-level control variables include the Age of the individual, indicators for
individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black
[omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and Separated)
and School Enrollment status.11,12 Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size,
Household Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last
month the individual has drunk 5 or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the
last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized)
or bullying before the age of 12 (Bullied) and whether the individual witnessed someone getting
shot before the age of 12 (Saw Someone Shot). The means of these variables are presented in
Table 2.1.

11

Those individuals who are younger than 16 years old are not asked the marital status questions. They are
identified with the indicator Can’t Marry. The reason for that is the fact that such individuals live with their parents
and they have not satisfied the minimum age requirement to get married.
12
While creating the race-ethnicity categories, ethnicity is given priority. That is, all individuals who are of Hispanic
or Latino ethnicity are classified into Hispanic category regardless of their races. Consequently, the remaining race
categories include individuals who are non-Hispanic. The possible race categories the respondents could choose
from include White; Black or African-American; American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut; and Asian or Pacific Islander.
Mixed race category includes individuals who identified themselves with more than one race.
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The empirical analyses also control for state-specific characteristics. Particularly, the
Crime Rate, Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability
and the Hunters’ Share in the State’s Population are state-level control variables. The Crime
Rate is obtained from the FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports and is defined as the total number of
felony crimes committed in individual‟s state of residence. The Unemployment Rate is the ratio
of the number of unemployed people to the number of people in the labor force aged 16 and
over. It is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The race and gender specific Homicide
Victimization Probability is the share of homicide victims in the race and gender group that the
individual belongs to in the total number of homicide victims in the individual‟s state of
residence. It is obtained from the FBI‟s Supplemental Homicide Reports, and is an average of the
period between 1997 and 2005. This construction results in a Homicide Victimization Probability
which is time invariant, but there is variation among the states and race-gender groups within
states. Hunter’s Share in the State’s Population is the share of individuals who have reported that
they have gone hunting at least once in their lives. This variable is the average of 1996, 2001 and
2006. It is obtained from the 1996, 2001 and 2006 waves of the National Survey of Fishing,
Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation conducted by the Census Bureau.13 The means of
the state-level variables are also presented in Table 2.1.
As demonstrated in column II of Table 2.1, Law Abiding Individuals (who are never
arrested) are mostly married females with slightly higher education levels compared to the
Arrestees (who have at least one arrest record as of the last interview). Law-Abiding Individuals‟
household incomes are greater and their alcohol and marijuana consumption levels are less
frequent than Arrestees. Further, Law Abiding Individuals are less likely to be victimized.
Within the group of Arrestees, Minor Crime Arrestees possess fewer unfavorable characteristics
than the Serious Crime Arrestees. Minor Crime Arrestees and Law-Abiding Individuals have
common characteristics.
Table 2.2 provides the means of the variables employed in the empirical analyses sorted
by whether the individual has carried a gun since the last interview. The individuals who have
carried guns committed more crimes (both misdemeanors and felonies) than those who have not.
Mostly married males with fewer years of schooling have carried guns. They reported consuming
more than five alcoholic beverages in a row and using marijuana more frequently in the last
month than did their counterparts who have not carried guns. The individuals who have carried
guns are more likely to have been a victim of burglary or bullying and more likely to have
witnessed someone getting shot in their childhood. They also belong to age-race categories
which are at greater risk for homicide in their states. Carrying a gun is more common for those
individuals who live in states in which the share of hunters in state‟s population is greater.
Some of the previous studies, such as Glaeser and Glendon (1998) and Cook and Ludwig (1997),
have investigated the determinants of gun ownership and gun carrying descriptively. The data
employed in this paper provide a similar descriptive picture of gun carrying. For example, Cook
and Ludwig (1997) argued that 14 million adults have carried firearms at least once in the last

13

http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/fishing.html
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year. 14 million individuals made up about 7 percent of the adult population in 1994.14 This is
consistent with the fact that five percent of the NLSY97 sample reported carrying a gun. 15
Ownership of guns does not necessarily mean carrying guns, but owning and carrying a
gun are highly correlated. In fact, Cook and Ludwig (1997) argued that one third of the
individuals who own a gun also reported carrying a gun at least once in the previous year.
Glaeser and Glendon (1998) provide a list of determinants of owning a gun. As a result of the
high correlation of owning and carrying, Glaeser and Glendon (1998)‟s findings may help check
the validity of the data set used in this study. Glaeser and Glendon (1998) employed the 19721994 waves of General Social Survey in their study. The summary statistics mentioned above
and presented in the Table 2.2 of this paper are consistent with Glaeser and Glendon (1998). For
example, Glaeser and Glendon (1998) reports that gun owners are less educated, married and
older males who are likely to live in the South. These characteristics are similar to the
individuals who have carried a gun in my sample. However, their report that higher probabilities
of victimization and arrest are associated with smaller tendencies to own a gun contradicts the
descriptive statistics reported in this paper obtained from NLSY97. Specifically, in my sample,
individuals who have carried guns are more likely to have been victims of burglary, bullying, or
to have witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12.
2.3 Individual-Level Analysis
I propose that an individual‟s probability to carry a handgun is determined by his/her
eligibility to obtain concealed weapons licenses, personal characteristics and demand for
protection as well as the conditions in the area that he/she lives. According to criteria set by the
shall-issue laws, in order to be eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license, an applicant must
satisfy various requirements which are discussed below. I use the findings of Cook and Ludwig
(1997) and Glaeser and Glendon (1998) to identify the individual determinants of gun carrying
activity. Findings of Cook and Ludwig (1997) and Glaeser and Glendon (1998) suggest that
individual‟s age, gender, education level, income and marital status are correlated with his/her
probability of carrying a gun. Further, an individual is more likely to carry a gun to protect
himself/herself, if his/her probability of being victimized is greater. Lastly, the economic
conditions, criminal activity and gun carrying culture in his/her state further influence his/her
tendency to carry a gun.

14

Cook and Ludwig (1997) employed the National Survey of Private Ownership and Use of Firearms in their
analysis. That survey was conducted in 1994. National adult population (18 and over) in 1994 was about 190
million. Source: Census Bureau.
15
This difference between Cook and Ludwig (1997)‟s 7% and NLSY‟s 5% may be due to the differences in the
samples employed. Cook and Ludwig (1997)‟s sample is older and wealthier than the sample of NLSY97.
Individuals‟ ages and their income may be significant determinants of carrying and owning guns. For example, a
wealthier individual is more likely to demand greater protection than a poorer individual does. Similarly, an older
individual is weaker than a younger individual in terms of resistance to offenders. As a consequence, an older
individual may demand carry guns more than a younger individual does. Further, the 14 million (7%), reported by
Cook and Ludwig (1997), is the share of individuals who is estimated to be carrying firearms, whereas 5% reported
in this paper is the share of individuals who carry handguns.
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Table 2.2 Means of the Individual-Level Variables Conditional on Carrying a Gun
Have Carried a Guna Have Not Carried a Gun
N=4,031
N=80,901
Variables of Interest
Law
0.661
0.586
Adult
0.436
0.456
Ever Arrested
0.416
0.212
Crimes Committed
Violence
Robbery
Burglary
Theft
Destruction of Property
Other Property Offenses
Drug Possession
Drug Sale
Major Traffic Offenses
Public Order Offenses
Other Offenses

0.044
0.030
0.027
0.037
0.032
0.022
0.048
0.024
0.037
0.026
0.052

0.006
0.002
0.003
0.005
0.003
0.002
0.008
0.002
0.008
0.007
0.010

Personal Characteristics
Age
Female
Black
Hispanic
Mixed
Can‟t Marry
Cohabiting
Married
Separated
Marital Status Missing
School Enrollment
School Enrollment Missing
Highest Grade Completed
HGC Missing
Household Size
Household Income
Household Size Missing
Household Income Missing
Heavy Drinking
Heavy Drinking Missing
Marijuana

19.380
0.147
0.268
0.210
0.007
0.223
0.097
0.105
0.012
0.005
0.442
0.003
10.607
0.010
3.812
34,415
0.000
0.362
2.815
0.015
4.572

19.637
0.514
0.264
0.210
0.010
0.200
0.099
0.088
0.008
0.004
0.528
0.001
11.234
0.009
3.848
33,636
0.000
0.368
1.217
0.010
1.656
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Table 2.2 Continued
Marijuana Missing
Burglarized
Bullied
Saw Someone Shot
Burglarized Missing
Bullied Missing
Saw Someone Shot Missing

Have Carried a Guna
N=4,031
0.003
0.189
0.242
0.215
0.025
0.024
0.024

Have Not Carried a Gun
N=80,901
0.002
0.151
0.192
0.105
0.017
0.016
0.016

State Characteristics
Crime Rateb
Unemployment Rate
Victimization Probability
Hunters‟ Share in State Pop.

4,286
4.913
27.271
0.251

4,158
4.963
19.734
0.152

Notes to Table 2.2:
a
Reported having carried a handgun since the date of last interview. The original question that this variable is built
on is “Have you carried a hand gun since the last interview? When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other
than a rifle or shotgun.”
b
Total number of Index-I crimes per 100,000 individuals.

Along these lines, the equation depicted below is employed in the empirical analysis:
(2.1)

Gun*ist = B1Lawst + B2Adultist + B3Ever Arrestedist + B12LawstAdultist + B13Lawst Ever
Arrestedist + B23AdultistEver Arrestedist + B123LawstAdultistEver Arrestedist + B4Xist + vist

where Gun*ist measures propensity to carry a gun of individual i who lives in state s in period t.
An individual‟s propensity to carry a gun is unobservable, but an indicator variable, Gunist, for
carrying a gun, is equal to one when Gun*ist > 0.16 If the error term vist is normally distributed,
then the result is a single-equation probit specification.
Lawst is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the state where the individual
resides is a shall-issue state in period t.17 Adultist indicates whether the individual i is old enough
to satisfy the minimum age requirement to obtain a concealed weapon license in state s in year t.
The minimum required age varies between 18 and 23 across states.18 Ever Arrestedist is an
indicator variable for whether the individual i has ever been arrested as of the interview date at
year t. The vector Xist includes both individual-level control variables (age, gender,
race/ethnicity, marital status, education, household income and size, alcohol and marijuana
consumption, whether the individual was victimized by burglary or bullying before the age of 12
and whether the individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12) and state-level
16

The Gun variable is constructed based on the answers of the individuals to the following question: “Have you
carried a hand gun since the last interview? When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or
shotgun.”
17
States‟ Concealed Weapon Law statuses are obtained from Ayres and Donohue (2009). The details are discussed
in the Individual-Level Data and the Appendix.
18
See the Individual-Level Data and Appendix for further details.
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control variables (Crime Rate, Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide
Victimization Probability and the Hunters‟ Share in the State‟s Population). The descriptions of
these variables are discussed in the Individual-Level Data section.
An individual is eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license only if he/she (a) lives in a
shall-issue state, (b) meets the minimum age requirement and (c) has no arrest record, history of
alcoholism, drug addiction or mental incapacity.19 In equation (2.1) all of these criteria are taken
into consideration. Individual‟s alcohol consumption and drug use (proxied by marijuana use)
are also included as control variables.
Estimation of equation (2.1) allows for a test for whether an individual becomes more
likely to carry a handgun when he/she becomes eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license.
The gun carrying probability of an individual is expected to go up in the presence of a shall-issue
law. This is because, a shall-issue law in effect is the first condition for being eligible, and it
reduces the cost of carrying a gun. However, a shall-issue law may also increase the probability
of carrying a gun even if an individual is not eligible.20 That is, ineligible individuals who are
minors (those who have not completed minimum required age) or those who have criminal
records may have greater access to handguns when a shall-issue law is enacted. The specification
above is flexible enough to allow for a test of these hypotheses. Inclusion of two-way and threeway interactions of Lawst, Adultist and Ever Arrestedist allows eligible and ineligible individuals
to have different gun carrying behaviors.
Estimation of equation (2.1) may suffer from a potential endogeneity problem due to
inclusion of the Ever Arrested variable.21 Because individuals with greater criminal human
capital are more likely to have arrest records, they are less likely to be eligible. At the same time,
individuals with high criminal human capital are more likely to carry a gun. Since criminal
human capital is not observable, and it is likely to drive both individual‟s tendency to carry a gun
and his/her eligibility status (through arrests), the estimation will be biased.
To overcome this hurdle, I employ the identification strategy of Grogger (1995) who
investigated the influence of arrests on wages. Since having an arrest record is not random and it
is determined simultaneously with wages, Grogger (1995) was confronted with an endogeneity
problem similar to the one in the context of gun carrying and being ineligible.
The solution proposed by Grogger (1995) was to estimate a wage regression for a sample
composed of individuals who were arrested at least once in the sample period. The individuals in
that sample have similar unobservable characteristics, i.e. criminal human capital. Consequently,
even if the omitted individual characteristics drive wages and arrests, their influence is similar
19

The minimum age requirement is defined by the concealed weapon law of the state. Therefore, shall-issue states
and may-issue states (which are included in non-shall-issue states) have defined a minimum age requirement.
However, in no-restriction states (Vermont) and no-issue states (Illinois and Wisconsin) there are no concealed
weapon laws by definition. I assign the minimum age requirements for owning a gun to the minimum age
requirements of the states which do not have a concealed weapon law. The details are in the Appendix.
20
Pointed out by, for example, Ayres and Donohue (2009), Black and Nagin (1998) and Rubin and Dezhbakhsh
(2003).
21
The variable Law may also be endogenous. It is possible for an individual who wants to carry a weapon to move
to a shall-issue state and start carrying a gun there. However, this is unlikely in this data set. A total of 3,851
observations (4.5 percent of the whole sample) have indicated a change in the state of residence during the survey
years. Most of these moves are due to finding a job in another state and going to college in another state. Among
those observations, in 131 cases individuals reported not carrying a gun before the move and started carrying after
the move. Among these 131 cases only a total of 34 involve a move from a non-shall-issue state to a shall-issue
state. Removing such individuals from estimation samples does not change any of the results throughout the paper.
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for all individuals in the sample. Therefore, the influence of unobservable characteristics is
eliminated when outcomes of two individuals in that sample are compared. Furthermore, because
of the variation in the timing of first arrest, Grogger (1995) is able to identify the effect of arrests
on wages. The wages of the individuals who do not have an arrest record but who will be
arrested in future are not affected by their arrests. On the other hand, the wages of individuals
who already have an arrest record at the time of the observation are influenced by their arrest
records. In other words, individuals who do not have an arrest record but will be arrested
eventually constitute the counter-factual for those who have been arrested previously.
Following Grogger (1995), I estimate equation (2.1) on separate samples which consist of
individuals that should be similar in terms of their unobserved criminal human capital. One
sample includes only those individuals who have never been arrested up to the last survey
(2007). The other sample is composed of only the individuals who have been arrested at least
once as of the last survey date. The influence of the unobservable factors on the probability of
carrying a gun and on being eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license is similar for the
individuals within these groups. Consequently, the estimation of the impact of eligibility on gun
carrying tendency of individuals is less likely to suffer from the endogeneity problem mentioned
above. Moreover, there is still variation in individuals‟ eligibility status which allows for
identification of the influence of becoming eligible on the probability of carrying a gun. There
are various sources of the variation in eligibility. These sources include becoming eligible by
enactment of a shall-issue law or aging to satisfy the minimum age requirement, and getting
arrested, which makes an individual ineligible.
2.3.1 Individuals Who Have Never Been Arrested
Individuals who do not have an arrest record as of the last interview date are referred to
as “Law Abiding Individuals.” When equation (2.1) is estimated for Law Abiding Individuals,
the variable Ever Arrested and its interactions with Law and Adult are dropped since there is no
variation in Ever Arrested for this sample. Consequently, the experiment in this section involves
comparing the gun carrying probabilities of two observationally identical individuals except for
their eligibility in terms of obtaining a concealed weapon license, who have never been arrested
as of the last survey date (in 2007 when they are 25 years old on average).
A Law Abiding Individual can become eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license
through two ways: (a) enactment of a shall-issue law given he/she has satisfied the minimum age
requirement and (b) satisfying the minimum age requirement given he/she lives in a shall-issue
state. The model specified by equation (2.1) allows for identification of both influences on a
Law-Abiding Individual‟s probability of carrying a gun. There is variation in both aspects of
becoming eligible in the sample. Some states have changed their shall-issue statuses in the
sample period of 1997-2007.22 Furthermore, ages of the respondents range between 12 and 27.
As a result of the variation in the states‟ minimum age requirements, the sample includes two
same-aged shall-issue state residents one of whom is eligible and the other is not.23

22

These states and the years in which they become shall-issue states are as follows: Colorado-2004, Kansas-2007,
Michigan-2002, Minnesota-2004, Missouri-2004, Nebraska-2007, New Mexico-2004, and Ohio-2005.
23
Minimum age requirement ranges between 18 and 23. Appendix provides more details on states‟ status on shallissue laws.
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The marginal effects that are obtained from estimation of equation (2.1) on the sample of
Law Abiding Individuals (those who do not have an arrest records as of the last interview date)
are presented in the first columns of Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Column I in Table 2.3 presents the
influence of the enactment of a shall-issue law and column I in Table 2.4 presents the impact of
satisfying the minimum age requirement on the probability of carrying a gun for Law Abiding
Individuals. The rows pertain to the responses estimated in different subsamples. For example,
the row 2 and column 1 of Table 2.3 presents the average marginal effect of the enactment of a
shall-issue law on the gun carrying probabilities of Law Abiding Individuals who are as old as
the minimum required age (i.e. Adult=1). The marginal effects presented in Table 2.3 (Table 2.4)
are obtained by calculating the average change in the probability of carrying a gun when Law
(Adult) is increased from zero to one while other variables are kept at their observed values.
Enactment of a shall-issue law increases the probability of carrying a handgun for Law
Abiding individuals on average (column I of Table 2.3). As displayed in row 1, enactment of a
shall-issue law translates into an increase of 0.7 percentage points in a Law-Abiding Individual‟s
probability of carrying a handgun. As observed in row 2, a Law Abiding Individual‟s probability
of carrying a handgun increases by 1.3 percentage points in response to the enactment of a shallissue law, conditional on having satisfied the minimum age requirement. Row 3 shows that the
average impact of the enactment of the law on minors (those who are younger than the minimum
required age) is insignificant.
Column I of Table 2.4 presents the average influence of satisfying the minimum age
requirement on a Law Abiding Individual‟s probability of carrying a handgun. The average
marginal effect of satisfying the minimum age requirement is not statistically different than zero
(row 1). However, when a Law Abiding Individual in a shall-issue state turns sufficiently old
enough to satisfy the minimum age requirement, his/her probability of carrying a handgun
increases by 0.9 percentage point on average and this effect is significant at 1% level (row 2).
The same impact does not significantly influence the handgun carrying probability of a Law
Abiding Individual who resides in a non-shall-issue state (row 3).
2.3.2 Individuals with At Least One Arrest Record
In this section, I investigate the question of whether Current Arrestees and Eventual
Arrestees carry guns more frequently because of shall-issue laws. A “Current Arrestee” is
defined as an individual who has an arrest record as of the interview date. An “Eventual
Arrestee” refers to an individual who does not have an arrest record at the current interview date,
but will eventually be arrested. The sample consisting of Current and Eventual Arrestees is
called “Arrestees.”24

24

All of the individuals in the Arrestees sample had arrest records when they were interviewed in the 2007 wave of
the survey. Among the 2,796 individuals who had at least one arrest record as of the 2007 wave, 2,067 (74%) did not
have an arrest record as of the first interview wave (1997).
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Table 2.3 Influence of Enactment of Shall-Issue Law on Probability of Carrying a
Handgun
I
II
Law Abiding
Arrestees
Individuals
Marginal Effect is calculated for
1 Whole sample
2 Individuals Over Min. Agea
3 Individuals Under Min. Ageb
4 Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,c

0.007***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)

5 Current Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,d
6 Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,c
7 Current Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,d
Observations

58,023

0.007
(0.006)
0.011
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.038**
(0.015)
0.008
(0.008)
0.009
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.009)
26,919

Notes to Table 2.3: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Law based on estimation of
equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Law Abiding Individuals are those who do not have an arrest record as of
the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Arrestees have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave. The first row provides the average
marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal effects evaluated for different
subsamples as following: a Adult=1, b Adult=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever Arrested=1
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a
handgun since the last interview? When we say handgun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a
handgun when the variable Law is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***,
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Estimating equation (2.1) using the sample of Arrestees will reveal whether the Eventual
Arrestees and Current Arrestees respond to shall-issue laws by carrying guns more frequently.
Notice that the individuals in the Arrestees sample are similar in terms of their unobserved
criminal human capital, i.e. they will commit a crime at least once at some point in their lives.
However, Eventual Arrestees may be eligible to carry concealed weapons while Current
Arrestees cannot be. These groups make up the counter-factual for each other. Specifically, the
experiment in this section involves a comparison of the change in an Eventual Arrestee‟s
probability of carrying a gun when he/she becomes eligible (through enactment of a shall-issue
law or satisfying the minimum age requirement) with that of a Current Arrestee who receives the
same treatment and would have become eligible if he/she did not have an arrest record.
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Table 2.4 Influence of Meeting the Minimum Required Age on Probability of Carrying a
Handgun
I
II
Law Abiding
Arrestees
Individuals
Marginal Effect is calculated for
1 Whole sample
2 Individuals in a Shall-Issue statea
3 Individuals in a Non-Shall-Issue stateb
4 Eventual Arrestees in Shall-Issue statea,c

0.004
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)

5 Current Arrestees in Shall-Issue statea,d
6 Eventual Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue stateb,c
7 Current Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue stateb,d
Observations

58,023

-0.004
(0.007)
0.003
(0.008)
-0.015*
(0.009)
0.024*
(0.015)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.016
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.009)
26,919

Notes to Table 2.4: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Adult based on estimation
of equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Law Abiding Individuals do not have an arrest record as of the 2007
wave of NLSY97. Arrestees have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave. The first row provides the average marginal
effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal effects evaluated for different sub-samples as
following: a Law=1, Law=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever Arrested=1
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you
carried a handgun since the last interview? When we say handgun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or
shotgun.” The marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of
carrying a gun when the variable Adult is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed
values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

The average marginal effects obtained from estimation of equation (2.1) are presented in
the second columns of Table 2.3 (the influence of the enactment of a shall-issue law) and Table
2.4 (the influence of completing the minimum age requirement). The rows pertain to the
responses estimated in different subsamples. For example, the fourth row in Table 2.3 presents
the average marginal effect of the enactment of a shall-issue law on the gun carrying
probabilities of Eventual Arrestees who are older than the minimum required age (i.e. Adult=1
and Ever Arrested=0). The marginal effects presented in column II of Table 2.3 (Table 2.4) are
obtained by calculating the average change in the gun carrying probabilities of Arrestees when
the Law (Adult) variable is increased from zero to one while other variables are kept at their
observed values.
As presented in row 1 column II of Table 2.3, the enactment of a shall-issue law does not
significantly increase the probability of carrying a handgun on average for Arrestees (individuals
who are arrested or will be arrested eventually). However, an Eventual Arrestee who has
satisfied the minimum age requirement is expected to carry handguns more frequently when a
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shall-issue law is enacted (row 4). The same impact does not significantly change the probability
of carrying a handgun for his Current Arrestee counterpart (row 5). A statistically significant
response is not observed for the Eventual or Current Arrestees who have not satisfied minimum
age requirement, when a shall-issue law is enacted (rows 6 and 7).
The impact of satisfying the minimum age requirement on Eventual and Current
Arrestees‟ probabilities of carrying handguns is weak. For example, as presented in column II of
Table 2.4, the average impact of becoming eligible through fulfilling the minimum age
requirement is insignificant in the sample of Arrestees on average (row 1). Nevertheless, in a
shall-issue state, when an Eventual Arrestee becomes old enough to satisfy the minimum age
requirement, his/her probability of carrying a handgun increases by 2.4 percentage points on
average (row 4).25 This marginal effect is larger compared to Current Arrestees who live in shallissue states (row 5).
2.3.3 Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees
The previous section considers all individuals who have committed or will commit a
crime to have similar unobservable criminal human capital. However, individuals‟ levels of
criminal human capital may vary with the severity of crimes they commit. For example, writing
graffiti is very different than committing a burglary. Furthermore, the results of the analysis in
section “Can the Eligibility Criteria Successfully Determine Future Uses of Guns?” below reveal
that Eventual Arrestees are less likely to be associated with violent crimes than are Current
Arrestees. This difference in the criminal human capital of individuals may be reflected in their
tendency to carry a gun.26
In this section, the arrestees are categorized into two groups in order to conduct the
estimation on more homogeneous samples. The categorization takes into consideration the
severity of crimes committed. Specifically, individuals whose arrest records include offenses of
Violence, Robberies, Burglaries, Thefts and Destruction of Property as of the last available
survey date (2007) are grouped into “Serious Crime Arrestees.”27 Their counterparts who have
been charged with Illicit Drug Possession and Sale, Major Traffic Offenses, Other Property
Offenses and Other Offenses are categorized as “Minor Crime Arrestees.” If an individual has
committed both a minor crime and a serious crime as of the last interview date, that individual is
considered as a Serious Crime Arrestee.
For the analysis, equation (2.1) is estimated separately over the samples of Serious and
Minor Crime Arrestees. Similarity in the criminal human capital of the individuals in these
samples reduces the possibility of bias due to unobservable characteristics which may affect both
gun carrying probability and eligibility of individuals. Since this influence is similar within these
groups, however, it will not lead to a bias in estimation. Further, the variation in the timing of
first arrests within the Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees subsamples allows for identifying the
impact of eligibility to obtain a concealed weapon license on carrying a handgun. That is, the
25

However, this impact is borderline significant.
Moreover, individuals who have committed minor crimes such as traffic offenses, drug use or public order
offenses may be eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license according to some of the states‟ laws.
27
This categorization of crimes follows the FBI which lists assaults, rapes, robberies, burglaries, thefts and arsons as
Index I crimes in its Uniform Crime Reports. Index I crimes are costlier to the society and they occur more
frequently. Destruction of Property offenses are also included in serious crimes since arson is a property destruction
offense and it has been considered as an Index I crime by FBI since 1979.
26
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individuals who are arrested in the later rounds of the survey make up the counterfactual for
those who have been arrested previously. Those Eventual Arrestees (who do not have arrest
records at the time of an interview but will be arrested in the future) are eligible, like Law
Abiding Individuals, in the estimation sample. However, they are similar to the Current Serious
or Minor Crime Arrestees in terms of their criminal human capital.28
The results are provided in the Tables 2.5 and 2.6 which present the impact of enactment
of a shall-issue law and satisfying the minimum age requirement on the probability of carrying a
handgun, respectively. The first and second columns in each table show the results for the
samples of Serious Crime Arrestees and Minor Crime Arrestees, respectively. The marginal
effects presented in the first row of Table 2.5 (Table 2.6) are obtained by calculating the average
change in the probability of carrying a handgun for the whole serious and minor crime arrestees
samples when the variable Law (Adult) is increased from zero to one while other variables are
kept at their observed values. The marginal effects shown in the other rows pertain to the
responses estimated in different subsamples. For example, row 4 and column I of Table 2.5 s the
marginal effect of the enactment of a shall-issue law calculated for the Eventual Serious Crime
Arrestees who are older than the minimum required age (Adult=1 and Ever Arrested=0).
Enactment of a shall-issue law does not increase the probability of carrying handguns for
Serious Crime Arrestees (column 1 of Table 2.5). The only statistically significant impact is
found for the Eventual Serious Crime Arrestees who are younger than the minimum required age
at the time of the enactment. This impact is negative. However, the marginal effect presented in
the row 1 and column II of Table 2.5 shows that the enactment of a shall-issue law increases a
Minor Crime Arrestee‟s probability of carrying a handgun by about 1.7 percentage points. This
influence is mainly due to the responsiveness of Eventual Arrestees to shall-issue laws. An
Eventual Minor Crime Arrestee, who meets the minimum required age, is 4.5 percentage points
more likely to carry a handgun in the presence of a shall-issue law compared to absence of the
law (row 4 of column II). This is similar for an Eventual Minor Crime Arrestee who has not
satisfied the minimum age requirement (row 2 column II).29 Among the Minor Crime Arrestees
who have satisfied the minimum age requirement, the probability of carrying a gun for an
Eventual Arrestee gun increases more than that for a Current Arrestee when a shall-issue law is
enacted (rows 4 and 5 of column II). However, as presented in Table 2.6, satisfying the minimum
age requirement does not significantly influence the probability of carrying a gun for Serious or
Minor Crime Arrestees.
The previous section‟s results suggest that Eventual Arrestees are more likely to carry
handguns when they become eligible. The findings in this section imply that the increase in the
handgun carrying probability of Eventual Arrestees is observed because of Eventual Minor
Crime Arrestees. Unlike their Serious Crime Arrestee counterparts, Eventual Minor Crime
Arrestees are very responsive to the shall-issue laws. The probability of carrying a handgun does
not change for individuals who have committed or will commit serious crimes in the future when
a shall-issue law is enacted. Only the Eventual Serious Crime Arrestees who are younger than
the minimum required age reduce their frequency to carry guns in response to the enactment of
28

In the rest of this section, definitions from the previous sections are used. That is, an individual who does not have
a serious (minor) crime offense charge in his/her arrest record as of the current interview date is referred to as an
Eventual Serious (Minor) Crime Arrestee. An individual who already has a serious (minor) crime offense charge in
his/her arrest record is considered a Current Serious (Minor) Crime Arrestee.
29
An individual who has not satisfied the minimum age requirement may have greater access to handguns even if
he/she is not eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license. For example, such an individual may borrow or secretly
obtain a handgun which is legally obtained by his/her parents with the enactment of shall-issue laws.
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shall-issue laws.30 On the other hand, a shall-issue law increases the tendency to carry a gun for
an individual who will commit a minor crime in the future. Although this effect is undesirable,
when compared to serious crimes, these minor crimes are less costly to society.
2.4 Extensions and Robustness Checks
2.4.1 Can the Eligibility Criteria Successfully Determine Future Uses of Guns?
According to the criteria to obtain a concealed weapon license, individuals with arrest
records (Current Arrestees) are considered to be ineligible. This is because past criminal activity
is a determinant of future criminal activity. Current Arrestees would have been likely to use
handguns in future criminal activity, if they were allowed to carry one. However, it is possible
for an individual without arrest record to obtain a concealed weapon license, to start carrying a
gun legally, and commit a crime in the future. This is because of the fact that license-issuing
authorities cannot distinguish future criminals from the entire pool of eligible individuals. In
other words, license-issuing authorities cannot differentiate between a Law Abiding Individual
and an Eventual Arrestee, and thus concealed weapon licenses may be granted to future
criminals. In support of this possibility, the findings of the section “Individuals with At Least
One Arrest Record” suggest that Eventual Arrestees become more likely to carry handguns when
they become eligible to obtain a concealed weapon license, unlike the Current Arrestees. As a
consequence, these criteria can be criticized for the possibility that they may (unintentionally)
provide concealed weapon licenses to individuals who may involve in criminal activity in the
future.
If Eventual and Current Arrestees commit similar crimes in the future, then granting
concealed weapon licenses to the Eventual Arrestees may not be a sound policy. Alternatively, if
the Eventual Arrestees do not commit crimes as severe as do the Current Arrestees, then
allowing concealed weapons to this group may not be a critical problem.31 Consequently,
whether the Current and Eventual Arrestees commit similar crimes becomes important in the
context of testing whether the criteria adopted by shall-issue states are successful in terms of
identifying future criminal use of guns.

30

Notice that although insignificant, the influence of the enactment of a shall-issue law for Eventual Serious
Arrestees who are older than the minimum required age is negative as well. However, the influence of the same
change on Current Serious Crime Arrestees is close to zero. This overall picture may be explained by the possibility
that Eventual Serious Crime Arrestees switch to crimes that do not require face-to-face contact with the victim and
therefore the marginal benefit of carrying a gun is lower. On the other hand, Current Serious Crime Arrestees who
are more experienced in committing crimes may not switch to such crimes. In fact, as will be shown in the next
section, Eventual Arrestees are less likely to commit crimes of Violence and Robbery compared to the Current
Arrestees.
31
Although all crimes are costly, minor crimes and misdemeanors such as illicit drug use, reckless driving or theft
are far less costly than severe crimes such as homicide, rape or robbery.
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Table 2.5 Influence of Enactment of Shall-Issue Law on Arrestees’ Probability of Carrying
Handgun
Serious Crime
Minor Crime
Arrestees
Arrestees
I
II
Marginal Effect is calculated for
1

Whole sample

2

Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,c

3

Current Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,d

4

Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,c

5

Current Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,d

-0.008
(0.010)
-0.037**
(0.015)
0.004
(0.015)
-0.045
(0.033)
0.002
(0.013)
10,685

Observations

0.017**
(0.007)
0.018*
(0.010)
0.010
(0.012)
0.045**
(0.018)
0.016
(0.010)
16,219

Notes to Table 2.5: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Law based on estimation of
equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I
crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none
of the Index-I crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated
for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal effects evaluated for different sub-samples as follows:
a
Adult=1, b Adult=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever Arrested=1
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a
hand gun since the last interview? When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun
when the variable Law is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

In this section, I investigate the types of future crimes individuals commit, conditional on
their arrest records. Specifically, I estimate the following specification for the sample of
Arrestees:
(2.2)

Crime*ist = B1Eventualist-1 + B2Gunist + B3Eventualist-1Gunist + B4Xist + vist

where Crime*ist is the propensity to be charged with an offense of individual i who lives in state s
in year t. Equation (2.2) is estimated using probit over the sample of Arrestees.
Eventualist-1 in equation (2.2) indicates whether the individual i was an Eventual Arrestee
in the previous time period, t-1. In other words, Eventualist-1 takes the value of one if the
individual i has never been arrested as of the previous survey wave at t-1, but he/she will
experience his/her first arrest after the date of his/her previous interview (after t-1). Notice that
since equation (2.2) is estimated for the sample of Arrestees, the variable Eventual identifies the
difference between Eventual and Current Arrestees in terms of committing a crime. Gunist
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measures whether an individual has carried a handgun since the previous interview date. The
vector Xist includes all of the control variables as in the equation (2.1).32
A variety of offenses are considered as outcome variables, which are defined in
Individual-Level Data section. The outcome variable takes the value of one if the individual is
charged with a specific offense. The charged offense can be one of the following: Violence,
Robbery, Burglary, Theft, Destruction of Property, Other Property Offenses, Drug Possession,
Drug Sale, Major Traffic Offenses, Public Order Offenses and Other Offenses.33
The estimated probability of committing a crime for Eventual Arrestees who have carried
handguns is presented in Table 2.7. The comparison group is Current Arrestees who have carried
a handgun. Although Table 2.7 only reports the average marginal effects estimated in the sample
individuals who have carried a gun, equation (2.2) is estimated for the whole sample of
Arrestees. The presented marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average change in the
probability of committing a crime when the variable Eventual is increased from zero to one
while other variables are kept at their observed values, for the Arrestees who have carried a
handgun since the last interview date (Gun=1). Each row in Table 2.7 pertains to a regression
where an indicator for the specified crime type is the dependent variable.
As presented in Table 2.7, among the group of individuals who have carried a handgun
since the last interview date, those who have never been arrested as of the previous survey date
but will be arrested after that date (Eventual Arrestees) are less likely to be associated with
committing violent crimes and robberies compared to their counterparts who already had an
arrest record as of the previous survey date (Current Arrestees). There is no statistical difference
between these two groups in terms of committing other crime types.34
These results indicate that Eventual Arrestees who carry a gun are less likely to commit
violent crimes such as assault, rape, manslaughter and robberies than are Current Arrestees who
carry a gun, although the difference is not statistically significant for other crimes.35 The results
32

The full set of control variables includes both individual and state-level control variables. The individual-level
control variables are the Age of the individual, indicators for individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black,
Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black [omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and
Separated) and School Enrollment status. Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, Household
Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last month the individual has drunk 5
or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the
individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) or bullying (Bullied) before the age of 12 and whether the
individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. The state-level control variables are the Crime Rate,
Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability and the Hunters’ Share in the
State’s Population.
33
According to the definition of NLSY, the variable Violence includes battery, rape, aggravated assault and
manslaughter.
34
The results for those who have not carried guns are not reported, but they are available upon request. Briefly,
among those Arrestees who have not carried a gun, the individuals who were Eventual Arrestees in the previous
wave are more likely to be associated with violent crimes (at 10% significance), theft, drug possession, traffic and
public order offenses compared to those who were Current Arrestees in the previous wave.
35
The main findings in this section are not surprising. The results indicate that the individuals who get arrested early
in their lives are more likely to commit highly-severe crimes, such as assault and robbery, and less likely to commit
less-severe crimes, such as drug possession, traffic and public order offenses, than those who get arrested later. One
reason for this may the differences in criminal human capital. For an individual who has accumulated a greater stock
of criminal human capital early in his/her life, it may be harder to switch to the legal sector later (Mocan and Bali,
forthcoming). Therefore, by staying in the criminal sector, such an individual continues accumulating even more
criminal human capital and he/she is more likely to commit more severe crimes than another individual with a
smaller initial criminal human capital.
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in previous sections showed that some eligible individuals who may commit crimes in the future
(Eventual Arrestees) carry guns more often in response to enactment of shall-issue laws.
However, when they have carried guns, Eventual Arrestees are less likely to commit violent
crimes compared to Current Arrestees who are considered ineligible for a concealed weapon
license. Therefore, granting concealed weapon licenses only to the individuals who do not have
arrest records at time of the application but not to the individuals with arrest records seems to be
a successful method of excluding individuals who will be involved in future criminal activity,
especially in violent offenses.
2.4.2 Observable Differences among Arrestees and Law Abiding Individuals
In the previous sections, individuals are categorized according to their arrest records. This
categorization was based on possible differences between these individuals in terms of their
criminal human capital. Arrestees are considered to have greater levels of criminal human capital
than Law Abiding Individuals.
Along the same lines, Arrestees are expected to have lower levels of legal human capital
than Law Abiding Individuals. In this section, I investigate whether Arrestees have common
characteristics that are associated with low levels of legal human capital and whether these
characteristics are different from Law Abiding Individuals. In this way, I test whether the
categorization based on arrest records is an appropriate way of classifying individuals to form
homogeneous groups within themselves. If Arrestees and Law Abiding individuals are
significantly different from each other in their legal human capital, then the classification based
on the existence of arrest records in individuals‟ lifetimes is a good proxy for categorizing
individuals according to their unobservable characteristics. Consequently, unobservable
characteristics of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees can be thought to be similar within
these samples.
Previous research has provided evidence supporting the classification based on arrest
records. For example, Grogger (1995) has shown that the current wages of individuals who will
be arrested in the future are not very different from the wages of those who already have an
arrest record.36 Further, Grogger (1995) argues that wages of those with arrest records are
economically and statistically different than wages of individuals without arrest records. Other
studies, such as Williams and Sickles (2002) and Marcotte and Markowitz (2009), have argued
that individuals who have arrest records are differentially associated with unsuccessful marriage
and mental health outcomes as compared to individuals with no arrest record.
To test whether Arrestees and Law Abiding Individuals differ in terms of their observable
characteristics, the following equation is estimated for a sample that pools Law Abiding
individuals with Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees:
(2.3)

36

Outcomei = B1Serious Crimei + B2Minor Crimei + B3Xi + vi

Grogger (1995) finds that the difference is statistically significant but not economically.

23

Table 2.6 Influence of Satisfying the Minimum Age Requirement on Arrestees’ Probability
of Carrying a Handgun
Serious Crime
Minor Crime
Arrestees
Arrestees
I
II
Marginal Effect is calculated for
1

Whole Sample

2

Eventual Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue Stateb,c

3

Current Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue Stateb,d

4

Eventual Arrestees in Shall-Issue Statea,c

5

Current Arrestees in Shall-Issue Statea,d
Observations

0.003
(0.011)
0.020
(0.039)
0.003
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.024)
0.002
(0.013)
10,685

-0.010
(0.008)
-0.020
(0.015)
-0.018*
(0.011)
0.010
(0.016)
-0.012
(0.010)
16,219

Notes to Table 2.6: Columns I and II present the average marginal effects of the variable Adult based on estimation
of equation (2.1) on samples listed at the top. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I
crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none
of the Index-I crimes as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97.The first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated
for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal effects evaluated for different sub-samples as follows: a
Law=1, b Law=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever Arrested=1.
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a
hand gun since the last interview? When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun
when the variable Adult is changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

where Outcome stands for various education levels (whether the individual has at least High
School, Associate or Bachelor’s degree and Highest Grade Completed), labor market outcomes
(Hourly Wages, Hours Worked per Week), family formation behaviors (being Married,
Cohabiting, Separated and number of Children) and mental health issues (being Nervous,
Uncalm, feeling Blue, Unhappy and Depressed). Equation (2.3) is estimated by probit (OLS) for
binary (continuous) outcomes. Estimation is conducted using the 2007 wave (last available
wave) for education, labor market and family formation outcomes. However, the 2006 wave is
the last wave which asks about mental health, and is used for the mental health outcome
variables.
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Table 2.7 Eventual Arrestees’ Probability of Committing a Crime Conditional on Carrying
a Gun
Outcome
Marginal Effect Standard Error
Violence
-0.030**
(0.012)
Robbery
-0.028***
(0.010)
Burglary
-0.004
(0.010)
Theft
-0.002
(0.012)
Property Destruction
-0.007
(0.011)
Other Prop.
0.000
(0.009)
Drug Possession
0.016
(0.013)
Drug Sale
0.014
(0.010)
Major Traffic Offense
0.019
(0.013)
Public Order Offense
0.007
(0.010)
Other Offense
-0.011
(0.014)
Notes to Table 2.7: The dependent variables, which are listed in the rows, are indicators for whether an individual is
charged with the specified offense. Each row pertains to a different regression. Violence includes battery, rape,
aggravated assault and manslaughter. The underlying coefficients are obtained from estimating equation (2.2) over
the sample of Arrestees (who have an arrest record as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97). Reported marginal effects are
the probabilities of committing the specified crime for the Eventual Arrestees who have carried a gun. The
comparison group is Current Arrestees who have carried a gun. Eventual Arrestees do not have an arrest record at
the time of the interview, but will be arrested in the future. Current Arrestees have an arrest record at the time of the
interview. The marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average change in the crime committing probabilities
for the individuals who have carried a gun (Gun=1) when the variable Eventual is increased from 0 to 1 while other
variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Serious Crime and Minor Crime are indicators for being a Serious Crime and
Minor Crime Arrestee, respectively. That is, Serious Crime (Minor Crime) takes the value of one
if the individual has an arrest record for rape, assault, manslaughter, robbery, burglary, theft and
destruction of property (illicit drug possession and sale, major traffic offenses, other property
offenses and other offenses) as of the last available survey date, 2007. The vector X includes
appropriate control variables. Specifically, the vector X includes all control variables that were
used in equation (2.1) except, for example, the education variables (Highest Grade Completed),
when the outcome considered is High School, Associate or Bachelor’s degrees and Highest
Grade Completed.37

37

The full set of control variables includes both individual and state-level control variables. The individual-level
control variables are the Age of the individual, indicators for individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black,
Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black [omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and
Separated) and School Enrollment status. Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, Household
Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last month the individual has drunk 5
or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the
individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) or bullying (Bullied) before the age of 12 and whether the
individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. The state-level control variables are the Crime Rate,
Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability and the Hunters’ Share in the
State’s Population.
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Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 provide the results for education and labor market, marriage and
family, and mental health outcomes in the last available wave, respectively. For the regressions
with Highest Grade Completed (column 4 in 2.8), Hourly Wages and Hours Worked per Week
(Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2.8) and number of Children (Column 4 of Table 2.9) the marginal
effects obtained from the estimation of equation (2.3) with OLS are presented. For the remaining
outcomes the marginal effects are obtained from probit.38 The reported marginal effects lay out
the similarities and differences between Minor Crime Arrestees, Serious Crime Arrestees and the
Law Abiding individuals as of the last wave of the survey.
As observed in Table 2.8, both Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees are less likely to have
at least a high school, associate or bachelor‟s degree as of the 2007 wave compared to Law
Abiding individuals. On average, Serious and Minor Crime Arrestees complete about two and
one fewer years of schooling, respectively than Law Abiding Individuals. Compared to their
counterparts who commit a minor crime, Serious Crime Arrestees are less likely to obtain a high
school or higher education degrees. Serious Crime Arrestees work more hours per week than do
the Law Abiding Individuals, although this marginal effect is borderline significant. Serious
Crime Arrestees‟ hourly earnings are much less. 39,40 There is no statistical difference between
Minor Crime Arrestees and Law Abiding individuals in terms of hours worked per week and
hourly wages.
Table 2.9 presents the results of the regressions for family formation and marriage
outcomes as of the 2007 wave interviews. Minor Crime Arrestees are less likely to be married
and more likely to be cohabiting with a partner than Law Abiding Individuals. Serious Crime
Arrestees are less likely to be married but they are as likely to be cohabiting as Law-Abiding
Individuals. Additionally, Serious Crime Arrestees are less successful in maintaining their
marriages than are Law Abiding individuals, because Serious Crime Arrestees are more likely to
be separated or divorced from their spouses. Except for being separated, there is no statistical
difference in family formation outcomes of Serious versus Minor Crime Arrestees. Serious
Crime Arrestees have more children than Minor Crime Arrestees and Law Abiding Individuals.
Further, Minor Crime Arrestees have more children than do Law Abiding Individuals as of the
2007 wave.
As displayed in Table 2.10, Serious Crime Arrestees have the worst mental health
conditions on overage among all subgroups as of the 2006 wave (last available survey for these
outcomes). They are more likely to feel blue, be nervous, unhappy, uncalm and depressed than
the Law Abiding individuals. Minor Crime Arrestees share these unfavorable mental health
outcomes with Serious Crime Arrestees, but they experience these negative outcomes at a
smaller magnitude. Minor Crime Arrestees are as likely to feel blue or depressed as Law Abiding
individuals, yet they are more likely to be nervous, uncalm and unhappy.

38

The marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as the average change in the probability of the outcome
when the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime are increased from zero to one while other variables
are kept at their observed values. The marginal effects obtained from OLS are the coefficient estimates. The
marginal effects presented in Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 are estimated for the whole sample observed in the last wave
of the survey.
39
Hourly Wage Rate is scaled by 0.01. This implies the coefficient of -93 for the Serious Crime Arrestees in
Column 5 of Table 2.8 indicate a difference of 93 cents/hour.
40
Hours worked per week and hourly wage regressions are conducted for the sample of individuals who reported
participating in the labor market.
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Table 2.8 Comparison of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees: Education and Labor
Market Outcomes (2007 wave)

Serious Crime
Arrestees

(1)
High
School +
-0.386***
(0.020)

Minor Crime
Arrestees
Observations

-0.193***
(0.015)
7,345

(2)

(3)
-0.160***
(0.007)

(4)
Highest
Grade
-1.981***
(0.081)

(5)
Hourly
Wage Rate
-92.727***
(27.145)

(6)
Hours
/Week
1.945*
(1.153)

College +

Bachelors +

-0.206***
(0.010)
-0.142***
(0.010)
7,345

-0.106***
(0.009)
7,345

-1.192***
(0.070)
7,290

-33.709
(23.034)
6,366

0.302
(0.898)
6,483

Notes to Table 2.8: The outcome variables are listed at the top of the columns. All columns present marginal effects
obtained from estimation of equation (2.3) for the whole sample of individuals (Law Abiding, Minor and Serious
Crime Arrestees) for 2007 wave. The base group is Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding Individuals have not
committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the
Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one
misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Columns 4-6 provide OLS
estimates and the remaining columns provide marginal effects obtained from probit. Hourly Wage Rate is measured
in one hundredths of a dollar. The marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as the average change in the
probability of the outcome when the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime are increased from zero to
one while other variables are kept at their observed values. The marginal effects obtained from OLS are the
coefficient estimates. The marginal effects presented are estimated for the whole sample observed in the last wave of
the survey. Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.

The findings in this section imply that Arrestees are different from Law Abiding
individuals in various aspects of legal human capital.41 These differences are more significant for
Serious Crime Arrestees than they are for Minor Crime Arrestees. However, although differences
exist, Minor Crime Arrestees resemble to Serious Crime Arrestees at a much greater extent than
they resemble to the Law Abiding Individuals. It is more appropriate to group Minor Crime
Arrestees with Serious Crime Arrestees rather than with Law Abiding Individuals. In addition,
the findings in this section imply that using arrest records to categorize individuals seems to be a
good method of classification according to unobservable criminal human capital. If I used the
components of legal human capital (education, labor market outcomes, family formation
behavior, mental health issues…etc.) instead of the existence of lifetime arrest records to
categorize individuals, then samples similar to what I employ in the previous sections of the
paper would have been obtained.

41

Same findings are found when equation (2.3) is estimated over the whole sample of observations consisting of all
survey waves.
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Table 2.9 Comparison of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees: Marriage and Family
Outcomes (2007 wave)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Married
Cohabiting Separated
Children
Serious Crime Arrestees
-0.052***
0.026
0.016**
0.214***
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.007)
(0.036)
Minor Crime Arrestees
-0.055***
0.036***
0.003
0.127***
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.005)
(0.026)
Observations
7,348
7,348
7,305
7,359
Notes to Table 2.9:
The dependent variables are listed at the top of the columns. All columns present marginal effects obtained from
estimation of equation (2.3) for the whole sample of individuals (Law Abiding, Minor and Serious Crime Arrestees)
for 2007 wave. The base group is Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding Individuals have not committed any
crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of
FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none of
the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Column 4 provides OLS estimates, the remaining
columns present marginal effects obtained from probit. The marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as
the average change in the probability of the outcome when the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime
are increased from zero to one while other variables are kept at their observed values. The marginal effects obtained
from OLS are the coefficient estimates. The marginal effects presented are estimated for the whole sample observed
in the last wave of the survey. The robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

2.4.3 Differential Treatment
In this section, I check whether the results presented above are robust to a different model
specification. This extension utilizes the variation in the exposure of states to the shall-issue
laws. Particularly, some individuals have been living in states that enacted their shall-issue laws
several years ago. This differential exposure of states to shall-issue laws may lead to differences
in the handgun carrying probability of the individuals. In other words, the handgun carrying
probability of an individual who resides in a state which enacted a shall-issue law many years
ago may be greater (or smaller) than that of an individual whose state just recently passed a
shall-issue law.42 This hypothesis may be especially important when a longer history of the
existence of shall-issue laws implies a culture of gun carrying in a shall-issue state.
To test whether exposure of the states to the shall-issue laws influences the probability of
carrying a gun, I estimate the equation outlined below:
(2.4)

Gun*ist = B1Exposurest + B2Adultist + B3Ever Arrestedist + B12ExposurestAdultist
+ B13ExposurestEver Arrestedist + B23AdultistEver Arrestedist
+ B123ExposurestAdultistEver Arrestedist + B4Xist + vist

42

The sign of the average marginal effect can be positive or negative. For example, an individual who have been
residing in a state that passed a shall-issue law many years ago may choose not to carry a handgun if he/she observes
that other individuals carry handguns enough to provide him/her with protection. Alternatively, the same individual
may choose to carry a handgun more frequently as carrying a gun may have become a part of the culture in that
state.
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where Exposure is a trend variable that counts the number of years since the state that the
individual resides passed a shall-issue law.43 Notice that equation (2.4) is exactly same as
equation (2.1) except that Law is replaced with variable Exposure. All of the control variables
employed in equation (2.1) are also included in equation (2.4).44 I estimate equation (2.4) by
probit. As an alternative, I also estimate equation (2.4) including the variable Exposure and its
square, as well as their interactions with Adult and Ever Arrested as covariates.45
The marginal effects obtained from estimating equation (2.4) over the sample of Law
Abiding Individuals are presented in the first column of Table 2.11, which corresponds to the
first column of Table 2.3. On average, residing in a state with an extra year of exposure to the
shall-issue laws does not significantly increase the probability of carrying a handgun for a Law
Abiding Individual. However, as presented in the second row and first column of Table 2.11, the
same marginal effect calculated for the sample of Law Abiding Individuals who are older than
the minimum age requirement is positive. The same result is found when the alternative
specification of equation (2.4), which includes both the variable Exposure and the square of it as
covariates, is employed. The marginal effects obtained from this specification are provided in the
second column of Table 2.11.
The marginal effects obtained from estimating equation (2.4) over the samples of Serious
and Minor Crime Arrestees are presented in the Table 2.12. The counterpart to this table is Table
2.5. Residing in a state that has greater years of exposure to shall-issue laws does not increase the
probability of carrying a handgun for Serious Crime Arrestees (column I). This finding holds
when both linear and quadratic Exposure are included in equation (2.4) (column II). No influence
of residing in a state with greater exposure to shall-issue laws is estimated for Minor Crime
Arrestees when only linear Exposure is employed in equation (2.4) (column III). However, when
both linear and quadratic Exposure variables are controlled for, the results change. As presented
in the column IV of Table 2.12, a Minor Crime Arrestee who resides in a state which passed a
shall-issue law earlier is more likely to carry a handgun than his/her counterpart who resides in a
state which has passed a shall-issue law recently. This finding holds for both Eventual and
Current Minor Crime Arrestees, except Current Minor Crime Arrestees who have not satisfied
the minimum age requirement.46

43

For those states that passed a shall-issue law earlier than 1970, the enactment year is set at 1970.
The full set of control variables includes both individual and state-level control variables. The individual-level
control variables are the Age of the individual, indicators for individual‟s gender (Female), race and ethnicity (Black,
Hispanic, Mixed and Non-Black [omitted]), marital status (Can’t Marry, Single [omitted], Cohabiting, Married and
Separated) and School Enrollment status. Other control variables are individual‟s Household Size, Household
Income and Highest Grade Completed in addition to the number of days in the last month the individual has drunk 5
or more drinks (Heavy Drinking), the number of days in the last month he/she used Marijuana, whether the
individual was a victim of burglary (Burglarized) or bullying (Bullied) before the age of 12 and whether the
individual witnessed someone getting shot before the age of 12. The state-level control variables are the Crime Rate,
Unemployment Rate, race and gender specific Homicide Victimization Probability and the Hunters’ Share in the
State’s Population.
45
When both Exposure and the square of it are included in the equation (2.4), there are four main effects, six twoway interactions, four three-way interactions and one four-way interaction in the equation.
46
Although not reported here, I calculated the marginal effect of satisfying the minimum age requirement at
different values of Exposure. There was not a clear pattern for any subsamples (Law Abiding Individuals, Eventual
or Current Arrestees).
44
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Table 2.10 Comparison of the Law Abiding Individuals and Arrestees: Mental Health
Outcomes (2006 wave)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Nervous
Uncalm
Blue
Unhappy Depressed
Serious Crime Arrestees
0.053*** 0.083*** 0.036*** 0.084***
0.011
(0.014)
(0.020)
(0.013)
(0.019)
(0.007)
Minor Crime Arrestees
0.027***
0.029*
0.003
0.025*
0.006
(0.010)
(0.016)
(0.009)
(0.015)
(0.006)
Observations
7,365
7,418
7,307
7,430
7,315
Notes to Table 2.10: The dependent variables are listed at the top of the columns. All columns present marginal
effects obtained from estimation of equation (2.3) using probit for the whole sample of individuals (Law Abiding,
Minor and Serious Crime Arretees) for 2006 wave. The base group is Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding
Individuals have not committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have
committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have
committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The
marginal effects obtained from probit are calculated as the average change in the probability of the outcome when
the indicator variables Minor Crime and Serious Crime are increased from zero to one while other variables are kept
at their observed values. The marginal effects presented in Table 2.10 are estimated for the whole sample observed
in the 2006 wave of the survey. The robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

2.4.4 Probability of Carrying a Gun in the Last Month
In this section, I test whether shall-issue laws influence tendency to carry a handgun in
the more recent past. For this purpose, I estimate equation (2.1) employing Gun in Last Month as
the dependent variable instead of Gun. The new dependent variable, Gun in Last Month, takes
the value of one if the individual has indicated that he/she has carried a gun at least one day in
the last 30 days.
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 present the marginal effects obtained from estimating equation
(2.1), with the dependent variable Gun in Last Month, over the samples of Law Abiding
Individuals, Serious Crime Arrestees and Minor Crime Arrestees, separately. The marginal
effects associated with the enactment of a shall-issue law and satisfying the minimum age
requirement are presented in Tables 2.13 and 2.14, respectively. The first columns in Tables
2.13 and 2.14 corresponds to the first columns in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Counterparts
of the second (third) columns in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 are the first (second) columns in Tables 2.5
and 2.6, respectively.
The marginal effects presented in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 are very similar to those reported
previously in Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Briefly, the probability of carrying a handgun in the
last month for the Law Abiding Individuals increases in the presence of a shall-issue law (row 1
column I in Table 2.13). This influence is mostly due to the Law Abiding Individuals who have
satisfied the minimum age requirement (row 2, column I in Table 2.13). Serious Crime Arrestees
do not change their handgun carrying behavior in the recent past with the presence of a shallissue law (column II in Table 2.13), whereas Minor Crime Arrestees become more likely to carry
a handgun (column III in Table 2.13). The influence of a shall-issue law is greatest for the
individuals who do not have an arrest record and who are old enough to satisfy the minimum age
requirement. These individuals are 3.5 percentage points more likely to carry a handgun after the
enactment of a shall-issue law (row 4, column III in Table 2.13).
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Table 2.11 Influence of Exposure to a Shall-Issue Law on Probability of Carrying a
Handgun for Law Abiding Individuals
I
II
Linear
Linear and Quadratic
Marginal Effect is calculated for
1 Whole sample

0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
58,023

2 Individuals Over Minimum Agea
3 Individuals Under Minimum Ageb
Observations

0.0007***
(0.0002)
0.0009***
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.0003)
58,023

Notes to Table 2.11: This table presents the average marginal effects of the variable Exposure based on estimation of
equation (2.4) on samples of Law Abiding Individuals. Law Abiding Individuals have not committed any crimes as
of the last wave of NLSY97. The marginal effects in the first column are obtained from estimation of equation (2.4)
including Exposure and the control variables. The marginal effects in the second column are obtained from
estimation of equation (2.4) including both linear and quadratic Exposure together with the control variables. The
first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal
effects evaluated for different sub-samples as follows: a Adult=1, b Adult=0
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a
hand gun since the last interview? When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average value of the derivative of the objective function (probit)
with respect to the variable Exposure evaluated at the observed values of the variables. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

As presented in Table 2.14, Law Abiding Individuals who become eligible to carry a
handgun in terms of satisfying the minimum age requirement are more likely to carry a handgun
in the past 30 days (row 1, column I in Table 2.14). This especially holds for those who reside in
shall-issue states (row 2, column I in Table 2.14). Satisfying the minimum age requirement does
not increase the handgun carrying probability of the Serious or Minor Crime Arrestees (columns
II and III in Table 2.14).
2.4.5 Do Shall-Issue Laws Increase Gun Thefts?
Some of the previous researchers, such as Cook, Molliconi and Cole (1995) and Cook
and Ludwig (1997), argue that shall-issue laws may increase the availability of guns to potential
criminals. For example, following the enactment of a shall-issue law, a greater number of legally
obtained guns are vulnerable to being stolen by criminals. If more guns are stolen after the
enactment of a shall-issue law, ineligible individuals, such as those who have committed serious
crimes, will be more likely to carry guns after the enactment of a shall-issue law. However,
results of the previous sections show that shall-issue laws have no influence on individuals who
have committed serious crimes in terms of carrying a handgun. Therefore, my findings in the
previous sections and the hypothesis that shall-issue laws increase the number of stolen guns are
contradicting.
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Table 2.12 Influence of Exposure to a Shall-Issue Law on Arrestees’ Probability of
Carrying Handgun
Serious Crime Arrestees
Only
Linear and
Linear
Quadratic

Minor Crime Arrestees
Only
Linear and
Linear
Quadratic

I

II

III

IV

-0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.0010
(0.0009)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
-0.0022*
(0.0013)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
10,685

0.0001
(0.0008)
-0.0025
(0.0019)
0.0011
(0.0015)
-0.0029
(0.0022)
0.0009
(0.0007)
10,685

0.0001
(0.0003)
-0.0002
(0.0005)
-0.0001
(0.0007)
0.0004
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0.0004)
16,219

0.0020***
(0.0006)
0.0029**
(0.0011)
0.0013
(0.0013)
0.0028***
(0.0008)
0.0016**
(0.0005)
16,219

Marginal Effect is calculated for
1 Whole Sample
2 Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,c
3 Current Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,d
4 Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,c
5 Current Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,d
Observations

Notes to Table 2.12: This table presents the average marginal effects of the variable Exposure based on estimation of
equation (2.4) on samples of Serious Crime Arrestees (Columns I and II) and Minor Crime Arrestees (Columns III
and IV). Serious Crime Arrestees have committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of
NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as
of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The marginal effects in the columns I and III are obtained from estimation of
equation (2.4) including only Exposure and the control variables. The marginal effects in the columns II and IV are
obtained from estimation of equation (2.4) including both linear and quadratic Exposure as well as the control
variables. The first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to
marginal effects evaluated for different sub-samples as follows: a Adult=1, b Adult=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever
Arrested=1
The dependent variable, Gun, is constructed based on the individuals‟ answers to the question “Have you carried a
hand gun since the last interview? When we say hand gun, we mean any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.” The
marginal effects are obtained by calculating the average value of the derivative of the objective function (probit)
with respect to the variable Exposure evaluated at the observed values of the variables. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

In this section, the hypothesis that shall-issue laws increase the amount of stolen guns is
empirically tested. Using state-level data, I investigate whether there is a difference in the
amount of gun thefts before and after a shall-issue law is passed in a state. The model to be
estimated is the following:
(2.5)

Stolen Gunsst = B1Lawst + B2Post-Passage Trendst + B3Xst + zst

where Stolen Gunsst denotes the reported per capita real value of stolen guns in state s in year t.
Despite not being the perfect measure of the number of stolen guns, the reported per capita real
value of guns stolen is used as a proxy for the actual amount of stolen guns. This measure is
calculated through deflating the annual value of reported stolen guns per 100,000 individuals by
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the national Consumer Price Index (CPI). Specifically, stolen gun data obtained from the
Supplement to Return A Master Files of UCR between 1978 and 2006. Monthly values of the
stolen firearms are available at the police agency level, but not all agencies report monthly. To
create the variable Stolen Guns Rate, only the data from agencies that reported the full 12
months are employed.47 After calculating the total value of stolen guns in a state (by summing
up the monthly figures of all agencies that report full 12 months), this annual total is divided by
the total population covered by the agencies (times 100,000) that contributed to the annual total
value of guns stolen.48 Finally, this per capita figure is deflated by the national Consumer Price
Index.
The investigating officer provides information about stolen and recovered property.
Whenever investigating a reported crime involving theft, the officer in charge includes the value
and type of all stolen property in his/her report. This is an obligation of the investigating officer
and as described in the Handbook of UCR: “such information is essential to assure the
completeness of a law enforcement investigative report on stolen property.” These reports are
summarized in the Return A Supplement forms are submitted monthly by each agency to the FBI
headquarters or to the FBI regional offices. These forms are designed to record the total value of
property stolen and recovered in the various classifications of properties, which include
Firearms. As defined in the Glossary of Handbook of UCR, firearms are weapons that fire a shot
by the force of an explosion. All handguns, rifles, shotguns, and other such devices commonly
referred to as firearms are included in this category. The recorded value of the firearms stolen is
left to the discretion of the reporting officer and is based upon several objective criteria.
However, in most instances the victim's evaluation of the value of the stolen item is accepted. In
those cases where value of the stolen item is negotiable, the current market price at the time of
the theft is recorded.
An individual is more likely to report a stolen gun case to the police if the gun is obtained
legally initially. Otherwise, the reporting individual can be arrested and charged with an offense
of illegal gun ownership. The measure of stolen guns employed in the empirical analysis is likely
to cover most thefts of legally obtained guns. This is because, a legal gun owner is likely to
report the theft of his/her gun to police regardless of the value of the gun. This is a protective
measure on the part of the reporting individual against accusations of possible future crimes
committed with the stolen gun. Further, this measure is less likely to suffer a bias due to false
reports. For example, a falsely reported stolen gun case can be corrected later by the police
agency if an individual mistakenly reports that his/her gun is stolen.
Lawst in equation (2.5) is an indicator for a shall-issue law and Post-Passage Trendst is a
time trend that counts the number of years since the enactment of a shall-issue law in state s in
year t. For the states that passed a shall-issue law earlier than 1970 and their counterparts which
never passed a shall-issue law, this variable takes the value of zero. The vector Xst includes
control variables such as the larceny rate, unemployment rate, per capita real personal income,
unemployment insurance, income maintenance and retirement payments, lagged incarceration
rate, population density and the share of white and black males aged 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 in
the total state population. The summary statistics of these variables are in Table 2.15. Also
47

Including the data obtained from agencies that reported less than 12 months do not affect the results presented in
this paper.
48
Population covered by the agency may not be same as the total state population. However, for most of the cases
the agencies that reported a full 12 months cover a quite large share of the population. For example, in 2006, the
total population covered by such agencies was over 200 million which makes up about 65% of the US population.
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included in the equation (2.5) are state fixed effects, year dummies together with linear state
trends.
The main source of the state-level data is Ayres and Donohue (2009).49 Some of these
variables (at the county level) are also used by Lott and Mustard (1997). The authors used this
data set to test whether a shall-issue law is associated with an increase in the crime rate of a state.
This data set provides, broadly, variables that measure economic conditions, criminal activity
and demographic characteristics of states. Table 2.15 provides the summary statistics. The
economic condition variables are the Unemployment Rate, and four per capita income variables;
namely Personal Income, Unemployment Benefits, Income Maintenance and Retirement
Payments. Other control variables include Larceny Rate and Incarceration Rate. Finally, the
variables that proxy the demographic characteristics of a state are the Population Density and the
share of black and white males aged 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 in the total state population (%
Black Male Population 10-19, % Black Male Population 20-29, % Black Male Population 30-39,
% White Male Population 10-19, % White Male Population 20-29, % White Male Population 3039).
The variables Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst in equation (2.5) are intended to capture
the increase in the availability of guns to potential criminals. However, Lott and Mustard (1997)
have demonstrated that when a shall-issue law is enacted, criminals switch to crimes that require
less contact with the victims. Specifically, they argue that when a shall-issue law is enacted, the
number of thefts increases, while the number of murders, rapes and robberies decreases. Further,
guns are one of the most commonly stolen items in thefts. Therefore, there may be a mechanical
relationship between shall-issue laws and amount of stolen gun cases through number of thefts.
Consequently, if the larceny rate is not controlled for in equation (2.5), the variables that measure
the state‟s status of shall-issue laws (Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst) proxy for both the increase
in the availability of guns to potential criminals through theft and (possible) increase in number
of larceny cases due to shall-issue laws. In other words, estimating equation (2.5) without the
larceny rate provides the total effect of shall-issue laws on stolen gun cases which incorporates
both its direct effect (increase in the availability of guns) and indirect effect (due to the (possible)
increase in thefts after the passage of shall-issue laws). When the larceny rate is controlled for,
the coefficients of Law and the Post-Passage Trend can be interpreted as the change in the
amount of stolen guns per theft when a shall-issue law is enacted in a state.50
Specification in equation (2.5) (except the larceny rate) is similar to the ones employed
by Ayres and Donohue (2009), Lott and Mustard (1997) and Moody and Marvell (2009). These
researchers estimate the impact of shall-issue laws on seven felony crimes employing equation
(2.5) in three different ways: (a) including the Lawst indicator alone, (b) including the PostPassage Trendst trend variable alone, and (c) including both Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst
together. I follow the convention in estimation and provide the results for all three models. These
models are estimated using OLS for the sample period 1978-2006.51 Except Lawst, Post-Passage
Trendst, year dummies, state fixed effects and trends, all variables are in natural logarithms.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and regressions are weighted by state population
covered by the police agencies.

49

http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/66/
Similar results are obtained when the burglary rate is included in equation (2.5) instead of the larceny rate.
51
1983 is out of the estimation sample. This is because the data set was not available at the source.
50
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Table 2.13 Influence of Enactment of Shall-Issue Law on Probability of Carrying a
Handgun in the Last Month
I
Law Abiding
Individuals

II
Serious Crime
Arrestees

III
Minor Crime
Arrestees

0.006***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)

-0.004
(0.008)

0.015**
(0.006)

-0.012
(0.025)
0.001
(0.011)
-0.023*
(0.012)
0.006
(0.011)
10,762

0.035***
(0.013)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.011
(0.008)
0.011
(0.010)
16,322

Marginal Effect is calculated for
1

Whole sample

2

Individuals Over Minimum Agea

3

Individuals Under Minimum Ageb

4

Eventual Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,c

5

Current Arrestees, Over Min. Agea,d

6

Eventual Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,c

7

Current Arrestees, Under Min. Ageb,d
Observations

58,217

Notes to Table 2.13: Columns I, II and III present the average marginal effects of the variable Law based on
estimation of equation (2.1) with the dependent variable Gun in Last Month on samples listed at the top. Law
Abiding Individuals have not committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have
committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have
committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The
first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal
effects evaluated for different sub-samples as follows: a Adult=1, b Adult=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever Arrested=1
The dependent variable, Gun in Last Month, is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual
reported that he/she has carried a handgun at least once in the last 30 days. The marginal effects are obtained by
calculating the average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun when the variable Law is
changed from 0 to 1 while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

The estimates obtained from estimation of equation (2.5) are provided in Table 2.16. In
the first three columns, only Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst are included in the regressions
without any controls. None of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. The results in
columns 4 to 6 pertain to the model where the measures of shall-issue status of the states and
state fixed effects are included. The coefficients of both Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst are
negative and significant, but controlling for year dummies and state trends removes the
significance of Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst (columns 7 to 9). When the whole set of control
variables but the larceny rate are included in equation (2.5) as covariates (columns 10 to 12), the
sizes of the coefficients of Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst do not change and they remain
insignificant. Controlling additionally for the larceny rate (columns 13 to 15) does not change the
statistical significance of the Lawst and Post-Passage Trendst, either. They remain insignificant.
These results hold regardless of the employed measure of shall-issue status of states (including

35

only Lawst dummy, only Post-Passage Trendst, or both). That is, shall-issue laws are unrelated to
the per capita real value of guns stolen in a state.52
Although more guns may become vulnerable to theft by potential criminals after the
enactment of a shall-issue law in a state, the findings in this section provide evidence that there is
no difference in the amount of stolen gun cases between shall-issue states versus non-shall-issue
states. This supports the findings in the previous sections of this paper. It seems safe to argue that
a shall-issue law is unlikely to increase the gun carrying frequency of the individuals with arrest
records.53
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
Whether the Concealed Weapon Laws, specifically the shall-issue laws, increase or
decrease crime is still debated. Employing state-level or county-level data sets, previous studies
report conflicting findings. Studies that find a positive impact of shall-issue laws on crime
suggest that crime-facilitating effect of these laws dominate the crime-reducing effect. On the
other hand, studies that find a reduction in crime following the enactment of shall-issue laws
justify their results by arguing that the crime-reducing effect is greater in magnitude than the
crime-facilitating effect. The upshot is that the estimated net effect of shall-issue laws on crime
reported by existing research is sensitive to model specification, particular data used, and
econometric methods.
This paper recognizes that the previous studies on shall-issue laws overlook the fact that
neither the crime-facilitating nor the crime-reducing effect of shall-issue laws can emerge if
individuals do not respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more frequently (first order
effect). To investigate this question, this paper employs an individual-level data set and
supplements it with an aggregate-level data set, and tests whether the first order effect of a shallissue law is actually realized. In other words, this paper investigates the most basic research
question in this context: “Do individuals respond to the shall-issue laws by carrying handguns
more often?” and “If they do so, what type of individuals respond?” The answers to these
questions are critical since the mechanisms through which shall-issue laws can increase or
decrease crime cannot be at work if individuals do not respond to these laws by carrying
handguns more frequently in the first place.
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The coefficients of the other variables are available upon request. Briefly, those control variables are mostly
insignificant except a few. For example, in the models that does not control for larceny rate, the coefficient of the
lagged prisoner rate is about -0.30 and the coefficient of the unemployment rate is 0.34. Both are significant at
conventional significance levels. However, inclusion of the larceny rate reduces the size of these coefficients (in
absolute value) and eliminates their significance. Larceny rate is positively associated with the real value of guns
stolen. This relationship is almost one-to-one. A one percent increase in the larceny rate is associated with about a
one percent increase in the per capita real value of guns stolen. This is consistent with Cook, Molliconi and Cole
(1995) who argued that cash and firearms are the most common types of assets stolen.
53
The most convenient way to acquire guns for individuals who are likely to commit serious crimes is to obtain
them illegally. Such illegal options mainly include stealing a gun or obtaining it through underground channels.
Guns traded through informal channels are more likely to be illegally obtained, possibly stolen guns, than legally
purchased ones. However, as the results of this section suggest, a shall-issue law does not influence the number of
gun thefts. If shall-issue laws do not have an influence on stolen gun cases, availability of guns to criminals through
underground markets should not be affected, either.
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Table 2.14 Influence of Satisfying Minimum Required Age on Probability of Carrying a
Gun in the Last Month
I
II
III
Law Abiding
Serious Crime
Minor Crime
Individuals
Arrestees
Arrestees
Marginal Effect is calculated for
1 Whole sample

0.006***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.002)

2 Individuals In a Shall-Issue Statea
3 Individuals In a Non-Shall-Issue Stateb
4 Eventual Arrestees in Shall-Issue Statea,c
5 Current Arrestees in Shall-Issue Statea,d
6 Eventual Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue Stateb,c
7 Current Arrestees in Non-Shall-Issue Stateb,d
Observations

58,217

-0.001
(0.008)

-0.011*
(0.006)

0.001
(0.020)
-0.002
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.025)
0.003
(0.011)
10,762

-0.001
(0.011)
-0.010
(0.009)
-0.022**
(0.010)
-0.014
(0.008)
16,322

Notes to Table 2.14: Columns I, II and III present the average marginal effects of the variable Adult based on
estimation of equation (2.1) with the dependent variable Gun in Last Month on samples listed at the top. Law
Abiding Individuals have not committed any crimes as of the last wave of NLSY97. Serious Crime Arrestees have
committed at least one of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. Minor Crime Arrestees have
committed at least one misdemeanor but none of the Index-I crimes of FBI as of the 2007 wave of NLSY97. The
first row provides the average marginal effects evaluated for the whole sample. Other rows pertain to marginal
effects evaluated for different sub-samples as follows: a Shall=1, b Shall=0, c Ever Arrested=0, d Ever Arrested=1
The dependent variable, Gun in Last Month, is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual reported that
he/she has carried a handgun at least once in the last 30 days. The marginal effects are obtained by calculating the
average of the change in individuals‟ probabilities of carrying a gun when the variable Adult is changed from 0 to 1
while other variables are kept at their observed values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.

The findings in this paper indicate that individuals start carrying handguns more often
when they become eligible, i.e. when their states pass shall-issue laws or when they satisfy the
minimum required age in an already-shall-issue state. This increase in handgun carrying
behavior is a result of changes in behavior of law abiding individuals and those who are likely to
commit minor crimes, such as drug possession, public order offenses or traffic offenses. After
the enactment of a shall-issue law, no change is observed in the handgun carrying activity of
individuals who are likely to commit serious offenses, such as assaults, rapes, manslaughters or
robberies. Further, the analysis at the state-level suggests that there is no systematic impact of
shall-issue laws on the amount of guns stolen, one mechanism through which ineligible
individuals can have access to guns. Enactment of a shall-issue law is unlikely to be associated
with an increase in the availability of guns to potential criminals. Taken as a whole, these
findings cast doubt on the presumed existence of the crime-facilitating effect of shall-issue laws.
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Table 2.15 Summary Statistics of Variables used in State-Level Analysis
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Stolen Guns
0.003
0.003
Law
0.391
Post-Passage Trend
1.983
4.297
Unemployment Rate
5.740
1.891
Per capita Personal Income
$18,627
10,997
Per capita Unemployment Benefits
$76.60
58.55
Per capita Income Maintenance
$247.36
172.19
Per capita Retirement Payments
$2,265
1,509
Larceny Rate
2,838
753
Lagged Incarceration Rate
298
221
Population Density
329
1241
% Black Male Pop. 10-19
0.010
0.010
% Black Male Pop. 20-29
0.009
0.009
% Black Male Pop. 30-39
0.008
0.008
% White Male Pop. 10-19
0.063
0.014
% White Male Pop. 20-29
0.065
0.014
% White Male Pop. 30-39
0.065
0.012
The results in this paper provide no evidence for a positive influence of shall-issue laws
on frequency of gun carrying for individuals who are likely to commit serious crimes. This could
be a consequence of the criteria to grant a concealed weapon license imposed by the shall-issue
laws. Specifically, the criteria only allow carrying handguns for individuals who have maintained
a clean arrest record until turning old enough to satisfy the minimum age requirement, which
ranges between 18 and 23 among states. The rationale for such a policy can be the high
likelihood of individuals who have committed crimes early in their lives to involve in future
criminal activity which is highly costly to the society.54
On the other hand, individuals who have maintained clean arrest records until satisfying
the minimum age requirement are eligible to carry handguns. It is possible for such individuals to
commit a crime in the future. However, the results of this paper, similar to the findings of the
previous literature, indicate that even if they carry guns, those individuals who have not
committed a crime earlier in their lives are less likely to commit violent crimes in the future
compared to the individuals who have committed crimes previously. This difference in tendency
to commit serious crimes in the future justifies the use of arrest records in determining an
individual‟s eligibility.

54

Previous research demonstrates that the individuals who have committed crimes (and therefore have a high level
of criminal human capital) early in their lives have difficulty in switching back to the legal sector, and thus
accumulate even more criminal human capital (Mocan and Bali, forthcoming).
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Table 2.16 Impact of Shall-Issue Laws on Stolen Guns
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Law
0.185
0.335
-0.662***
(0.318)
(0.330)
(0.094)
Post-Passage Trend
0.001 -0.022*
-0.064***
(0.023) (0.013)
(0.009)
State FE
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Year Dummies
No
No
No
No
No
State Trends
No
No
No
No
No
Control Variables
No
No
No
No
No
Larceny Rate
No
No
No
No
No
Observations
1,381
1,381
1,381
1,381
1,381

Law

(7)
-0.044
(0.076)

Post-Passage Trend
State FE
Year Dummies
State Trends
Control Variables
Larceny Rate
Observations

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
1,381

(8)

0.040
(0.025)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
1,381

(9)
-0.067
(0.077)
0.041
(0.025)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
1,381

(10)
-0.043
(0.079)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,381

(11)

0.022
(0.029)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,381

(12)
-0.051
(0.080)
0.023
(0.029)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,381

(6)
-0.394***
(0.099)
-0.037***
(0.008)
Yes
No
No
No
No
1,381

(13)
-0.055
(0.077)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,381

(14)

0.026
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,381

(15)
-0.065
(0.077)
0.027
(0.023)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,381

Notes to Table 2.16: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real value of number of firearms stolen per 100,000 individuals. Control variables are
the natural logarithms of the unemployment rate, per capita real personal income, unemployment insurance, income maintenance and retirement payments,
lagged incarceration rate, population density and the share of white and black males aged 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 in the total state population. Standard errors are
clustered at the state-level and regressions are weighted using the population. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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CHAPTER 3. UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME
3.1 Introduction
The economics literature has suggested that criminal activity is primarily motivated by
net relative benefits to illegal activities. First pointed out by Becker (1968), potential criminals
weigh the costs and benefits of committing crime. Crime and labor markets are not mutually
exclusive choices but they represent a continuum of legal and illegal income-generating
competing activities (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005, Machin and Meghir 2004, Block and
Heineke 1975, Erlich 1973). Individuals with potentially better current and future opportunities
in the legal labor market are less likely to commit crime.
One determinant of these opportunities in the labor market is the unemployment rate,
which fluctuates over the business cycle. During a recession, when the unemployment rate goes
up, employment chances in the legal labor market diminish. As long as the employment
prospects of individuals are influenced by the legal labor market conditions, the changes in the
unemployment rate will impact the crime rate which is an aggregation of individuals‟ criminal
activities. During times of high unemployment, the relative benefit of working in the legal labor
market for an individual decreases on the margin, increasing the crime rate in the country.
Using data from one single country, several studies confirm that unemployment increases
crime. For example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002),
Corman and Mocan (2005), and Lin (2008) used data from the U.S. to investigate the impact of
unemployment on crime. Other researchers have examined the same question using non-U.S.
data, such as Edmark (2005) and Oster and Agell (2007) with Swedish data, and Buonanno
(2006) with Italian data.
However, in an international context, the impact of unemployment on crime has not been
studied extensively. Only Wolpin (1980) analyzed unemployment‟s influence on crime by using
burglaries in Japan, U.K. and U.S.55 There is only a handful of studies which investigate other
aspects of crime using country-level data sets. For example, Lin (2007) investigated the
relationship between democracy and crime. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000, 2002)
analyzed the impact of income inequality on crime by analyzing only homicides and robberies.
Miron (2001) show that drug prohibition policies are one of the main determinants of crime
across countries.
The primary reason for the paucity of research based on international data is the absence
of comparable crime statistics across countries. Legal practices, such as definitions and recording
methods of crimes differ across countries. Another reason for non-comparability is the fact that
some crimes are underreported. Underreporting is a more serious issue for developing countries
and especially for low-value property crimes, such as theft and for crimes carrying a social
stigma for the victim, such as rape (Soares 2004). Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000,
2002) dealt with this measurement problem by assuming a time-invariant form for the
measurement error in crimes. In this paper, a similar approach is used to deal with potential
underreporting. In addition, differences in legal practices across countries are accounted for. The
crime data employed in this paper have the advantage of having consistent measures of crime
across countries as explained in more detail below.
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In his study U.S. is represented by California.
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This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime by employing a uniformly
collected international data set from European countries. In this international context, using the
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable has an additional advantage. Analyses based on
city level or state level data may suffer from reverse causality as crime may impact the local
unemployment rate (Cullen and Levitt 1999). However, variation in a country‟s crime rate is not
expected to directly affect the unemployment rate of that specific country, reducing the concern
of a bias. However, for other reasons such as measurement error and confounding factors,
unemployment rate may be endogenous. Therefore, I also estimate IV models where the
exchange rate movements, industrial accidents and earthquakes are used as instruments for the
unemployment rate. Consistent with Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), I find that 2SLS and
OLS estimates are not significantly different from each other.
The overall unemployment rate may not be an appropriate measure to identify the
marginal criminal. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008) suggest that employment
conditions among population subgroups may drive the impact of unemployment on crime. In
addition, Engelhardt (2010) suggests that duration of the unemployment is a significant
determinant of criminal activity. To test these hypotheses, I decompose the overall
unemployment rate into various components according to gender, education and the duration of
the unemployment. The results provide evidence that unemployment of males, of the individuals
with low education, and of the individuals who have been jobless for more than one year drive
the influence of the overall unemployment rate on crime.
3.2 Empirical Framework
Following previous research, I estimate a crime equation that includes controls for
deterrence, economic incentives, consumption goods associated with crime and other sociodemographic controls (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001, and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard,
2002). As described below, the empirical framework aims at isolating the influence of
unemployment on crime through mechanism related to individuals‟ labor market opportunities.
In the empirical analysis, homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, burglary and motor
vehicle theft are analyzed. Due to the organization of the data at the source, theft includes all
activities that involve stealing such as burglaries and motor vehicle thefts. In other words, theft
measure in this paper is comparable to the FBI‟s total property crime measure. As the eighth
outcome variable, I construct larceny by taking the difference between the theft rate and sum of
the burglary and motor vehicle theft rates.
The variable of interest is the unemployment rate. As explained in the introduction, in an
individual level framework, participation in criminal activity is associated with the employment
status of the individual. As long as the current and future employment prospects of individuals
are influenced by the legal labor market opportunities in the country, the changes in the
unemployment rate will affect the crime rate which is an aggregation of individuals‟ criminal
activities. The relationship between unemployment and crime is expected to be stronger for
thefts, burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts which involve pecuniary benefits.56
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However, as noted by Corman and Mocan (2000), there may be some impact of unemployment on violent crimes
as well. This is because violent crimes and property crimes can take place together in one incident. For example, a
murder can follow a burglary.
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There are mechanisms through which unemployment can influence crime other than
labor market opportunities. One of these channels is the consumption of crime-related goods. For
example, Ruhm (1995) has shown that alcohol consumption increases during expansions and
decreases during recessions. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) argue that gun availability and
drug use may also move pro-cyclically. In addition, the link between unemployment and crime
may be driven by the availability of theft-worthy goods. Specifically, during a recession
individuals‟ incomes decline and this possibly reduces the consumption of high-value-storing
goods such as jewelry or consumer durables. The decrease in consumption of such wealthstoring goods may decrease the expected returns to criminal activity and therefore, leads to
reduction in crime rate. A third mechanism may work through income inequality. Mocan (1999)
and the papers he cites find that increases in unemployment worsen the relative position of lowincome groups in the income distribution. Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza
(2002) suggest that a higher degree of income inequality induces greater criminal activity.
The first two of the mechanisms mentioned above are directly controlled for in this
analysis. The influence of unemployment on crime is isolated from the impact of consumption of
crime-related goods by controlling for alcohol consumption per capita and drug crime rate. In
addition, control variables include GDP per capita as a proxy for pecuniary returns to criminal
activity. A similar approach is taken by Witte (1980).
Income inequality is not explicitly controlled for in my main analysis because the sample
size would have been reduced to almost half if a measure of inequality such as the Gini
coefficient was added as a control variable. However, for a smaller sample, I run regressions that
additionally employ Gini as a covariate.57 The results are almost identical to those that do not
employ Gini.58 In order to conduct the empirical analysis with a larger sample, I do not employ
the Gini coefficient in my empirical analysis.
In addition to alcohol consumption per capita, drug crime rate and GDP per capita,
control variables include lagged police rate, urbanization rate and the ratio of young to old
people.59 I also control for country indicators and year dummies in the regressions. Police rate is
lagged by one year to avoid a potential reverse causality problem (Corman and Mocan 2000,
2005).
The unit of observation in this paper is a country-year. Consequently, the estimation
strategy, as described above, may suffer from omitted variables that are not conventionally
considered by previous studies that use data from one country. For example, Lin (2007) shows
that the level of democracy in a country can be a significant determinant of crime. If the regime
type in a country also influences the employment opportunities in a country, then my estimation
will be biased. Similarly, immigration may influence both crime and unemployment (Bianchi,
Buonanno and Pinotti 2011). Although I do not control for such influences in my main
regressions, in the Results section, I show that my estimation is robust to controlling for such
possibly-confounding factors.
57

For example, inclusion of the Gini coefficient reduces the sample size in my largest sample (theft rate) from 187
to 95. The source of the Gini coefficient is World Bank‟s World Development Indicators.
58
To do this analysis, I run the models that include and exclude Gini coefficient in the same samples to eliminate the
influence of the reduction in sample size. Gini was always insignificant. Generally, the signs, magnitudes and
significance of the coefficients of unemployment rate are unaffected by the inclusion of Gini. The only exception is
theft. The coefficient of the unemployment rate turns significant when Gini is additionally controlled for in theft
regressions.
59
Ratio of young to old population is computed by dividing the number of people who are aged between 15 and 39
to the number of people older than 39.
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Exogeneity of unemployment in a crime regression could be questionable. Previous
literature provided mixed evidence on the exogeneity of the unemployment rate in this context.
For example, with a state panel data set, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) have shown that
there is not much difference between OLS and IV estimates of the unemployment rate in a crime
equation, suggesting reverse causality is not a major issue with state level data. Lin (2008) and
Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) have found that IV estimates of the unemployment rate are
consistently larger than the OLS estimates.
In this paper, reverse causality is not alarming since a panel of countries (more
aggregated units of observation) is employed in the empirical analysis. This is because variations
in the crime rate of a country in a given year are not expected to influence the unemployment
rate of the country in that same year. Moreover, in the empirical analysis, I control for several
country characteristics as well as country fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobservable
variables. However, for other reasons such as measurement error and confounding factors,
unemployment rate may be endogenous. Therefore, I also estimate instrumental variable models
in which the unemployment rate is instrumented by the exchange rate, industrial accidents and
earthquakes. Instrumental Variables section below provides a more detailed discussion of the
instruments and the estimation.
Lin (2008) and Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) suggested that unemployment of
population sub-groups may be the driving force behind the impact of the overall unemployment
rate on crime. To gauge the potentially differential impact on crime of the unemployment
prevailing in different population groups in a country, several unemployment rate measures are
constructed. Specifically, I decompose the overall unemployment rate into measures of female
and male unemployment; unemployment of the low educated and high educated individuals.
These measures are constructed by computing the ratios of the unemployed people in the
specified sub-groups of the population to the total labor force. For example, labor force share of
unemployed females (males) is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed females
(males) by the total labor force. Similarly, labor force share of the unemployed with primary
education (with high education) is the ratio of the number of unemployed individuals who have
completed at most primary school (at least secondary school) to the total labor force.
Notice that the sum of the labor force shares of the unemployed from population subgroups equals to the overall unemployment rate. Therefore, employing the overall
unemployment rate in the specification restricts the coefficients of the labor force share variables
to be equal to each other. For example, the unrestricted form depicted by equation (3.1) below
would reduce to equation (3.2) under the restriction that the coefficients βm and βf are equal to βu.
(3.1)

Crime = (βm Unemployed Males + βf Unemployed Females) / Labor Force + Xγ + ε

(3.2)

Crime = βu Unemployment Rate + Xγ + ε

Similarly, labor force shares of the unemployed individuals with primary education and high
education are used in the empirical analysis.
The influence of unemployment on crime may also depend on its duration. An individual
who has been unemployed for a longer time period is more likely to commit a crime. This is
because, individuals who have been jobless for a longer time periods face a lower opportunity
cost of committing crime. Along the lines of this idea, Engelhardt (2010) reports that reduction
in unemployment spell leads to decreases in criminal activity. To test this finding with an
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international data set, I decompose the overall unemployment rate according to the duration of
the unemployment and gender, similar to education and gender decomposition of the
unemployment rate described above. Specifically, the constructed variables measure the labor
force shares of males and females who are long and short-term unemployed.60
3.3 Data
The crime and police officers data are obtained from two waves of European Sourcebook
of Crime and Criminal Justice, covering the period between 1995 and 2003.61 The first wave of
the European Sourcebook, which covers the period between 1990 and 1994, is not included in
this analysis because police officers data are not available. Prosecutions and convictions are
available in all three waves and they can be considered as measures of deterrence. However, they
are not consistently measured between and within the countries over time, making the
comparison difficult.62
The data set used in this paper includes information from 33 countries. The list of the
countries and the years covered for each country is presented in Table 3.1. Some of the European
countries are excluded from the analysis due to missing data. However, the included countries
can be claimed to represent an overall picture of Europe. As of 2009, three quarters of the
Europeans lived in the 33 countries that are included in this study. Further, these countries
account for production of about 74 percent of the total European GDP.63
Crime statistics obtained from the European Sourcebook are similar to those provided by
the Uniform Crime Reports in US. Both sources present information about crime as measured by
reported complaints to the police. Another similarity between the European Sourcebook and
Uniform Crime Reports is the uniformity in what is counted as a crime. That is, crime definitions
in both sources are consistent over time. This quality of European Sourcebook is unique among
cross-country crime data sets.64
For all crimes included in the European Sourcebook, a standard definition is used and the
statistics follow this standard definition where possible. These definitions are provided in Table
3.2. If a country‟s crime statistics deviate from the standard definition, the European Sourcebook
provides information about what aspect of the standard definition is not met. For example, the
standard definition of homicide is “intentionally killing of a person.” According to this
definition, euthanasia should be included as homicide, since euthanasia involves killing a fetus
intentionally. However, euthanasia is not considered a homicide by some countries and it is
impossible for these countries to provide homicide data that include euthanasia cases. The
European Sourcebook lists the countries that follow the standard definition and also those that do
60

The long-term (short-term) unemployed individuals are those who are unemployed for at least one year (less than
one year).
61
Since I use lagged police rate in estimation, the effective sample period becomes 1996-2003.
62
In most of the European countries the police use discretion to decide whether to prosecute or not. For example, the
criminal can get away with a warning for small scale thefts or burglaries. Most importantly, the crime definitions
used by the judicial system and the police are not identical. Although offence definitions adopted by the various
police systems present uniformity among countries, rules for recording punishments can vary substantially.
63
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
64
For example, the United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems provide
data reported by law enforcement agencies in each country. The crime statistics in the U.N. dataset are not standard
across countries, unlike the European Sourcebook data.
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not follow. The countries that deviate from the standard crime definitions and the way they
deviate from the standard definitions are listed in Table 3.3. In the empirical analysis, any nonconformity to definitions is controlled for by a set of dummy variables.
The source of labor market variables, GDP per capita and urban population is the World
Development Indicators.65 The ratio of young population to the old population is the ratio of
population aged 15-39 to the population aged 40 or more. It is constructed using the data from
the U.S. Census Bureau's International database.66 Alcohol consumption per capita variable is
obtained from the World Health Organization‟s Global Alcohol Database.67 Drug crime rate and
the police rate are crimes related to drugs and police officers per 100,000 individuals,
respectively. They are obtained from the European Sourcebook. Table 3.4 presents the
definitions and the descriptive statistics of all the variables as well as their sources.
Among the instrumental variables, exchange rate is obtained from the Penn World Tables
version 6.3. Exchange rate is measured as the amount of domestic currency that one US dollar
can buy. Share of manufacturing sector‟s value added in GDP is obtained from World
Development Indicators. Finally, the data on industrial accidents and earthquakes are obtained
from EM-DAT data base (the international disaster data base).68. More details about the
instruments are provided in the Instrumental Variables Regressions Section below.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Overall Unemployment Rate
Figure 1 provides a visual analysis of the influence of the unemployment rate on crime.
In Figure 1, a measure of theft rate and the unemployment rate for the set of the countries with
non-missing data are depicted. Theft rate is chosen because as defined in this paper, thefts
include all property crimes, such as burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts. As a result,
thefts in this paper correspond to FBI‟s total property crimes. The graphs of individual crime
types are similar to that of theft. The solid line represents the variation in the theft rate that is
unexplained by the control variables. Specifically, the measure of the theft rate depicted in
Figure 1 is obtained by calculating the residuals from the regression of theft rate on control
variables.69 The dashed line is the unemployment rate.
Among the graphs of the 16 countries presented in Figure 1, most graphs show that the
unemployment rate and the theft rate have very similar trends. Graphs of seven countries (UK,
Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Italy, Hungary and Finland) display an obvious positive
correlation between the unemployment rate and the theft rate for the whole sample period.70
Another 6 graphs (Slovenia, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark, Czech Republic and Croatia) reveal
positive correlation for some years in the sample.
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http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/
67
http://www.who.int/globalatlas/default.asp
68
http://www.emdat.be/
69
The control variables are Lagged Police Rate, GDP per capita, % Urban Population, Drug Rate, Young per Old
population and Alcohol consumption per capita as well as country fixed effects, year dummies and indicators that
account for the differences in crime definitions.
70
In this study UK refers to England and Wales.
66
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Table 3.1 Countries Covered in the Study
Country
Years covered
Albania
2001
Austria
1996 - 2003
Belgium
2000, 2003
Croatia
1996 - 2003
Cyprus
1999 - 2003
Czech Republic
1996 - 2003
Denmark
1996 - 2003
Estonia
1996 - 2001, 2003
Finland
1996 - 2003
France
1997, 2001, 2003
Georgia
1998 - 2003
Greece
1996 - 2003
Hungary
1996 - 2003
Iceland
2003
Ireland
1996 - 2003
Italy
1996 - 2003
Latvia
1996 - 1999
Lithuania
1996 - 2003
Luxembourg
2003
Malta
2000, 2001
Moldova
1999, 2000
Netherlands
1998 - 2003
Norway
1996 - 1999
Poland
1996 - 2003
Portugal
1996 - 2003
Romania
1996 - 1999, 2001 - 2003
Russia
2001
Slovakia
2001 - 2003
Slovenia
1996 - 2003
Sweden
1996 - 2003
Switzerland
1996 - 2003
Turkey
1996 - 1999
UK: England & Wales
1996 - 2003
To quantify the relationship between unemployment and crime observed in Figure 1, I
regress the crime rates on the unemployment rate and the control variables using OLS. The
crimes considered are homicide, assault, rape, robbery, total theft, burglary, larceny and motor
vehicle theft.71 The variable of interest in this section is the unemployment rate. Control
variables include lagged police rate, GDP per capita, % urban population, drug rate, young per
old population and alcohol consumption per capita. The regressions also control for country
71

The definitions of these variables are presented in Table 3.2 and the Data section.
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fixed effects and year dummies as well as indicators that account for the differences in crime
definitions. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
Regressions are weighted by the country population.72 The results are provided in Table 3.5.
Being unemployed can induce motivation to earn income illegally, but it does not
necessarily increase violent behavior. The estimates in Table 3.5 support this hypothesis. The
sign of the unemployment rate‟s coefficients are positive for all crimes that involve pecuniary
benefits except robbery. Further, this influence is statistically significant for total thefts, larcenies
and motor vehicle thefts. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated
with 2%, 1% and 4% increase in total thefts, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts, respectively.73
These results are consistent with previous studies that employ US data, such as Lin (2008),
Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) and Levitt (2004). The unemployment rate is not
significantly associated violent crimes. The negative sign of the unemployment rate in violent
crime regressions is not uncommon in the literature. For example, OLS estimates in Lin (2008)
show the same exact pattern.
GDP per capita is positively associated with property crimes but not with violent crimes.
This may be because GDP per capita is a proxy for the benefits associated with crimes. The
greater is the average income in a country, the greater returns to committing property crimes are
on average. Along the similar lines, the coefficient of Young per Old for crimes that involve
monetary benefits is negative. This variable may be indicative of wealth in a country. Generally
wealth is accumulated over the life cycle and the elderly have more valuable assets compared to
the young. If in a country there are more young individuals for each elderly individual, then there
is less to steal.74
The coefficient of Drug Crime Rate is consistently positive for violent crimes and
negative for property crimes.75 This pattern may arise because drug crimes can be substitutes for
theft, burglary and motor vehicle theft, but complements for violent crimes. Individuals who
choose to work in illegal sector allocate their time between several illegal income-generating
activities. The criminals whose net returns to drug crimes are greater than net returns to theft,
burglary or vehicle theft are less likely to commit theft, burglary or motor vehicle theft. They
rather earn income through drugs.
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The country population that is used for weighting is the average for the sample period.
Similar elasticities are estimated when natural log of the crimes are used instead of the level of the crime. When
standard errors are corrected for first-order serial correlation, the coefficients of the unemployment rate in theft,
larceny and motor vehicle theft regressions are significant at conventional levels and the estimated elasticities are
similar to those reported in Table 3.5.
74
On the other hand, it is well-known that the young are more likely to commit crimes compared to the old. In fact,
this is reflected in the positive coefficient of Young per Old in the Assault regression. The greater the ratio of young
individuals to old individuals is, the greater the number of assaults which has no monetary rewards to the offender.
75
The Drug Crime Rate is not only a proxy for the prevalence of drug use and possession, but also a measure of the
extent of illegal income-generating activities related to drugs.
73
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Crime

Table 3.2 Standard Definitions of Crimes in the European Sourcebook
Definition

Homicide

Intentional killing of a person. It includes assault leading to death, euthanasia and infanticide, excludes
assistance with suicide.

Assault

Inflicting bodily injury on another person with intent. It excludes assault leading to death, threats, acts just
causing pain, slapping/punching, sexual assault.

Rape

Sexual intercourse with a person against her/his will (per vaginam or other). Where possible, the figures
include other than vaginal penetration (e.g. buggery), violent intra-marital intercourse, sexual intercourse
without force, with a helpless person, sexual intercourse with force with a minor, incestual sexual intercourse,
with or without force with a minor. But it excludes sexual intercourse with a minor without force and other
forms of sexual assault.

Robbery

Stealing from a person with force or threat of force. Where possible, the figures include muggings (bagsnatching), theft with violence. But they exclude pick-pocketing, extortion and blackmail.

Theft

Depriving a person/organization of property without force with the intent to keep it. Where possible, the
figures include burglary, theft of motor vehicles, theft of other items, theft of small value. But they exclude
embezzlement, receiving/handling of stolen goods.

Burglary

Gaining access to a closed part of a building or other premises by use of force with the intent to steal goods.
Figures on burglary should, where possible, include theft from a factory, shop or office, from a military
establishment, or by using false keys; they should exclude, however, theft from a car, from a container, from a
vending machine, from a parking meter and from a fenced meadow/compound.

Motor Vehicle Theft

According to the standard definition, figures on theft of a motor vehicle should, where possible, include
joyriding, but exclude theft of motorboats and handling/receiving stolen vehicles.
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Table 3.3 Countries that Deviate from the Standard Crime Definitions
Offense

Deviation from the definition

Countries – 2nd wave

Countries – 3rd wave

Homicide

Assault leading to death
excluded

Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Moldova,
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia,
Slovenia.

Albania, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary,
Moldova, The Netherlands, Russia,
Slovenia.

Homicide

Euthanasia excluded

Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Malta, Russia, Slovenia.

Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Malta,
Slovenia.

Homicide

Infanticide excluded

Czech Republic, Greece, Norway, Romania.

Czech Republic, Greece, Romania.

Homicide

Assistance with suicide
included

Austria, Latvia, Norway, Slovakia,
Switzerland.

Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ireland,
Italy, Malta, Switzerland.

Assault

Assault leading to death
included

Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta,
Moldova, Norway, Romania, Russia,
Slovenia.

Albania, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Malta, Moldova,
Netherlands, Russia, Slovenia.

Assault

Threats included

Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands,
UK.

Georgia, Ireland, Malta.

Assault

Acts causing pain included

Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia,
Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden, Turkey, UK.

Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Malta, Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden, UK.
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Table 3.3 continued
Offense

Deviation from the definition

Countries – 2nd wave

Countries – 3rd wave

Assault

Sexual assault included

Georgia, Ireland, Malta, Norway.

Croatia.

Rape

Acts other than vaginal
penetration excluded

Latvia, Romania, Russia.

Denmark, Georgia, Greece, Russia,
UK.

Rape

Violent intra-marital
intercourse excluded

Greece, Romania, Russia.

Greece, Moldova, Russia.

Rape

Sexual intercourse without
force with a helpless person
excluded
Sexual intercourse with force
with a minor excluded

Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden.

Denmark, Georgia, Greece,
Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden.

--

Georgia, Greece, Slovenia.

Rape

Incestual sexual intercourse
with or without force with a
minor excluded

Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, UK.

Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
UK.

Rape

Sexual intercourse with a
minor without force included

Albania, Belgium, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia

Albania, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Malta, Moldova, Portugal.

Rape

Other forms of sexual assault
included

Czech Republic, Georgia, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania.

Romania.

Robbery

Extortion and blackmail
included

Cyprus.

--

Rape
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Table 3.3 continued
Offense

Deviation from the definition

Countries – 2nd wave

Countries – 3rd wave

Robbery

Pick-pocketing included

Turkey.

Moldova, Netherlands.

Robbery

Muggings excluded

Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Lithuania,
Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden.

Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece,
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden.

Robbery

Theft with violence excluded

Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy,
Norway.

Denmark, Greece, Hungary, ,

Theft

Burglary excluded

Cyprus, Norway.

--

Theft

Theft of motor vehicles
excluded
Theft of small values
excluded

Denmark.

Denmark, Moldova.

Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, , Switzerland.

Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia.

Theft

Receiving/handling stolen
property included

UK.

--

Theft

Embezzlement included

--

Albania, Cyprus, Greece, Moldova.

Burglary

Burglary from a factory,
shop, or office excluded

Italy, Luxembourg, Norway.

Italy.

Burglary

Burglary from a military
establishment excluded

Georgia, Italy, Luxembourg and Norway.

Albania, , Georgia, Greece, Italy,
Slovenia

Theft
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Table 3.3 continued
Offense

Deviation from the definition

Countries – 2nd wave

Countries – 3rd wave

Burglary

Theft (burglary) by gaining
entrance with false keys
excluded
Theft from a car included

Georgia, Norway, Switzerland.

Greece, Switzerland

Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey.

Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Iceland, Malta, Moldova,
Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia.

Burglary

Theft from a container
included

Albania, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Latvia,
Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey.

Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Iceland, Moldova,
Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland.

Burglary

Stealing from vending
machine included

Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland.

Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Iceland, Malta, Moldova,
Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland.

Burglary

Theft from a parking meter
included

Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland.

Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Netherlands, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland.

Burglary
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Table 3.3 continued
Offense

Deviation from the definition

Countries – 2nd wave

Countries – 3rd wave

Burglary

Theft from a fenced meadow
or compound included

Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Greece, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands,
Poland, Romania, Russia.

Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, Iceland, Moldova,
Netherlands, Poland, Romania,
Russia.

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

Joyriding excluded

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Netherlands,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia.

Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece,
Moldova, Netherlands, Poland,
Russia, Slovenia.

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

Theft of motorboats included

Cyprus, Finland, France, Georgia, Italy,
Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, UK.

Cyprus, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden.

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

Receiving/handling stolen
motor vehicles included

Cyprus, Georgia.

Lithuania.
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Variable
Homicide Rate*

Table 3.4 Summary Statistics and Descriptions
Definition
Homicides per 100,000 individuals.

Assault Rate*

Source
A

N
169

Mean
5.28

Std. Dev.
3.94

Assaults per 100,000 individuals.

A

187

185.83

239.54

Rape Rate*

Rapes per 100,000 individuals.

A

187

8.01

6.41

Robbery Rate*

Robberies per 100,000 individuals.

A

187

73.74

67.75

Theft Rate*

Thefts per 100,000 individuals.

A

187

2618.52

1991.86

Burglaries per 100,000 individuals.
Difference between the Theft Rate and the sum of
Burglary Rate and Motor Vehicle Theft Rate.

A
A

160
153

938.69
1668.26

681.00
1339.17

Motor Vehicle Theft*

Thefts of motor vehicles per 100,000 individuals.

A

179

275.10

238.89

Unemployment Rate

Ratio of unemployed population to labor force times 100.

B

187

8.52

4.25

Share of Unemployed Males in
Labor Force

Ratio of unemployed male population to total labor force
times 100.

B

187

4.48

2.27

Share of Unemployed Females in
Labor Force

Ratio of unemployed female population total labor force
times 100.

B

187

4.04

2.11

Share of the Poorly-Educated
and Unemployed in Labor Force

Ratio of unemployed population with at most primary
schooling to total labor force times 100.

B

172

2.67

1.58

Share of the Well-Educated and
Unemployed in Labor Force

Ratio of unemployed population with more than primary
schooling to total labor force times 100.

B

171

5.71

3.67

Share of the Poorly-Educated
and Unemployed Males in Labor
Force

Ratio of unemployed male population with at most
primary schooling to total labor force times 100.

B

172

1.47

0.93

Burglary Rate
Larceny Rate

*
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Table 3.4 continued
Variable
Share of the Poorly-Educated
and Unemployed Females in
Labor Force
Share of the Well-Educated and
Unemployed Males in Labor
Force
Share of the Well-Educated and
Unemployed Females in Labor
Force
Share of Short-term Unemployed
Males in Labor Force

Definition
Ratio of unemployed female population with at most
primary schooling to total labor force times 100.

Source
B

N
172

Mean
1.19

Std. Dev.
0.74

Ratio of unemployed male population with more than
primary schooling to total labor force times 100.

B

171

2.91

1.97

Ratio of unemployed female population with more than
primary schooling to total labor force times 100.

B

171

2.80

1.78

Ratio of males who are unemployed for less than one year
to total labor force times 100.

B

154

2.38

1.02

Share of Short-term Unemployed
Females in Labor Force

Ratio of females who are unemployed for less than one
year to total labor force times 100.

B

154

2.16

0.94

Share of Short-term Unemployed
Males in Labor Force
Share of Short-term Unemployed
Females in Labor Force

Ratio of males who are unemployed for more than one
year to total labor force times 100.
Ratio of females who are unemployed for more than one
year to total labor force times 100.

B

154

1.89

1.35

B

154

1.74

1.34

Lagged Police Rate

Total number of police officers per 100,000 people

A

187

349.21

168.69

GDP per capita
% Urban Population

Real GDP per capita in 2000 dollars. Scaled by 0.01.
Ratio of the population living in urban areas to the total
population times 100.
Crimes related to drugs per 100,000 individuals.

B
B

187
187

207.47
67.25

105.81
12.81

A

187

145.55

180.67

C
D

187
187

9.69
83.09

3.09
9.80

Drug Rate
Alcohol
Young/Old

Alcohol consumption per capita per annum, in liters.
Ratio of population aged 15-39 to the population aged
more than 40 times 100.
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Table 3.4 continued
Variable
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1
Industrial Accidents × Manuf.
GDPt-1
Earthquake

Definition
Exchange rate weighted with the share of manufacturing
sector‟s value added to GDP
Dummy for industrial accidents weighted with the share of
manufacturing sector‟s value added to GDP
Dummy for earthquakes

Source
F, B

N
175

Mean
372.83

Std. Dev.
1155.74

E,B

175

1.60

5.65

E

187

0.09

0.29

Notes to Table 3.4:
*
See Table 3.2 for the standard definitions of crimes and the Table 3.3 for the deviations of the countries from the standard definition
A – European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice, B – World Development Indicators, C – World Health Organization, Global Alcohol Database,
D – U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, E – EM-DAT, the international disaster data base.
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A similar pattern is observed for the coefficient of the Alcohol consumption. Alcohol
consumption per capita is correlated positively with violent crimes and negatively with property
crimes. A possible explanation of this pattern involves the impact of alcohol on individual
behavior. First, excessive alcohol consumption is associated with more aggressive and violent
behavior (Markowitz 2005). Secondly, individuals who consume large amounts of alcohol may
suffer from judgment impairment and diminished physical performance. These and other
mechanisms that relate alcohol consumption and criminal activity are discussed in Carpenter and
Dobkin (2010). The side effects of alcohol consumption are reflected in the estimated
coefficients of alcohol. Potential criminals under the influence of alcohol are less likely to
effectively carry out activities related to property crimes. In fact, several property crimes require
some skills such as opening a locked door (in case of a burglary) or starting a car without keys
(in case of motor vehicle theft).
Although most of variables‟ coefficients exhibit the expected signs, police rate and
urbanization rate do not. Nevertheless, those variables are not the variables of interest. Notice
that these control variables are included in the regressions to isolate the influence of the
unemployment rate on crime through mechanisms other than legal labor market opportunities.
The reason for the unexpected coefficient signs may be due to imprecise estimation as these
control variables may be a noisy measure. Therefore, I do not put much stake on these
coefficients.76
The sample I employ contains countries with both stable and unstable democracies.
Using a country-level data set, Lin (2007) shows the level of democracy in a country is a
significant determinant of crime. If the regime type in a country also influences the
unemployment rate, then my estimation will be biased. Further, the influence of unemployment
rate on crime may be different in democratic versus less democratic countries.77 To investigate
these possibilities, I obtained the Democracy index of the countries in my sample from Polity
IV.78 The Democracy index ranges between -10 (strongly autocratic) and 10 (strongly
democratic). European countries in my sample were mostly strongly democratic countries with
median Democracy level of 10. I construct an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a
country‟s average democracy level during the years covered is equal to 10. 18 countries‟ average
democracy levels are 10 the sample.79 In addition to all of the control variables mentioned
above, I included the democratic country indicator and its interaction with the unemployment
rate in the regressions. The coefficients of the unemployment rate variable remain unaffected,
while the interaction term is insignificant. The sum of the interaction term and the
unemployment rate is also positive and significant at conventional levels. These results indicate
that there is no systematic difference between the strongly democratic and less democratic
countries in terms of the influence of the unemployment rate on crime. In other words, findings
reported in this section are not driven by the countries with stable democracies.

76

Similarly, some previous studies had positive coefficients for police in crime regressions. Examples include
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994).
77
I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
78
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
79
These countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.
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Figure 3.1 Thefts and the Unemployment Rate
Solid line represents the residuals from the regression where the theft rate is regressed on all control variables except the unemployment rate (police rate, GDP
per capita, alcohol consumption, drug rate, % urban population, young per old population country fixed effects, year dummies and indicators that account for
differences in crime definitions). Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. Dashed line is the unemployment rate. Only graphs for
the countries that have data for the whole sample period (1996-2003) are presented.
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Unemployment Rate
Police Rate (t-1)
GDP per cap.
% Urban Pop.
Drug Rate
Young/Old
Alcohol
N
F test for fixed effects
P value for fixed effects

Table 3.5 Crime and Overall Unemployment Rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Homicide
Assault
Rape
Robbery
Theft
Burglary
-0.02
-4.86
-0.25*
-0.85
43.10***
6.01
(0.03)
(4.05)
(0.14)
(1.68)
(14.26)
(7.75)
0.00***
0.20
0.00
0.02
0.73
0.50
(0.00)
(0.21)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.61)
(1.21)
-0.01
1.77
-0.04
-0.31
7.44**
0.23
(0.01)
(1.91)
(0.08)
(0.81)
(2.98)
(2.35)
0.15**
-10.25
-0.84*
6.88*
15.63
-5.95
(0.06)
(25.61)
(0.48)
(3.57)
(30.84)
(14.52)
0.00
1.01***
0.00
0.03
-1.30*
-1.00***
(0.00)
(0.31)
(0.01)
(0.06)
(0.73)
(0.33)
-0.06
23.16*
0.04
-3.02
-42.90**
-17.52
(0.04)
(12.55)
(0.26)
(3.24)
(20.08)
(10.49)
0.12
35.11
0.68
2.28
-14.93
-25.90
(0.08)
(24.29)
(0.52)
(3.36)
(44.62)
(16.47)
169
187
187
187
187
160
10,344
2,152
12,218
676
861
88
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

(7)
Larceny
21.07**
(8.60)
2.57
(1.80)
4.28**
(1.95)
5.21
(19.80)
-0.00
(0.38)
-35.91***
(12.62)
-0.65
(27.18)
153
843
0.00

(8)
Vehicle Theft
11.17***
(2.90)
0.18
(0.11)
1.75
(1.03)
-7.74
(10.57)
-0.57***
(0.15)
-1.86
(6.02)
-9.25
(14.86)
179
265
0.00

Notes to Table 3.5: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries, Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All models
include country fixed effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. Standard errors that are clustered at the country
level are presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
F test for fixed effects and P value for fixed effects rows provide the F statistic and p value for the joint significance of country fixed effects and year dummies,
respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime
definitions differences across countries, respectively.
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Many mechanisms can motivate a positive influence of migration on crime. For example,
migrants are more likely to be poorly-educated and to be discriminated against. Customers may
reveal distaste against migrants. Alternatively, migrants may be less productive in some
industries. All of these mechanisms may cause migrants to have less lucrative labor market
opportunities and consequently lead them to involve in criminal activity. As a result, exclusion of
a measure of migration may result in biased estimates if migration influences both
unemployment and crime.80 To prevent against this possibility, I include the share of migrants in
country population in the regressions. The results are virtually unchanged. Despite a slight
decrease, the magnitude and significance of the unemployment rate remain almost identical to
Table 3.5 for property crimes. The share of migrants does not significantly influence any crime
except motor vehicle theft. The coefficient of the share of migrants is negative and significant for
motor vehicle thefts.81
3.4.2 Unemployment of Population Sub-Groups
As discussed in the introduction and empirical framework sections and by Gould,
Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008), overall
unemployment rate may not be able to identify the marginal criminal. Individuals who belong to
two different population sub-groups (such as the highly-educated versus poorly-educated or
males versus females) and who are financially at the margin of committing a crime may respond
differently when they become unemployed. For example, Freeman (1995), Grogger (1998), and
LaGrange, Teresa and Silverman (1999) argued that males are more likely to commit a crime
than do females. Similarly, Becker and Mulligan (1997), Lochner (2004), and Lochner and
Moretti (2004) have suggested that greater schooling decreases criminal activity. Furthermore,
Grogger (1998) and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) report that unskilled and uneducated
males respond to changes in their employment statuses most significantly by committing crimes.
3.4.2.1 Gender-Specific Unemployment
In this section, I investigate whether the influence of male unemployment on crime is
different from that of female unemployment. The overall unemployment rate is decomposed into
measures of gender-specific unemployment as described in the empirical framework section.
Specifically, instead of the overall unemployment rate, labor force shares of the unemployed
males and females are included in regressions.82 Notice that these labor force shares add up to
the overall unemployment rate. In the upper panel of Table 3.6, results for total theft, burglary,
larceny and motor vehicle theft are summarized.83 Although only the coefficients of the measures
of gender-specific unemployment are provided, the control variables included in the models are
80

I thank another anonymous referee for pointing this out.
The coefficient of migrants share is negative but insignificant for other property crimes. This result may be due to
migrants‟ poverty. Migrants are associated with low levels of income and wealth. After all, poverty may be one
reason why they migrate to another country. Therefore, an increase in the share of migrants in a country implies
fewer pecuniary benefits of committing a crime on average.
82
Labor force share of unemployed males (females) is calculated as the ratio of unemployed males (females) to the
total labor force.
83
For violent crimes, the coefficients of gender-specific unemployment measures are statistically insignificant.
81
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same as those in Table 3.5. The signs and significance of these control variables are similar to
those in the model with the overall unemployment rate (Table 3.5). The regressions are weighted
by the country population and standard errors are clustered at the country-level. For comparison
purposes, the lower panel includes the estimates from the specification where the overall
unemployment rate is included instead of labor force shares of unemployed males and females.
As shown in Table 3.6, when labor force shares of unemployed both males and females
are included jointly instead of the overall unemployment rate, their coefficients turn insignificant
or become significant at a lower level. This result is not surprising, as male and female
unemployment rates are highly correlated with each other (0.85). However, the comparison of
the magnitudes of the coefficients reveals that male unemployment is more dominant for
property crimes compared to female unemployment. The coefficients of male unemployment are
significantly greater than coefficients of the female unemployment with p-values less than 0.05.
The results obtained from burglaries are interesting. Conditional on female
unemployment, an increase in the male unemployment is associated with an increase in the
burglary rate. On the other hand, keeping the male unemployment rate constant, the female
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with burglary rate. This systematic difference may be
due to difference in the behavior of unemployed males and females. If an unemployed female is
more likely to stay at home than an unemployed male, then increase in female unemployment
will constitute deterrence for burglaries.84
3.4.2.2 Education-Specific Unemployment
The overall unemployment rate is decomposed into education-specific unemployment
measures. This allows me to gauge the differential impacts on crime of the unemployment of
individuals with higher and lower levels of education. Specifically, instead of the overall
unemployment rate, the shares of the unemployed people with primary education and higher
education in the labor force are included in regressions.85 Since individuals with primary
education have worse labor market prospects than high educated individuals, the relationship
between crime and the unemployment of individuals with primary education is expected to be
stronger.
Table 3.7 displays the results. In the upper panel, results for total theft, burglary, larceny
and motor vehicle theft are summarized. For comparison purposes, the lower panel presents the
estimates from the specification where the overall unemployment rate is included instead of the
labor force share variables. The sample sizes in these regressions are smaller due to missing
education-specific unemployment data. Consequently, in Table 3.7, the coefficients estimates of
the overall unemployment rate are different from those reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.

84

This is because burglarizing a house when the residents are inside is costlier for a potential criminal.
Labor force share of the unemployed with primary education (high education) is the ratio of the unemployed
individuals who has completed primary school (who has completed secondary or tertiary school) to the total labor
force.
85
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Table 3.6 Crime and Gender-Specific Unemployment
Unemployed Males in Labor Force
Unemployed Females in Labor Force
Overall Unemployment Rate
Observations

Theft
121.63
(80.30)

Burglary
83.40**
(38.26)

Larceny
68.82
(67.50)

Vehicle Theft
30.12*
(14.96)

-52.44
(83.70)

-85.37**
(37.89)

-34.03
(71.84)

-11.95
(18.69)

43.10***
(14.26)

6.01
(7.75)

21.07**
(8.60)

11.17***
(2.90)

187

160

153

179

Notes to Table 3.6: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries,
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of unemployed males and females. For
comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the estimates of the overall unemployment rate instead of the labor
force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are presented in parentheses.
The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the
descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences across countries, respectively.

Results presented in Table 3.7 provide evidence that unemployed individuals with
primary education are the driving force behind the influence of the unemployment rate on crime.
A one percentage point increase in the labor force share of the unemployed with low education
leads to about 7% and 16% increase in total thefts and motor vehicle thefts, conditional on the
unemployment of the high educated individuals.86 The influence of the labor force share of the
unemployed with low education is greater than that of the unemployed with high education in
magnitude for all property crimes. The difference is statistically significant for total thefts and
motor vehicle thefts.87
3.4.2.3 Gender-and-Education-Specific Unemployment
In this section, the estimated specification is modified to include unemployment measures
of males and females with primary and higher education instead of the overall unemployment
rate. That is, four unemployment variables are included in the regressions instead of the overall
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These elasticity estimates are consistent with the estimates of the overall unemployment rate. For example, a one
percentage point increase in the overall unemployment rate is associated with two percent increase in the total theft
rate. In this sample, on average, one third of the all unemployed individuals have at most primary education. If
individuals with low education and high education are equally likely to be laid off for example due to a recession, a
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a one third percentage point increase in the
unemployment of individuals with primary education. According to the estimates in Table 3.7, such a change will
lead to a two percent increase in the total theft rate (six percent multiplied by one third).
87
However, the impact of education specific unemployment on violent crimes is statistically not different than zero
with very high p-values. The results are not presented.
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unemployment rate: labor force shares of the unemployed males and females with low and high
education.88
Table 3.8 presents the results. In the upper panel, results for total theft, burglary, larceny
and motor vehicle theft are summarized. For comparison purposes, in the lower panel, the
estimates from the specification where the overall unemployment rate is included are presented.
The sample sizes in these regressions are smaller due to missing education-specific
unemployment data. Consequently, in Table 3.8, the coefficients estimates of the overall
unemployment rate are different from those reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
The results in Table 3.8 are very similar to the findings in the previous sections. The
coefficients of unemployment of males with primary education are significant and positive for
total thefts and motor vehicle thefts, but not for burglaries and larcenies. This may be due to
either smaller sample sizes or the high correlation of the unemployment of males and females in
the same education group.89 The unemployment of males with primary education is positively
associated with other property crimes as well. Within the education categories, the coefficients of
the labor force share of the unemployed males are greater than that of females. In addition,
within gender categories, the coefficients of the labor force share of the unemployed individuals
with primary education are greater than that of individuals with high education.
3.4.3 Duration of the Unemployment
This section investigates whether the length of the unemployment spell is a significant
determinant of the influence of unemployment on crime. Specifically, I investigate whether the
individuals who are long-term unemployed (more than one year) or short-term unemployed
drives the relationship between crime and the overall unemployment rate. Individuals who are
unemployed for longer periods are expected to be more likely to commit crimes.
To test this hypothesis, the overall unemployment rate is decomposed into labor force
shares according to the duration of the unemployment. Specifically, I construct variables that
measure the labor force shares of the long-term and short-term unemployed males and females.
These labor force share variables are then included into the regressions instead of the overall
unemployment rate.90
The results are presented in Table 3.9. In the upper panel, results for total theft, burglary,
larceny and motor vehicle theft are summarized. For comparison purposes, in the lower panel,
the estimates from the specification where the overall unemployment rate is included are
presented. The sample sizes in these regressions are smaller due to missing unemployment
duration data. Consequently, in Table 3.9, the coefficients estimates of the overall unemployment
rate are different from those reported in previous tables.

88

Labor force share of the unemployed males (females) with low education [high education] is the ratio of the
number of unemployed males (females) with low education [high education] to the total labor force.
89
Correlations between males and females‟ unemployment are 0.71 for individuals with primary education and 0.92
for individuals with high education.
90
There are four such components. The labor force share of the long term (short term) unemployed males [females]
is calculated by the ratio of the number of males [females] who are unemployed for more than one year (less than
one year) to the total labor force. Notice these four components add up to the overall unemployment rate.
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Table 3.7 Crime and Education-Specific Unemployment
Theft
Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
Unemployed with Primary Educ. in LF
214.67*
69.59
96.36
46.09**
(107.50)
(54.13) (92.57)
(18.47)
Unemployed with High Educ. in LF

3.02
(31.55)

-4.29
(15.72)

4.78
(25.60)

-1.33
(4.91)

Overall Unemployment Rate

48.25**
(20.02)

8.64
(10.39)

20.81
(14.13)

9.15*
(4.59)

171

150

145

166

Observations

Notes to Table 3.7: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries,
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of the unemployed with primary and higher
(secondary or tertiary) education. For comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the estimates of the overall
unemployment rate instead of the labor force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that are clustered at the
country level are presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and ***
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the
sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences
across countries, respectively.

The labor force share of the long-term unemployed males is positively associated with all
property crimes. Conditional on the unemployment of other groups, a one percentage point
increase in the labor force share of the males with long-term unemployment is associated with
about 9%, 11%, 7% and 21% increase in the total thefts, burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle
thefts. These elasticities may seem to be too high, but notice that the mean of the labor force
share of the long-term unemployed males is about two percent. A one percentage point increase
from the base line of two percent corresponds to a 50% increase.
3.5 Instrumental Variables
As discussed in the empirical framework section, unemployment can be endogenous in a
crime regression. Although using a country-level panel data set minimizes this concern, there
may be other reasons that motivate IV estimation such as measurement errors and unobserved
confounding factors. Therefore, I estimate IV models where the unemployment rate is
instrumented by several instrumental variables.
First instrument is the exchange rate weighted by the manufacturing sector‟s value added
to the country‟s GDP in previous year. This instrument is similar to the one used by Lin (2008)
for his analysis of crime and unemployment in US, and by Oster and Agell (2007) for their
analyses of crime and unemployment in Sweden. The impact of the exchange rate on the
unemployment rate is theoretically well-founded.91 When the exchange rate appreciates, goods
91

See the studies cited by Lin (2008) for a review.
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and services in the country become more expensive compared to the rest of the world. This leads
to a decrease in foreign demand for domestic goods and an increase in domestic demand for
foreign goods. As a result, exports and eventually production in the domestic country declines
which increases the unemployment rate. That is, if the exchange is calculated as the amount of
domestic currency per U.S. dollar, then theoretically there should be an inverse relationship
between the exchange rate and the unemployment rate. Following the previous literature, I
weighted the exchange rate movements with the manufacturing sector‟s value added in previous
year.
The second and third instruments are constructed using disasters experienced by
countries. Data on occurrence of such disasters are obtained from EM-DAT (the international
disaster data base).92 For an event to be included in the EM-DAT database as a disaster, it has to
satisfy certain criteria. First, the event must be unforeseen and sudden. Because of this criterion,
the events included in the EM-DAT database are unquestionably random. Secondly, the event
must fit at least one of the following categories: A) 10 or more people got killed; B) 100 or more
people got affected93; C) the affected country declared a state of emergency; D) the affected
country called for international assistance. Consequently, the events listed in the EM-DAT
database can be considered to have caused great damage, destruction and human suffering.
One of the instruments that are created based on disasters is the occurrence of industrial
accidents in a country. EM-DAT defines an industrial accident as a technological accident of an
industrial nature or involving industrial buildings such as factories. Examples of industrial
accidents include collapse or explosion of mines, destruction of industrial buildings or
infrastructure and spill of hazardous/chemical materials. The list of industrial accidents in the
sample used is presented in Table 3.10.
Industrial accidents can be related to employment through two mechanisms. First,
industrial accidents lead to shut-down of a plant/factory and therefore cause termination of
employment of the workers. Secondly, because of the spill-over effects, employment in other
plants/factories may be affected as well. Specifically, the production of the businesses that use
the output of the closed plant/factory as an input in their production is expected to reduce.
Similarly, the production of the businesses that supply inputs to the closed factory/plant is
expected to decrease. Consequently, the employment in such businesses is likely to decrease as
well as the employment in the firm affected by the accident.
The mechanism can be explained better using an example of, say, a coal mine and a
transportation company that delivers the coal from the mine to other locations. When the coal
mine collapses, the production of the coal mine stops or gets reduced. This reduces the
employment in the coal mine. Further, the services of the transportation company will not be
needed which may lead to a reduction of employment in the transportation company. The
collapse of the coal mine will also reduce the employment in other businesses which use coal as
an intermediate good.
As a result, an increase in the unemployment rate is expected due to the industrial
accidents. The influence of industrial accidents on unemployment must be greater for the
92

http://www.emdat.be/
According to the EM-DAT, a person is considered affected if he/she has required immediate assistance during a
period of emergency, i.e. requirement of basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate
medical assistance.
93
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countries with greater employment in manufacturing sector. Other things equal, manufacturing
employment is greater in the countries whose contribution of the manufacturing sector to the
GDP. As a result, I use the interaction of the indicator variable for the occurrence of industrial
accidents in a country with the share of manufacturing sector‟s value-added to GDP in previous
year as an instrument.
The third instrument is the occurrence of earthquakes. An earthquake is defined as the
shaking and displacement of ground due to seismic waves by EM-DAT. As mentioned above,
these earthquakes were large enough to influence the lives of many individuals. The list of
earthquakes (observed by EM-DAT) in the sample used is provided in Table 3.11.
Generally speaking, in the area where an earthquake is observed, buildings and the
infrastructure are destroyed or damaged and people are killed or injured and so on. Therefore,
the initial influence of an earthquake in the local area where it is observed is a reduction in
employment. There are multiple papers which show that the area struck by an earthquake suffers
extensive economic losses For example, Cavallo, Powell and Becerra (2010) show that the Haiti
earthquake of 2010 has cost at least eight billion dollars to Haitians. Holden, Bahls, and Real
(2007) forecast that an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.9 in the Bay Area in Northern
California could result in a loss of employment in the Bay area by about 420,000.
Although the initial effect of disasters such as earthquakes can be devastating in the local
area affected, in the longer run both the local and the aggregate labor market improve. That is,
despite its initial damage on the local areas, an earthquake can improve the economic conditions
in the country as a whole in the longer run. The mechanism involves the reconstruction efforts in
the shaken locality. Specifically, in the local area hit by an earthquake, the demand for goods and
services such as demand for health care and especially construction services go up. In such a
case, employment opportunities for those individuals who are not affected by the earthquake can
get improved. This is demonstrated by Pereira (2009) who studies the economic impact of 1755
Lisbon Earthquake which is the largest natural catastrophe ever recorded in Europe. Pereira
(2009) argues that the earthquake lead to a rise in the wage premium of construction workers due
to the reconstruction efforts. Using evidence from hurricanes (which are similar to earthquakes),
Ewing and Kruse (2005) suggest that “hurricanes may have a short run adverse impact on a
community; however, these storms may also be associated with a long run positive impact on
economic activity.” Similarly, Ewing, Kruse and Thompson (2009) argue that 1999 Oklahoma
City tornado led to improvements in the labor market at the aggregate level. In the light of the
evidence provided above, an earthquake is expected to reduce the annual unemployment rate in a
country.94
The 2SLS estimates of the impact of the unemployment rate on thefts, burglaries,
larcenies and motor vehicle thefts are presented in Panels 1 to 4 of Table 3.12. Panels for each
crime also provide the first stage results and test statistics pertaining to validity and strength of
the instruments (F statistic for the strength and J statistic for the validity). Notice that there are
differences between the samples used in each panel. Due to the unavailability of the outcome
94

Using earthquakes as an instrument, I assume that earthquakes do not directly influence crime, but only through
the changes through the unemployment rate. This is indeed in line with the previous research. For example, using
the Hurricane Katrina which was very destructive for New Orleans, Varano et.al. (2010) argue that there was not
significantly large increases in the crime rates of Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix which received largest
numbers of displaced New Orleans residents due to Hurricane Katrina. Moreover, since the number of instruments is
greater than the number of endogenous variables, I conduct test for over-identifying restrictions. In this test, the null
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation. The instruments used in the paper pass this test.
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variable, the sample sizes of burglary and larceny rate are much smaller than sample sizes of
theft rate and meter vehicle theft. 95 In the first column of each panel, the OLS estimate of the
unemployment rate is given for comparison purposes. In each panel, columns 2 to 5 provide the
2SLS estimates where a different combination of the instruments is used in the first stage.
Specifically, second columns present the estimates of 2SLS model where exchange rate,
industrial accidents and earthquakes are included as instruments jointly. In columns 3, 4 and 5,
exchange rate and industrial accidents; exchange rate and earthquakes; and industrial accidents
and earthquakes are used as instruments, respectively.
For all samples the interaction of the exchange rate with the lagged manufacturing share
of GDP is a strong instrument. The other instruments, industrial accidents and earthquakes are
not always strong instruments. Especially for the Burglary rate (Panel 2) and Larceny rate (Panel
3) samples, earthquakes and industrial accidents are not significant determinants of the
unemployment rate. This is due to the reduced variation in industrial accidents and earthquakes
in burglary rate and larceny rate samples.96 Nonetheless, the F-statistic for the instruments in the
first stage is around 10 which is the rule of thumb threshold for a weak instrument suggested by
Stock and Watson (2003).97 Admittedly, in some cases, the instruments barely pass this
threshold. However, the lowest F-statistic is about 9 (excluding the specification in the 5th
columns of Panels 2 and 3 with smaller samples and weaker instruments of industrial accidents
and earthquakes).
In addition, Table 3.12 presents the J-statistic. This is a test of over-identifying
restrictions.98 With the exception of the larceny rate in Panel 3, all of the crime categories pass
the over-identification test. Moreover, most of the J-statistics are smaller than two. This indicates
that the 2SLS method is insensitive to the choice of instrumental variables.
According to the OLS estimates in columns 1 of each panel, a one percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with 1.7%, 0.8%, 1.3%, 3% increase in thefts,
burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts. 2SLS estimation (columns 2-5) produces larger
point estimates. For example, the 2SLS estimations of unemployment elasticity for theft rate
using different sets of instrumental variables range from 2.4 to 3.8 percent. These estimates are
larger than the OLS estimates. However, in 3 out of 4 cases, OLS point estimate for the
unemployment rate is within one standard error distance from the 2SLS point estimate (columns
2, 3 and 5 of Panel 1). In one case, OLS estimate is much smaller than the 2SLS estimate
(column 4 of Panel 1), but still, it is within two standard errors distance.

95

Depending on the availability of the outcome variable, the sample sizes differ for each panel. Also sample size in
Table 3.12 is smaller than the size of the sample used in Table 3.5 (OLS results). This is due to the missing data on
instruments for some years and countries.
96
For example, the sign of the industrial accident is always positive in all samples but insignificant in burglary and
larceny samples. This is just due to the smaller sample size. Table 3.12 presents change of sign for earthquake. This
is due to fact that Greece and Italy are not in the burglary and larceny samples. Greece and Italy account for about
half of the earthquakes in the estimation sample. See Table 3.11 for details.
97
The null hypothesis is that all coefficient estimates of the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression are
not jointly different from zero.
98
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation.
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Table 3.8 Crime and Education & Gender-Specific Unemployment
Theft

Burglary

Larceny

Unemployed Males with Primary education in LF

393.39*
(235.66)

167.93
(148.59)

131.1
(179.67)

Vehicle
Theft
91.73**
(40.37)

Unemployed Females with Primary education in LF

14.4
(237.52)

-32.42
(152.85)

75.3
(221.60)

-6.53
(41.67)

Unemployed Males with High education in LF

68.34
(102.25)

65.89
(64.17)

77.64
(105.02)

12.22
(20.47)

Unemployed Females with High education in LF

-80.17
(126.57)

-90.17
(74.44)

-85.68
(148.16)

-18.09
(25.83)

Overall Unemployment Rate

48.25**
(20.02)

8.64
(10.39)

20.81
(14.13)

9.15*
(4.59)

171

150

145

166

Observations

Notes to Table 3.8: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries,
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of the unemployed males and females with
primary and higher (secondary or tertiary) education. For comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the
estimates of the overall unemployment rate instead of the labor force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that
are clustered at the country level are presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country
population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and
years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime
definitions differences across countries, respectively.

This similarity between the OLS and 2SLS estimates can be observed for other crime
categories as well. For example, the 2SLS estimates of unemployment elasticity for burglary rate
range between 2.8 and 4.2 percent and for motor vehicle theft between 5.7 and 7 percent. Similar
to the theft rate, for burglaries and motor vehicle thefts OLS point estimates are smaller than the
2SLS estimates, but they are generally within two standard errors distance from the 2SLS point
estimates.
The results in this section indicate a positive impact of the unemployment rate on
property crimes after accounting for endogeneity of unemployment. The 2SLS point estimates
are larger than the OLS estimates. However, the difference between the 2SLS and OLS estimates
are not significant. In the context of the similarity between 2SLS and OLS estimates, these
results are in line with Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002).
3.6 Economic Impact of Crime Due to Recessions
In this section, I simulate the economic impact of one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate on crime. The back-of-the-envelope calculations rely on the cost of crime
estimates of Anderson (1999) who decomposes the aggregate burden of crime into several
components.
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Table 3.9 Crime and Unemployment Duration
Long-term Unemployed Males in LF
Short-term Unemployed Males in LF
Long-term Unemployed Females in LF
Short-term Unemployed Females in LF

Overall Unemployment Rate

Observations

Theft

Burglary

Larceny

225.75***
(81.12)
150.52
(119.04)
-331.98**
(137.26)
121.71
(108.07)

105.81**
(45.61)
107.85***
(36.51)
-211.88***
(47.15)
16.13
(36.81)

114.38*
(60.35)
129.78
(87.00)
-188.69**
(80.92)
44.88
(107.53)

Vehicle
Theft
57.24**
(24.40)
22.1
(19.83)
-49.6
(36.23)
10.94
(30.25)

35.90***
(11.03)

4.73
(7.57)

23.99***
(8.28)

11.25***
(2.87)

154

138

132

148

Notes to Table 3.9: Outcome variables are listed on top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of Burglaries,
Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables as well as country fixed
effects, year dummies and indicators that account for the differences in crime definitions. The upper panel presents
the results from the regressions that include the labor force shares of the long and short-term unemployed males and
females. For comparison purposes, the lower panel provides the estimates of the overall unemployment rate instead
of the labor force shares in the same sample. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are presented in
parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide
the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences across countries, respectively.

Based on Anderson (1999)‟s estimates, I calculate each property crime costs about
$46,000 in US in 1999 dollars. The calculations are summarized in Table 3.13. Thefts in the
European Sourcebook include thefts of all kinds such as burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle
thefts. That is, aggregate property crime rate in the Uniform Crime Reports of FBI corresponds
to the theft rate in this paper. Therefore, I use $46,000 as the cost of one theft in this analysis.
The OLS estimates in this paper as well as those in previous studies suggest that a one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with about one to two percent
increase in thefts. Consequently, a one percentage point rise in the overall unemployment rate
translates into about 25,000-30,000 extra thefts for a country with population similar to France,
Italy or UK (50-60 million). Therefore, for each percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate, the French, Italians and Britons incur about $1.2 – $1.4 billion additional cost due to crime.
The 2SLS estimates in this paper draw a more pessimistic picture. According to the 2SLS
estimates, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases theft rate by about
2.4 – 3.8 percent. These elasticities translate into about $1.6 – $2.5 billion additional cost of
crime for Italy, France or UK due to the increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage
point.
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Year
1998
2001
2001
2003
2000
1999
1997
1997
2002
2001
2001
1995
1998
1999
1998
1996
1996
1997

Country
Austria
Denmark
France
France
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Norway
Poland
Romania
Romania
Slovenia
Turkey
Turkey
Ukraine
UK
UK
UK

Table 3.10 Industrial Accidents
Location
Sub Type
Detail
Lassing
Collapse
Mine
Baltic sea
Other
Fuel
Toulouse
Explosion
Petro-chemical factory AZF
Saint-Nazaire
Collapse
Ocean liner Queen Mary 2
Chemical Spill Cyanide
Belmullet
Fire
Turin
Poisoning
Food
Barentsburg
Explosion
Coal mine
Jastrzebie Zdroj Explosion
Mine Jast-Mos
Vulcan
Explosion
Coal mine
Iasi
Poisoning
Cyanure
Mezica
Fire
Waste dumping
Istanbul
Explosion
Bazar Egyptian
Istanbul
Chemical Spill
Donetsk
Explosion
Mine
Wales
Chemical Spill Petrol
Aiskew
Explosion
Gas storage depot
Cadoxton
Chemical Spill Vinyl Chloride Monomer

3.7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a panel data set of 33
European countries, and it is one of the few papers which studies crime in an international
context. The primary advantage of the data set is that it contains consistently measured crime
variables across countries and over time.
The findings presented in this paper are consistent with the previous literature. I find that
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases thefts by about 2 percent
using OLS. Although unemployment can be endogenous in a crime regression, using a countrylevel panel data set minimizes this concern. My 2SLS estimation using the exchange rate,
industrial accidents and earthquakes as instruments for the unemployment rate supports this
hypothesis. 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, but the difference between OLS
and 2SLS estimates is not significant. This finding is similar to the conclusion of Gould,
Weinberg and Mustard (2002).
Because the overall unemployment rate may not be able to identify people on the margin
of committing a crime (Lin 2008 and Raphael Winter-Ebmer 2001), the influences of genderspecific, education-specific and duration-specific unemployment on crime are investigated. The
overall unemployment rate is decomposed into labor force shares of unemployed males and
females, unemployed individuals with poor and well education and unemployed individuals with
a short and long unemployment spell. The results show that the unemployment of males,
individuals with poor education, and individuals with longer unemployment spells are significant
determinants of the impact of the unemployment rate on crime. Most of the influence of the
overall unemployment rate on crime can be attributable to the unemployment of males who are
unemployed for more than one year.
70

Year
1998
1996
2002
1996
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
1997
1998
2002
2002
2002
2003
1998
1996
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999

Table 3.11 Earthquakes
Country
Location
Austria
Arnoldstein
Croatia
Ston, Slano area
Georgia
Tbilisi area
Greece
Konitsa
Greece
Athens Suburbs of Menidi
Greece
Mihalitsi, Mitikas, Flabo
Greece
Aegean sea
Greece
Bartholomio
Greece
Lefkada
Italy
Umbria, Marche regions
Italy
Gualdo Tadino-Nocera
Italy
Sicily, Palermo
Italy
San Guliano di Puglia
Italy
Zafferana Etnea, Giarre
Italy
Alessandria (Piemont)
Slovenia
Bovec, Trenta, Kobarid
Turkey
Corum-Amasya
Turkey
Kayseri
Turkey
Ceyhan, Adana area
Turkey
Adana, Ceyhan, Hatay
Turkey
Duzce, Bolu, Kaynasli
Turkey
Sakarya Province
Turkey
Izmit
Turkey
Marmaris
Turkey
Kocaeli, Bursa, Istanbul
Turkey
Izmit, Kocaeli, Yalova

The magnitude of the unemployment‟s impact on crime is economically significant. For
example, France, Italy or UK suffer about 25,000-30,000 additional larcenies, burglaries and
motor vehicle thefts per year for one percentage point increase in the unemployment. The cost of
each property crime can be roughly approximated to be $46,000 in 1999 dollars. Due to one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the French, Italian and British incur an extra
crime cost of about $1.2-$1.4 billion according to the OLS estimates or $1.6 – $2.4 billion
according to the 2SLS estimates.99

99

See Table 3.13 and section 6 for the details of this calculation.
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Table 3.12 2SLS Estimates of Unemployment on Crime
Panel 1: Theft Rate
Unemployment Rate
Number of Observations
J statistic
P-value of the J statistic

(1)
OLS
48.390***
(13.662)
172

(2)
2SLS
77.810**
(36.784)
172
0.992
0.609

(3)
2SLS
70.747**
(32.188)
172
0.426
0.514

(4)
2SLS
110.376***
(31.958)
172
0.200
0.655

(5)
2SLS
72.049
(47.157)
172
0.777
0.378

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.090**

0.075*

0.084**

(0.037)
-1.175***
(0.279)
8.924
0.000

(0.037)
-0.450**
(0.174)
10.634
0.000

(0.038)
-1.158***
(0.279)
10.776
0.000

(5)
2SLS
51.645
(54.813)
145
2.369
0.124

First Stage Results
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1
Ind. Accidents × Manuf. GDPt-1
Earthquake
F statistic for weak IV
P-value for weak IV

Panel 2: Burglary Rate
Unemployment Rate
Number of Observations
J statistic
P-value of the J statistic

(1)
OLS
7.266
(10.615)
145

9.697
0.001

(2)
2SLS
39.908*
(20.729)
145
2.391
0.303

(3)
2SLS
34.948**
(17.453)
145
0.050
0.823

(4)
2SLS
26.511***
(9.676)
145
2.158
0.142

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.051

0.044

0.043

(0.031)
-0.437
(0.575)
9.395
0.000

(0.028)

(0.033)
-0.338
(0.577)
1.135
0.340

First Stage Results
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1
Ind. Accidents × Manuf. GDPt-1
Earthquake
F statistic for weak IV
P-value for weak IV
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14.458
0.000

0.200
(0.467)
11.156
0.000

Table 3.12 continued
Panel 3: Larceny Rate
Unemployment Rate
Number of Observations
J statistic
P-value of the J statistic

(1)
OLS
22.977*
(12.790)
141

(2)
2SLS
18.125
(23.731)
141
3.856
0.145

(3)
2SLS
14.989
(25.381)
141
3.539
0.060

(4)
2SLS
54.719***
(9.832)
141
2.055
0.152

(5)
2SLS
-43.401
(35.224)
141
1.201
0.273

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.050

0.044

0.043

(0.032)
-0.439
(0.579)
9.150
0.000

(0.028)
0.197
(0.469)
11.087
0.001

(0.033)
-0.337
(0.579)
1.115
0.347

(5)
2SLS
25.074**
(11.174)
166
0.333
0.564

First Stage Results
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1
Ind. Accidents × Manuf. GDPt-1
Earthquake
F statistic for weak IV
P-value for weak IV

Panel 4: Vehicle Theft Rate
Unemployment Rate
Number of Observations
J statistic
P-value of the J statistic
First Stage Results
Exchange Rate × Manuf. GDPt-1
Ind. Accidents × Manuf. GDPt-1
Earthquake
F statistic for weak IV
P-value for weak IV

(1)
OLS
11.176***
(3.133)
166

14.044
0.000

(2)
2SLS
20.467**
(8.050)
166
1.074
0.584

(3)
2SLS
21.331**
(9.242)
166
1.017
0.313

(4)
2SLS
3.791
(10.307)
166
0.003
0.958

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.001***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.090**

0.075*

0.084**

(0.037)
-1.169***
(0.277)
9.075
0.000

(0.037)

(0.038)
-1.153***
(0.275)
10.919
0.000

9.544
0.001

-0.444**
(0.175)
10.400
0.001

Notes to Table 3.12: The method of estimation is indicated at the top of each column. Theft is defined as the sum of
Burglaries, Larcenies and Vehicle Thefts. All regressions include the whole set of control variables. The upper
panels present the results from the 2nd stage. The bottom panels provide estimates of the 1st stage where the
unemployment rate is regressed on the instruments. Standard errors that are clustered at the country level are
presented in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the country population. *, ** and *** denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. See Table 3.1 for the countries and years included in the sample.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the descriptions of the outcome variables and the crime definitions differences across
countries, respectively.
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Table 3.13 Cost per Property Crime
Anderson (1999)‟s
estimate of cost of
crime

Crime-induced production ($397 billion) + Opportunity costs ($130 billion) +
Risks to life and health ($574 billion) – Transfers from victims to offenders
($603 billion) = $1,102 billion. [From Table 7 in Anderson (1999)]

Number of Property 1,380,000
Crimes in 1999
Number of Violent
Crimes in 1999

10,120,000

Total Cost of
Violent Crimes

Risks to life and health ($574 billion) + 12% * Remaining Costs ($531 billion)
= $638 billion

Total Cost of
Property Crimes

88% * $531 billion = $467 billion

Cost per Property
crime

$467 billion / 10,120,000 = $46,000

Notes to Table 3.13: Since the Index-I crimes of FBI are the costliest to the society, I assume that all of these costs
are incurred due to Index-I crimes (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft). All of the
costs associated with Risks to life and health are assigned to violent crimes. The remaining costs are allocated to
property and violent crimes according to their shares in total crimes (violent crimes + property crimes).
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CHAPTER 4. CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL TOURISM
4.1 Introduction
Tourism is typically regarded as a major industry in many countries, and particularly
desirable one, since it is relatively low in energy consumption and pollution. Tourism generates
about 7.3% of the total worldwide exports100. For some countries, tourism is the main source of
income and foreign currency, and many local economies heavily depend on tourism.
This paper investigates the possibility that crime creates an externality in the form of
reduction in international tourism activity. Although the impact of economic activity on crime
has been investigated extensively (Corman and Mocan 2000, Levitt 1998, Block and Heineke
1975), there are a few studies that analyzed the influence of crime on economic activity. For
example, Cullen and Levitt (1999) report that individuals move away from areas with high crime
rates. Peri (2004) argues that organized crime is associated with low economic development.
Further, despite its economic importance, tourism received very little attention in this context.
There are only a handful of studies that investigated whether tourism activity (as a part of overall
economic activity) is influenced by crime using data obtained from small geographic regions.
For example, Levantis and Gani (2000) find that increased crime is associated with less tourism
activity using time-series data from South Pacific and the Caribbeans. McPheters and Stronge
(1974) report that property crime is positively correlated with the number of tourists in Miami.
Howsen and Jarrell (1987 and 1990) argue that an increase in the number of tourists is associated
with an increase in the property crimes. However, these cross-sectional or time-series analyzes
have limitations, such as the inability to control for unobservable area characteristics.
Furthermore, the results from the studies that focus on one specific location may not be
generalizable. Using a panel data set of European countries covering years 1995 to 2003, this
paper investigates the influence of crime on international tourism activity and the differential
responsiveness of tourism by region. The findings suggest that violent crimes (homicide, rape,
robbery and assault) are negatively associated with incoming international tourists and with
tourism revenue for an average country in Europe.
The negative influence of crime on tourism activity is not surprising theoretically. Crime
is a demand shifter for tourism. When individuals decide about whether to take a holiday and
where to spend that holiday, they would take the risk of victimization into account. Other things
being equal, potential tourists are more likely to visit countries with smaller risk of victimization.
However, individuals do not have a true measure of victimization risk in the destination
country; they can only have a perception about it. This ex-ante expectation about being
victimized in the destination country can be formed by obtaining information through various
channels, such as print or electronic media or word-of-mouth101. Regardless of the source of the
information, the actual crime rate in the destination country can be a proxy for the perceived risk
of being victimized. In this paper, this proxy (the crime rate) is used in the empirical analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II has a discussion of the empirical
framework and the data employed in the analysis. Section III summarizes the results and Section
IV concludes.

100
101

World Tourism Organisation (http://www.world-tourism.org/facts/tmt.html).
Regarding the impact of word-of-mouth information on behavior, see Rincke and Traxler (Forthcoming).
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4.2 Empirical Framework and Data
Weather conditions and touristic attractions are the main determinants of tourism activity
for a country (Richardson and Loomis 2004, Lyssiotou 2000). Other influential factors may
include quality of the health services, prevalence of diseases, economic development and various
socio-economic characteristics of the country. This paper hypothesizes that the perception of
victimization risk is a determinant of the demand for tourism by the international visitors.
Following the guidelines described above, the estimated equation is depicted below:
(4.1)

Tc,t = α + βCrimec,t-1 + γSc,t + µc + τt + εc,t

where Tc,t stands for international tourists visiting country c in year t per 10 residents, or real
international tourism revenue per 10 residents102. Both variables are obtained from World
Development Indicators.
I assume that the potential tourists‟ perceptions of victimization can be proxied by the
actual crime rate in the destination country. Crimec,t-1 denotes the number of crimes per 100,000
residents in country c in year t. Following Corman and Mocan (2000) and Levitt (1998), crime
rate is lagged by one year to avoid potential reverse causality. Both violent crimes (homicides,
assaults, rapes, robberies) and property crimes (thefts and burglaries) are analyzed. Crime data
are obtained from European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice.
The vector Sc,t controls for the unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, exchange rate,
urbanization rate, number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, prevalence of tuberculosis, teenage
pregnancy rate and the ratio of old people to young people in the country103. Time invariant
factors that may influence the international tourism activity such as a country's historical sites, its
coastline's length and average temperature and other unobservable country characteristics are
captured by country fixed effects (µc). Regressions also include time dummies represented by τt.
4.2.1 Potential Endogeneity
It can be argued that the crime rate in the estimated equation may be endogenous.
Specifically, as the number of tourists visiting a country goes up, crime in that country may rise.
This is because, the incoming tourists are presumably wealthy and they may increase the
expected return for criminals. In fact, McPheters and Stronge (1974) and Howsen and Jarrell
(1987 and 1990) argue that an increase in the number of tourists increases property crimes.104
However, these papers do not have strong empirical designs as they employ crosssectional or time series data sets. Time series data from one geographical location do not include
102

The mean of tourists per 10 residents is 7.2 and that of the tourism revenue per 10 residents is $4942.56
The source of labor market variables and income, teen pregnancy and urban population controls is the World
Development Indicators. The ratio of old population to the young population is constructed using the data from the
U.S. Census Bureau's International database. Alcohol consumption per capita variable is obtained from the World
Health Organization‟s Global Alcohol Database.
104
These authors do not find a relationship between tourism activity and violent crime. This may be because, when
tourists (who are presumably wealthy) visit a country, the expected return to criminal activities such as theft and
burglary goes up, since incoming tourists may increase the number of targets from whom valuable assets can be
stolen by the potential criminals. However, there are no direct incentives for committing a violent crime, such as
murder or rape. Therefore, the link from tourism to violent crime is expected to be much weaker.
103
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any kind of comparison group. With cross sectional data, unobserved heterogeneity that can
impact both the crime rate and the tourism activity cannot be controlled for. Therefore, using
cross sectional or time series data sets may lead to biased estimates. This paper, on the other
hand, uses a panel data set which allows for inclusion of country fixed effects and year dummies
to capture the time-invariant unobservable country characteristics.
Further, in the estimated equation, the crime rate is lagged by one year to overcome a
potential reverse causality. The rationale behind this approach is that tourists that visit a country
in a specific year cannot influence the crime rate of that country in the previous year. Same
method has been employed by Corman and Mocan (2000) and Levitt (1998) even in the context
of crimes and arrests which are very much likely to be dependent on each other105.
4.3 Results
Table 4.1 presents the results from the specification where the number of international
tourism revenue per 10 residents is the dependent variable. Total violent crime rate (which
consists of homicide, rape, robbery and assault) have a significant negative impact on receipts
from international tourists. All of the components of violent crime are also associated negatively
with tourism revenue separately106. On the other hand, aggregate property crime or its
components (theft and burglary) do not have a significant influence. Elasticity estimates of
international tourism revenue per 10 residents in the host country with respect to aggregate
violent crime, homicide, rape and assault rates are -0.08, -0.14, -0.13 and -0.07, respectively.
Similar results, which are displayed in Table 4.2, are obtained from the specification where the
number of international tourists per 10 residents in the host country is the dependent variable.
Elasticities of international tourists per 10 residents with respect to aggregate violent crime,
homicide and assault rates are -0.07, -0.28 and -0.07, respectively.
Crime's impact on international tourism may differ between countries. Similar to the
trade-off between risk and return (Fama and MacBeth 1973), if international tourists are highly
attracted to a country's touristic prospects, the crime rate in that country may not be a significant
deterrent for international tourists. In other words, the attractiveness of a country may partly
compensate for the probability of victimization. According to the World Tourism
Organization107, 50% of all international tourists visit a foreign country for leisure and
recreation. According to this criterion, Southern Europe is a more attractive tourist destination
compared to Northern Europe, since Southern European countries have longer coastlines
available for sea tourism, more historical artifacts and mountainous terrain that offer
opportunities for skiing.

105

Specifically, these authors use one period lagged arrest rates to explain the variation in crime.
Although the coefficient of robbery rate is insignificant, its sign is still negative.
107
http://www.unwto.org/facts/menu.html
106
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Crime Listed
Unemployment Rate
GDP Growth Rate
% Urban Population
Teen Pregnancy Rate
Tuberculosis Rate
Hospital Beds
Old / Young
Exchange Rate
Observations

Table 4.1 Impact of Crime on International Tourism Revenue
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Violent
Property
Crime
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
Assault
Crime
-1.750***
-260.780**
-80.812*
-1.561
-2.236***
0.251
(0.570)
(104.465)
(41.445)
(2.886)
(0.631)
(0.241)
-23.391
-76.474*
-38.060
-39.758
-42.364
-68.461
(48.014)
(38.677)
(46.972)
(46.383)
(47.443)
(60.332)
-12.595
-12.848
6.175
0.740
-3.785
0.401
(30.746)
(31.206)
(28.254)
(29.046)
(30.079)
(37.601)
-0.203
22.470
-4.127
-8.884
-2.430
-131.037
(129.571)
(96.464)
(126.984) (121.600) (126.175)
(143.042)
9.957**
13.702***
8.838**
7.951*
10.230**
13.351*
(4.117)
(4.731)
(4.012)
(4.384)
(4.441)
(7.593)
-26.405
-16.754
-26.489
-30.171
-26.494
-38.577
(21.298)
(32.426)
(21.364)
(21.795)
(21.813)
(30.290)
-33.967
-8.806
-26.475
-43.386
-7.476
-142.702
(231.457)
(239.036)
(209.681) (206.042) (217.060)
(264.878)
-3.519
37.393
23.396
-0.934
-7.620
-39.616
(62.294)
(62.339)
(60.755)
(62.255)
(64.198)
(61.857)
-3.695
241.521
-2.830
-3.256
-3.477
-2.769
(2.263)
(217.064)
(1.831)
(2.167)
(2.255)
(2.999)
181
162
192
193
190
156

(7)

(8)

Theft
0.440
(0.286)
-44.982
(45.248)
6.576
(29.519)
-12.247
(125.285)
9.609**
(4.115)
-29.824
(20.810)
-16.643
(212.364)
-13.737
(60.049)
-2.741
(2.094)
192

Burglary
0.365
(0.721)
-68.297
(61.021)
-4.987
(38.223)
-137.459
(140.487)
12.744
(8.047)
-38.157
(30.352)
-173.263
(267.365)
-35.268
(62.935)
-3.064
(3.114)
156

Notes to Table 4.1: The dependent variable is international tourism revenue per 10 residents. In each column the first row represents the coefficient of the crime
rate listed on the top. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Each
regression includes country fixed effects and time dummies.
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Table 4.2 Impact of Crime on International Tourists
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Crime Listed
Unemployment Rate
GDP Growth Rate
% Urban Population
Teen Pregnancy Rate
Tuberculosis Rate
Hospital Beds
Old / Young
Exchange Rate
Observations

(1)
Violent
Crime
-0.002***
(0.001)
-0.035
(0.069)
0.057
(0.040)
0.051
(0.162)
-0.008
(0.007)
-0.085**
(0.038)
0.224
(0.232)
0.048
(0.073)
-0.004
(0.003)
182

Homicide
-0.691***
(0.146)
-0.130**
(0.063)
0.052
(0.034)
0.033
(0.111)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.111*
(0.057)
0.280
(0.220)
0.088
(0.075)
0.065
(0.109)
156

Rape
-0.059
(0.050)
-0.044
(0.065)
0.074*
(0.042)
0.051
(0.158)
-0.010
(0.006)
-0.085**
(0.038)
0.297
(0.232)
0.058
(0.079)
-0.004
(0.003)
193

Robbery
-0.000
(0.007)
-0.047
(0.060)
0.071*
(0.040)
0.040
(0.136)
-0.010
(0.006)
-0.086**
(0.039)
0.298
(0.234)
0.036
(0.085)
-0.004
(0.003)
194

Assault
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.042
(0.066)
0.065
(0.042)
0.070
(0.163)
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.081**
(0.037)
0.360
(0.230)
0.031
(0.075)
-0.005
(0.003)
191

(6)
Property
Crime
0.001
(0.000)
-0.078
(0.082)
0.081
(0.052)
-0.053
(0.165)
-0.016
(0.012)
-0.103**
(0.050)
0.206
(0.281)
-0.005
(0.061)
-0.005
(0.005)
152

(7)

(8)

Theft
0.001*
(0.000)
-0.041
(0.064)
0.081*
(0.041)
0.045
(0.144)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.082**
(0.037)
0.328
(0.244)
0.018
(0.070)
-0.004
(0.002)
193

Burglary
0.002
(0.001)
-0.071
(0.082)
0.070
(0.051)
-0.071
(0.166)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.096*
(0.048)
0.096
(0.267)
0.007
(0.062)
-0.005
(0.005)
152

Notes to Table 4.2: The dependent variable is international tourists per 10 residents. In each column the first row represents the coefficient of the crime rate
listed on the top. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Each regression
includes country fixed effects and time dummies.
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Table 4.3 Impact of Violent Crimes on International Tourism in North versus South Europe

Crime Listed
Observations

Crime Listed
Observations

Panel A: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents
Violent Crime
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
Assault
North
South
North
South
North
South
North
South
North
South
-1.572* -1.384
-93.582
-221.780 -87.875***
21.866
0.421
-2.876 -2.064** -1.523
(0.749) (4.987) (119.766) (237.409)
(22.968)
(169.031) (3.683) (8.004)
(0.948)
(5.308)
79
102
79
83
87
105
87
106
87
103
Panel B: Dependent Variable: International Tourists per 10 Residents
Violent Crime
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
North
South
North
South
North
North
South
North
-0.002**
-0.006
-0.493**
-0.573
-0.024
0.035
0.001
-0.013
(0.001)
(0.004)
(0.193)
(0.377) (0.055) (0.088) (0.006) (0.008)
77
105
77
79
85
108
85
109

Assault
South
North
-0.003**
-0.007
(0.001)
(0.006)
85
106

Notes to Table 4.3: North and South samples are separated by the latitude 50 North. Full set of control variables (as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are included in the
regressions. The coefficients presented are those of the crime rates listed on the top of each column. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level.
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To investigate whether crime impacts tourism differently in Southern versus Northern
Europe, I estimate the model described in section II using two sub-samples. Countries whose
average latitude is above (below) 50 North are included in the Northern (Southern) sample108. In
the interest of space, only the coefficients of the violent crimes are reported in Table 4.3. As
presented in Panel A of Table 4.3, more rapes, assaults and aggregate violent crimes are
associated with less tourism revenue in Northern sample, but not in the Southern sample 109.
Similar findings are displayed in Panel B of Table 4.3 which presents the estimates of violent
crimes' separate components‟ (homicide, rape, robbery and assault) impacts on incoming
international tourists. Tourists respond to aggregate violent crime, homicide and assault in
Northern sample significantly whereas in Southern sample the impact is statistically
insignificant.
The results presented in Table 4.3 suggest that international tourism activity is not
influenced by the crime rate in the Southern European Countries which are more attractive
tourism destinations than Northern European countries. To investigate this differential response
further, I divided the whole sample according to the sea tourism attractiveness of the countries
and run the analysis in these samples separately. That is, the countries that have favorable
conditions for sea tourism are included in “Attractive” sample and those countries that are not
suitable for sea tourism are included in the “Unattractive” sample. Specifically, the countries that
have a coastline and are located close to Equator110 are considered as “Attractive”. The
remainder of the countries is included in the “Unattractive” sample111.
In Panel A and B of Table 4.4, I present the results of the models where the whole sample
is divided according to sea tourism attractiveness. Violent crimes significantly reduce both
tourism revenue (Panel A) and international tourists (Panel B) only in the countries which are not
suitable for sea tourism, or which are less attractive in terms of sea tourism.
I further estimate models where the interaction of a country's average latitude with its
crime rate is included as an independent variable. The main effect of the latitude cannot be
included jointly with the interaction term as the models contain country fixed effects. The results
presented in Table 4.5 indicate that the closer to the North Pole a country is, the larger the impact
of violent crimes on tourism activity becomes (in absolute value). A 1% increase in the aggregate
violent crime rate decreases the international tourism revenue per 10 residents by
(0.00156×Latitude) percent. According to this estimate, for Iceland (which is located at the
latitude 65 North), the elasticity of tourism revenue per 10 residents with respect to the aggregate
violent crime rate is -0.101. The same elasticity for Cyprus (at 35 North) is -0.055. As shown in
the Panel B of Table 4.5, similar results are obtained for international tourists.

108

South sample consists of the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.. The countries in the North sample are Belgium, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom
and Iceland.
109
Similar results are obtained when 47.2 North (the median latitude) or 45 North is used to separate Northern
European countries from Southern European countries.
110
Latitude is mechanically correlated with average temperature. If some place is closer to the Equator than, it
receives rays of the Sun more directly throughout the year and have warmer temperatures over the year on average.
111
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and
Ukraine are in the Attractive sample.

81

Table 4.4 Impact of Violent Crimes on International Tourism in Attractive versus Unattractive Countries

Crime Listed
Attractive:
Observations

Panel A: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents
Violent Crime
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-1.67***
6.45
-130.64
-224.23
-61.34*
-15.25
0.53
3.40
(0.53)
(9.89) (140.17) (264.67) (33.33) (250.39) (3.95) (10.09)
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
114
67
106
56
122
70
122
71

Assault
(9)
(10)
-2.41***
16.59
(0.61)
(16.48)
No
Yes
122
68

Panel B: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents
Violent Crime
Homicide
Rape
Robbery
Assault
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Crime Listed -0.002*** -0.008 -0.482** -0.315 -0.032 0.000
-0.000 -0.014 -0.003*** -0.019
(0.000) (0.008) (0.170) (0.441) (0.056) (0.165) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001) (0.015)
Attractive:
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
111
71
99
57
119
74
119
75
119
72
Notes to Table 4.4: Countries in the “Attractive” sample are located below the latitude 50 North and have a coastline. Countries in the “Unattractive” sample are
located above the Latitude 50 North or do not have a coastline. In each panel, the odd (even) numbered columns present the results from the unattractive
(attractive) sample. Full set of control variables (as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are included in the regressions. The coefficients presented are those of the crime rates
listed on the top of the columns. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level.
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Table 4.5 Changing Impact of Violent Crimes on International Tourism According to
Latitude
Panel A: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents
Crime Listed x Latitude
Observations

(1)
Violent Crimes
-3.242***
(1.048)
181

(2)
Homicide
-436.008**
(174.465)
162

(3)
Rape
-158.448**
(74.314)
192

(4)
Robbery
-2.487
(5.287)
193

(5)
Assault
-4.169***
(1.165)
190

Panel B: Dependent Variable: International Tourism Revenue per 10 Residents
Crime Listed x Latitude
Observations

(1)
Violent Crimes
-0.004***
(0.001)
182

(2)
Homicide
-1.226***
(0.224)
156

(3)
Rape
-0.123
(0.099)
193

(4)
Robbery
0.001
(0.014)
194

(5)
Assault
-0.006***
(0.002)
191

Notes to Table 4.5: The coefficients presented are those of the crime rates listed on the top of each column interacted
with the latitude of the country. Full set of control variables (as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are included in the
regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at country level.

4.4 Conclusion
Using a panel data set of European countries, this paper investigates the impact of crime
on international tourism activity. Violent crimes are negatively associated with incoming
international tourists and international tourism revenue. The results suggest that tourists evaluate
the risk of victimization when choosing a destination. Further, the analyzes show that the impact
of violent crimes on international tourism activity in Northern Europe is stronger than it is in
Southern Europe which has more touristic attractions. Especially, a country‟s sea tourism
attractiveness may be a factor offsetting the effect of the risk of being victimized for potential
tourists. This finding may be evidence for the hypothesis that the risk of victimization borne by
the tourists is (partly) compensated by the touristic attractiveness of the country.
The impact of crime on tourism is also economically significant. For example, for an
average country with a population of 25 million, a 10% increase in aggregate violent crime rate
leads to about $100 million (in 2000 dollars) decline in international tourism revenue. Using
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000)'s locally-owned entertainment venue multiplier of 1.5 as a lower
bound, the economic impact of such an increase in violent crime rate is at least $150 million.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The three pieces of my research presented in second, third and fourth chapters of this
dissertation contribute to the economics of crime literature. Second chapter investigates the
impact of shall-issue laws on crime. Third chapter analyzes the impact of unemployment on
crime. Chapter four pointed out that cost of crime includes losses from tourism revenue.
As explained in the second chapter, a shall-issue law allows law-abiding individuals to
obtain a license to carry concealed handguns provided that they satisfy some requirements
indicated by the law. Employing state-level or county-level data sets, previous studies report
conflicting findings. Studies that find a positive (negative) impact of shall-issue laws on crime
suggest that crime-facilitating (reducing) effect of shall-issue laws dominate the crime-reducing
(facilitating) effect. There is no consensus on the net effect of shall-issue laws on crime.
The previous studies on shall-issue laws overlook the fact that neither the crimefacilitating nor the crime-reducing effect of shall-issue laws can emerge if individuals do not
respond to shall-issue laws by carrying handguns more frequently (first order effect). To
investigate this question, second chapter tests whether the first order effect of a shall-issue law is
actually realized using an individual-level data set. The mechanisms through which shall-issue
laws increase or decrease crime cannot be at work if individuals do not respond to these laws by
carrying handguns more frequently in the first place.
The findings in this paper indicate that individuals start carrying handguns more often
when they become eligible, i.e. when their states pass shall-issue laws or when they satisfy the
minimum required age in an already-shall-issue state. This increase in handgun carrying
behavior is a result of changes in behavior of law abiding individuals and those who are likely to
commit minor crimes, such as drug possession, public order offenses or traffic offenses. After
the enactment of a shall-issue law, no change is observed in the handgun carrying activity of
individuals who are likely to commit serious offenses, such as assaults, rapes, manslaughters or
robberies. These findings cast doubt on the presumed existence of the crime-facilitating effect of
shall-issue laws.
The third chapter investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a panel data
set of 33 European countries, and it is one of the few papers which studies crime in an
international context. The primary advantage of the data set is that it contains consistently
measured crime variables across countries and over time.
The findings presented show that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate increases property crimes by about two percent. Although unemployment can be
endogenous in a crime regression, using a country-level panel data set minimizes this concern.
My 2SLS estimation using the exchange rate, industrial accidents and earthquakes as instruments
for the unemployment rate supports this hypothesis. 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS
estimates, but the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates is not statistically significant.
This finding is similar to the conclusion of Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002).
The magnitude of the unemployment‟s impact on crime is economically significant. For
example, France, Italy or UK suffer about 25,000-30,000 additional larcenies, burglaries and
motor vehicle thefts per year for one percentage point increase in the unemployment. The cost of
each property crime can be roughly approximated to be $46,000 in 1999 dollars. Due to one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the French, Italian and British incur an extra
crime cost of about $1.5 billion. Further, the results show that the impact of unemployment on
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crime is mainly driven by the unemployment of males, individuals with poor education, and
individuals with longer unemployment spells.
The fourth chapter investigates the impact of crime on international tourism activity,
using the panel data set of European countries which is introduced in the third chapter. Violent
crimes are negatively associated with incoming international tourists and international tourism
revenue. The results suggest that tourists evaluate the risk of victimization when choosing a
destination. Further, the analyzes show that the impact of violent crimes on international tourism
activity in Northern Europe is stronger than it is in Southern Europe which has more touristic
attractions. Especially, a country‟s sea tourism attractiveness may be a factor offsetting the effect
of the risk of being victimized for potential tourists. This finding may be evidence for the
hypothesis that the risk of victimization borne by the tourists is (partly) compensated by the
touristic attractiveness of the country.
The impact of crime on tourism is also economically significant. For example, for an
average country with a population of 25 million, a 10% increase in aggregate violent crime rate
leads to about $100 million (in 2000 dollars) decline in international tourism revenue. Using
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000)'s locally-owned entertainment venue multiplier of 1.5 as a lower
bound, the economic impact of such an increase in violent crime rate is at least $150 million.

85

REFERENCES
Anderson, David A. “The Aggregate Burden of Crime.” Journal of Law and Economics 42
(1999): 611-42.
Ayres, Ian and John J. Donohue III. “More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evidence
from 1977 – 2006.” Econ Journal Watch 6 (2009): 218-38.
Ayres, Ian and John J. Donohue III. “Shooting Down the `More Guns, Less Crime` Hypothesis.”
Stanford Law Review 55 (2003): 1193-312.
Becker, Gary S. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” The Journal of Political
Economy 76 (1968): 169-217.
Becker, Gary S., and Casey B. Mulligan. “The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 729-58.
Black, Dan A., and Daniel S. Nagin. “Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?” The
Journal of Legal Studies 27 (1998): 209-19.
Block, M. K., and J. M. Heineke. “A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice.”
American Economic Review 65 (1975): 314-25.
Buonanno, Paolo. “Crime and Labor Market Opportunities in Italy (1993-2002).” Labour 20
(2006): 601-24.
Buonanno, Paolo, Milo Bianchi, and Paolo Pinotti. “Do Immigrants Cause Crime?" Journal of
European Economic Association (2011). Forthcoming.
Carpenter, Christoper, and Carlos Dobkin. “Alcohol Regulation and Crime.” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 15828. (2010).
Cavallo, Eduardo, Andrew Powel, and Oscar Becerra. “Estimating the Direct Economic
Damages of the Earthquake in Haiti.” Economic Journal 120 (2010): F298-312.
Cook, Philip. “The Technology of Personal Violence." Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of
Research 14 (1991): 1-71.
Cook, Philip J. and Jens Ludwig.Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive National Survey
on Firearms Ownership and Uses. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation,1997.
Cook, Philip J., Jens Ludwig, Sudhir A. Venkatesh, and Anthony A. Braga. “Underground Gun
Markets.” The Economic Journal 117 (2007): F558–F588.

86

Cook, Philip J., Stephanie Molliconi, and Thomas B. Cole. “Regulating Gun Markets." Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology 86 (1995): 59–92.
Corman, Hope, and Naci Mocan. “Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows.” Journal of Law and
Economics 48 (2005): 235-66.
Corman, Hope, and Naci Mocan. “A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug
Abuse in New York City.” The American Economic Review 90 (2000): 584-604.
Cornwell, Christopher, and William N. Trumbull. “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime
with Panel Data.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 76 (1994): 360-366.
Cullen, Julie B., and Steven D. Levitt. “Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities.”
The Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1999): 159-169.
Donohue III, John J., and Steven D. Levitt. “Guns, Violence, and the Efficiency of Illegal
Markets.” The American Economic Review 88 (1998): 463-467.
Edmark, Karin. “Unemployment and Crime: Is There a Connection?” Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 107 (2005): 353-373.
Ehrlich, Isaac. “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation.” Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973): 521-565.
Engelhardt, Bryan Eldon. “The Effect of Employment Frictions on Crime.” Journal of Labor
Economics 28 (2010): 677-718.
Ewing, Bradley T. and Jamie B. Kruse. “Hurricanes and Unemployment.” East Carolina
University Center for Natural Hazards Research Working Paper 0105-002, (2005).
Ewing, Bradley T., Jamie B. Kruse and Mark A. Thompson. “Twister! Employment Responses
to the 3 May 1999 Oklahoma City Tornado.” Applied Economics 41 (2009): 691-702.
Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza. “What Causes Violent Crime?” European
Economic Review 46 (2000): 1323-1357.
Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza. “Inequality and Violent Crime.” Journal
of Law and Economics 45 (2002): 1-40.
Fama, Eugene and James MacBeth. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests.” The
Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973): 607-636.
Freeman, Richard. B. “Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What
Might We Do About It?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (1995): 25-42.

87

Glaeser, Edward and Spencer Glendon. “Who Owns Guns? Criminals, Victims, and the Culture
of Violence.” The American Economic Review 88 (1998): 458-462.
Gould, Eric D., Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard. “Crime Rates and Local Labor
Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979-1997.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics 84 (2002): 45-61.
Grogger, Jeffrey. “Market Wages and Youth Crime.” Journal of Labor Economics 16 (1998):
756-791.
Grogger, Jeffrey. “The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and Earnings of Young Men.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 51-71.
Holden, Richard J., Donna Bahls, and Charles Real. “Estimating Economic Losses in the Bay
Area from a Magnitude-6.9 Earthquake.” Monthly Labor Review 130 (2007): 16-22.
Howsen Roy M., and Stephen Jarrell. “Transient Crowding and Crime: The More „Strangers‟ in
an Area, the More Crime Except for Murder, Assault and Rape.” American Journal of
Economics and Sociology 49 (1990): 483-494.
Howsen Roy M., and Stephen Jarrell. “Some Determinants of Property Crime: Economic Factors
Influence Criminal Behavior But Cannot Completely Explain the Syndrome.” American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 46 (1987): 445-457.
Kelly, Morgan. “Inequality and Crime.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2000): 530–
539.
LaGrange, Teresa C., and Robert A. Silverman. “Low Self-Control and Opportunity: Testing the
General Theory of Crime as an Explanation for Gender Differences in Delinquency.”
Criminology 37 (1999): 41-72.
Levantis, Theodore and Azmat Gani. “Tourism Demand and the Nuisance of Crime.”
International Journal of Social Economics 27 (2000): 959-967.
Levitt, Steven D. “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the
Decline and Six That Do Not.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (2004): 163-190.
Levitt, Steven D. “Juvenile Crime and Punishment.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998):
1156-1185.
Levitt, Steven D. “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on
Crime.” The American Economic Review 87(1997): 270-290.
Lin, Ming-Jen. “Does Democracy Increase Crime? The Evidence From International Data.”
Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007): 467-483.

88

Lin, Ming-Jen. “Does Unemployment Increase Crime? Evidence From U.S. data 1974–2000.”
Journal of Human Resources 43 (2008): 413–436.
Lochner, Lance. “Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach.” International
Economic Review 45 (2004): 811-843.
Lochner, Lance, and Enrico Moretti. “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence From Prison
Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports.” The American Economic Review 94 (2004): 155189.
Lott Jr., John R. “The Concealed-Handgun Debate.” Journal of Legal Studies 37 (1998a): 221243.
Lott Jr., John R. More Guns, Less Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998b.
Lott Jr., John R., and David B. Mustard. “Crime, Deterrence, and Right-To-Carry Concealed
Handguns.” The Journal of Legal Studies 26 (1997): 1-68.
Ludwig, Jens. “Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel
Data.” International Review of Law and Economics 18 (1998): 239-254.
Lyssiotou, Panayiota. “Dynamic Analysis of British Demand for Tourism Abroad,” Empirical
Economics 15 (2000): 421-436.
Machin, Stephen.,and Costas Meghir. “Crime and Economic Incentives.” The Journal of Human
Resources 39 (2004): 958-979.
McPheters, Lee and William Stronge. “Crime as an Environmental Externality of Tourism:
Miami, Florida.” Land Economics 50 (1974): 288-292.
Marcotte, Dave E., and Sarah Markowitz. “A Cure for Crime? Psycho-Pharmaceuticals and
Crime Trends.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.15354,
(2009).
Markowitz, Sarah. “Alcohol, Drugs and Violent Crime.” International Review of Law and
Economics 25 (2005): 20-44.
Miron, Jeffrey. “Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-country Analysis.” Journal of Law and
Economics 44 (2001), pp.615-633.
Mocan, Naci. “Structural Unemployment, Cyclical Unemployment and Income Inequality.” The
Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1999): 122-134.
Mocan, Naci and Daniel Rees. “Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime: Evidence
from Micro Data.” American Law and Economics Review 7 (2005): 319-349.

89

Mocan, Naci, Stephen C. Billups, and Jody Overland. “A Dynamic Model of Differential Human
Capital and Criminal Activity.” Economica 72 (2005): 655-681.
Mocan, Naci and Turan G. Bali. “Asymmetric Crime Cycles.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics. 92 (2010): 899-911.
Moody, Carlisle. “Testing for the Effects of Concealed Weapons Laws: Specification Errors and
Robustness.” Journal of Law and Economics 44 (2001): 799-813.
Moody, Carlisle and Thomas Marvell. “The Debate on Shall Issue Laws, Continued.” Econ
Journal Watch 6 (2009): 203-217.
Olson, David and Michael Malt. “Right-To-Carry Concealed Weapon Laws and Homicide in
Large U.S. Counties: The Effect on Weapon Types, Victim Characteristics, and VictimOffender Relationships.” Journal of Law and Economics 44 (2001): 747-70.
Oster, Anna. and Jonas Agell. “Crime and Unemployment in Turbulent Times.” Journal of the
European Economic Association 5 (2007): 752-775.
Pereira, Alvaro S. “The Opportunity of a Disaster: The Economic Impact of the 1755 Lisbon
Earthquake.” Journal of Economic History 69 (2009): 466-499.
Peri, Giovanni. “Socio-Cultural Variables and Economic Success: Evidence from Italian
Provinces.” B.E. Journals in Macroeconomics: Topics 4 (2004): article 12.
Polsby, Daniel D. “Firearms Costs, Firearms Benefits and the Limits of Knowledge” The Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 86 (1995): 207-220.
Raphael, Steven, and Raphael Winter-Ebmer. “Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on
Crime.” Journal of Law and Economics 44 (2001): 259-283.
Richardson, Robert B., and John B. Loomis. “Adaptive Recreation Planning and Climate
Change: A Contingent Visitation Approach.” Ecological Economics 50 (2004): 83-99.
Rincke Johannes, and Christian Traxler. “Enforcement Spillovers,” The Review of Economics
and Statistics (Forthcoming). doi:10.1162/REST_a_00128.
Rubin, Paul and Hashem Dezhbakhsh. “The Effect of Concealed Handgun Laws on Crime:
Beyond the Dummy Variables.” International Review of Law and Economics 23 (2003):
199–216.
Ruhm, Christopher J. “Economic Conditions and Alcohol Problems.” Journal of Health
Economics 14 (1995): 583-603.
Siegfried, John and Andrew Zimbalist. “The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their
Communities." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000): 95-114.
90

Soares, Rodrigo R. “Development, Crime and Punishment: Accounting for the International
Differences in Crime Rates.” Journal of Development Economics 73 (2004): pp.155-184.
Varano, Sean, Joseph Schafer, Jeffrey Cancino, Scott Decker, and Jack Greene. “A Tale of Three
Cities: Crime and Displacement After Hurricane Katrina.” Journal of Criminal Justice 38
(2010): 42-50.
Williams, Jenny and Robin Sickles. “An Analysis of the Crime as Work Model: Evidence from
the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study.” Journal of Human Resources 37 (2002): 479509.
Witte, Ann D. “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 94 (1980): 57-84.
Wolpin, Kenneth I. “A Time Series-Cross Section Analysis of International Variation in Crime
and Punishment.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 62 (1980): 417-423.

91

APPENDIX
STATES’ CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS
State

Shall-Issue State?

Minimum Age
Requirement

AlabamaA

Yes

18

AlaskaB

Yes

21

Arizona

Since 1995

21

Arkansas

Since 1996

21

CaliforniaC

No

21

Colorado

Since 2004

21

Connecticut

Since prior to 1970

21

Delaware

No

21

District of
ColumbiaD

No

21

Florida

Since 1988

21

Georgia

Since 1990

21

Source

Reference

Alabama Code
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-530013A-11-76
5/atf-p-5300-5-alabama.pdf
Alaska Statues
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-530011.61.1905/atf-p-5300-5-alaska.pdf
11.61.220
Arizona
http://www.azdps.gov/Services/Concealed_Weapons/Permi
Department of
ts/Obtain/
Public Safety
Arkansas Statue http://www.asp.arkansas.gov/divisions/rs/pdf/CHCL%20sta
5-73-309
tutes_effective%20073107_010109.pdf
See the note C
http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/dwcl/index.php
below
Colorado Statue
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-530018-12-203
5/atf-p-5300-5-colorado.pdf
General Status of
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300Connecticut 295/atf-p-5300-5-connecticut.pdf
36f
Delaware Code,
law 1441 in
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title11/c005/sc07/index.shtml
Chapter 5 of Title
11
Code of DC
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300numbered 75/atf-p-5300-5-district_of_columbia.pdf
2502.03
Florida Statue
http://www.flsenate.gov/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Di
790.06
splay_Statute&URL=Ch0790/ch0790.htm
Georgia Code 16http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-530011-129
5/atf-p-5300-5-georgia.pdf
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Appendix continued
State

Shall-Issue State?

Minimum Age
Requirement

Source

Reference

Idaho

Since 1991

21

Idaho Statue 183302

IllinoisE

No

21

See note E below

http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title18/T18CH33S
ECT18-3302.htm
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1657
&ChapAct=430%26nbsp;ILCS%26nbsp;65/&ChapterID=3
9&ChapterName=PUBLIC%2BSAFETY&ActName=Firea
rm%2BOwners%2BIdentification%2BCard%2BAct

Indiana

Since 1981

18

Iowa

No

21

Kansas

Since 2007

21

Kentucky

Since 1997

21

Louisiana

Since 1997

21

Maine

Since 1986

18

MarylandF

No

21

Massachusetts

No

21

Michigan

Since 2002

21

Minnesota

Since 2004

21

Indiana Code 3547-2-3
Iowa Code
724.15
Kansas Code 757c04
Kentucky Statue
237.11
Louisiana State
Police Public
Safety Services
Maine Revised
Statues
Annotated 252003
Maryland State
Statue 5–133
Massachusetts
Gun Control Act
of 1998
Michigan
Compiled Law
28.422
Minnesota Statue
624.714
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http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title35/ar47/ch2.html
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-53005/atf-p-5300-5-iowa.pdf
http://www.ksag.org/files/2010_Summary_SB306__Website2.pdf
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/KRS/237-00/110.PDF
http://www.lsp.org/handguns.html
http://www.maine.gov/dps/msp/licenses/documents/Weapo
ns/CFP%20Booklet.pdf
http://mlis.state.md.us/asp/web_statutes_2011.asp?gps&5133
http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dfw/education/hed/hed_gun_l
aws.htm
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-53005/atf-p-5300-5-michigan.pdf
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bin/getpub.php?pubtype=STA
T_CHAP_SEC&year=current&section=624.714

Appendix continued
State

Shall-Issue State?

Minimum Age
Requirement

Mississippi

Since 1991

21

Missouri

Since 2004

23

Montana

Since 1992

18

Nebraska

Since 2007

21

Nevada

Since 1996

21

New
HampshireG

Since prior to 1970

18

New Jersey

No

18

New Mexico

Since 2004

21

New York

No

21

North
Carolina

Since 1996

21

North Dakota

Since prior to 1970

18

Ohio

Since 2005

21

Oklahoma

Since 1996

21

Source
Mississippi Code
45-9-101
Missouri Statue
571.101.1
Montana Statue
45-8-321
Revised Statue
69-2433
Nevada Statue
202.3657
See note G below
Administrative
Code 13:54-2.3
of New Jersey
New Mexico
Department of
Public Safety
New York
Consolidated
Law 400.00
North Carolina
General Statue
14-415.12
North Dakota
Attorney General
Ohio Code
2923.125
Oklahoma Statue
21.1290.9
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Reference
http://www.mscode.com/free/statutes/45/009/0101.htm
http://www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/c500599/5710000101.htm
http://www.mtssa.org/mtlaws.phtml?code=45-8315+M.C.A.
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=692433
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-53005/atf-p-5300-5-nevada.pdf
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-53005/atf-p-5300-5-new_hampshire.pdf
www.njsp.org/info/pdf/firearms/njac-title13-ch54.pdf
http://www.dps.nm.org/lawEnforcement/ccw/index.php
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-53005/atf-p-5300-5-new_york.pdf
http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/B
yChapter/Chapter_14.html
http://www.ag.state.nd.us/BCI/CW/ObtainPermit.htm
http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2923.125
http://www.oscn.net/applications/OCISWeb/DeliverDocum
ent.asp?CiteID=69792
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State

Shall-Issue State?

Minimum Age
Requirement

Source

Reference

Oregon

Since 1991

21

Oregon Statue
166.291

http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/166.html

Pennsylvania

Since 1990

21

Pennsylvania
State Police

Rhode Island

No

21

South
Carolina

Since prior to 1970

21

South Dakota

Since prior to 1970

18

Tennessee

Since 1995

21

Texas

Since 1996

21

Utah

Since 1996

21

VermontH

Since prior to 1970

18

Virginia

Since 1989

21

Washington

Since prior to 1970

21

West Virginia

Since 1990

18

http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=512&o
bjID=4451&&PageID=462424&level=2&css=L2&mode=
2
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/Title11/11-47/11-4718.HTM

Rhode Island
statue 11-47-48
South Carolina
Code of Laws 23http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t23c031.htm
31-215
South Dakota
http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Statute=
Codified Law 2323-7-7.1&Type=Statute
7-7.1
http://www.michie.com/tennessee/lpext.dll/tncode/1191f/1
Tennessee Statue
234d/126a5/1274a?f=templates&fn=document39-17-1351
frame.htm&2.0#JD_39-17-1351
Government
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/GV/htm/GV.411.
Code of Texas
htm#411.172
411.172
Utah Code 53-5http://le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE53/htm/53_05_070400.htm
704
See Note H
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullsection.cfm?Title=13
below
&Chapter=085&Section=04008
Code of Virginia http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+18.218.2-308
308
Washington‟s
Revised Code
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9.41.070
9.41.070
West Virginia
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/WVCODE/Code.cfm?chap=6
Code 61-7-4
1&art=7#07
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Appendix continued
State

Shall-Issue State?

Minimum Age
Requirement

Source

WisconsinI

No

18

See note I below

Wyoming

Since 1995

21

Wyoming Statue
6-8-104

Reference
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/atf-p-53005/atf-p-5300-5-wisconsin.pdf
http://attorneygeneral.state.wy.us/dci/pdf/6-8104With2010Aammendment.pdf

Notes to Appendix:
A
Alabama is considered a shall-issue state by Ayres and Donohue (2009) although it is a may-issue state by its law (Alabama Code 13A-11-75).
B
Alaska is originally an unrestricted state. However, since 1995, it also issues licenses to individuals who demand one.
C
California is a may-issue state and some argue that it is a de facto no-issue state. The Concealed Weapon Law of California does not state a minimum required
age for the eligibility to obtain a license. The law and the standardized application documents (http://www.lasd.org/contact_us/inquiry/gen_pub_ccw_app.pdf)
for a concealed weapon actually discourage individuals from applying. For example, it is explicitly stated that carrying a concealed gun is not a right, but a
privilege. Therefore, to be consistent with the de facto conditions, age 21 is used as the minimum age requirement in the empirical analysis.
D
Because there is no concealed carry law in DC, the minimum age to register a gun is used in the empirical analysis for minimum age requirement. According to
the Code of DC numbered 7-2502.03, no individual who is younger than 21years of age can register a gun.
E
Since Illinois is a no- issue state, the minimum age requirement for owning a gun is used in the empirical analysis. All individuals who own a firearm must
have a Firearm Owner‟s Identification Card. According to Illinois Compiled Statue 65/4 all applicants to Firearm Owner‟s Identification Card must be 21 years
old or older.
F
The Maryland state Statue 5–133 does not allow individuals below 21 years of age to possess a handgun.
G
In the state‟s Statues there is no age restriction listed. Therefore, the Federal minimum age requirement of 18 years is used in the empirical analysis.
H
Vermont is an unrestricted state. Therefore, it is considered to be a shall-issue state in the empirical analysis. Since the state does not have a concealed weapon
law, the minimum age requirement for possession is used in the empirical analysis. According to the Vermont Statue Ch. 85 13-4008, only children under the age
of 16 are considered to be delinquent if they possess a gun or have a gun in their control
(http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullsection.cfm?Title=13&Chapter=085&Section=04008). This implies that the minimum age required to possess a gun is 16.
However, the US Code Section 922 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00000922----000-.html) indicates that possession of firearm by an
individual younger than 18 is unlawful. For this reason, age 18 is used in the empirical analysis as the minimum required age in Vermont.
I
Wisconsin is a no-issue state. Because of the lack of a concealed weapon law in Wisconsin the minimum age requirement regarding the possession of a firearm
is used in the empirical analysis. According to the Wisconsin Statue 948.60 any individual younger than 18 years old cannot possess a firearm.
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